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SUMMARY 
 
Incidents, threats and vulnerabilities have the potential to negatively affect an 
organisation’s assets. Information on these incidents, threats and vulnerabilities are 
important to security. It is therefore necessary for this security information to be 
effectively and efficiently managed, so that correct decisions may be made on the 
implementation of security risk control measures. This study explored the 
management of security information in the security industry by undertaking the 
following: 
• establishing the “status quo” of the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of security risk control measures in 
practice; 
• identifying the nature and extent of problems experienced in the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures; and the 
•  discovery of a new Security Information Management Model (SIMM).  
 
Mixed methods research was used to study the management of security information 
in the security industry. The explorative research design was used for this purpose. 
Semi-structured and focus group interviews were conducted with senior security 
managers and operational security officers, respectively. The grounded theory 
research design was used to analyse the qualitative data in order to generate a 
substantive grounded theory. The theory is that security officers operate without a 
standardised framework to manage security information.  
 
The data from the semi-structured and the focus group interviews were used to 
design a questionnaire to conduct a survey using the quantitative approach. The 
non-experimental research design was used to conduct this self-administered 
questionnaire survey. The data from this questionnaire survey helped validate and 
confirm the substantive grounded theory. The study found that there was the need 
for a Security Information Management Model to manage security information in the 
security industry. Based on this finding the researcher recommended a new Security 
vi 
Information Management Model for the management of security information in the 
security industry. 
 
Key terms 
 
Security Industry; Security information; Threat; Vulnerability; Incident; Collection of 
security information; Analysis of security information; Implementation of security risk 
control measures, Sharing of information, Information protection.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade-and-half private security officials in South Africa have 
developed and increased their skills and body of knowledge. Some of this 
development has been necessitated by the increasing use of new (security) 
technologies and equipment and growing managerial sophistication within this 
specialised field of expertise (Minnaar, 2005: 85). Many of them have been 
employed as security officials at various government departments, i.e. not confined 
to the ‘private’ security sector. They safeguard and protect government assets just 
as in the private sector (Irish, 1999: 1-7). Owing to the aforementioned, the 
researcher decided to use the concept ‘security service providers’, rather than 
‘private’ security service providers as the collective descriptive term of the target 
research population in this study.  
 
Private security service providers commonly use security risk management 
processes to identify risks in organisations (Fisher, Halibozek & Green, 2008: 148). 
Based on the analysis of risks, security risk control measures are often designed to 
either overprotect a non-essential component or fail to adequately protect a vital 
portion of a facility. This misalignment is due to a lack of understanding of what is 
being protected and the surrounding environment. It is absolutely essential that a 
facility (site being protected) be fully understood in term of its constraints, expected 
performance, operations and the circumstances in which the facility exists. Garcia 
(2001: 15), calls this, the “characterisation of a facility”. When characterising a 
facility, security information is collected on many different aspects of the facility and 
then reviewed and analysed.  
 
The term ‘security information’ relates to information on incidents, threats and 
vulnerabilities which has the potential to adversely affect an organisation’s assets 
(Fischer et al., 2008: 149). Incident based information can be anything from an 
accident, anecdote (bird flies into a camera), violation of law or violation of company 
2 
policy (Opolot, 1999: 6-7). Threat information includes information on criminals, 
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, commercial or industrial competitors and 
people with malicious intent (to harm the organisation). Information on vulnerabilities 
is emphasised in specific security control measures, projected through people 
assets, information assets, physical assets/information and communication 
technology (ICT) (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 32-35).  
 
This study explored the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures in the security industry of the 
Gauteng province in South Africa.  
 
This chapter introduces and provides the motivation for the study. It discusses the 
rationale for the study, problem statement, research questions, research goal, 
research objectives, definitions of concepts and the outline of the thesis.  
 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
In 2002, Ernest and Young’s Global Information Security Company (GISC) from the 
United States (US) conducted a survey on information management at companies 
worldwide. The survey showed alarming gaps in their critical systems and data 
(Johnson, 2005: 331). The survey found that, of the companies surveyed:  
• many do not conduct workplace investigations;  
• some do not have security information strategies; 
• personnel lack security information training; and 
• there were no standard operating procedures relating to security 
information management (Johnson, 2005: 331).  
 
According to Clark (2010: 1-4), the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 
identified many failures. Some of the common failures include:  
• failure to share security information;  
• failure to analyse security information; and  
• failure to act on the information.  
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Focus group interviews1 for this study indicated that many security service providers 
do not have:  
• awareness programmes on security information at their facilities;  
• security information collection units; 
• security plans for the collection of security information;  
• policy for security information management; and  
• standard operating procedures (SOP). 
 
1.2.1 Create awareness on the importance of security information  
 
More needs to be done towards creating awareness on the importance of security 
information in reducing crime, increasing detection rates and preventing losses 
(Garcia, 2008: xvii). If all employees are contractually made aware of their role and 
responsibilities towards security information, they can be held accountable for any 
breach of security. Security service providers need to create awareness among all 
personnel and their clients on the importance of security information (Van Rooyen, 
2008: 2). People should be made aware that information can come from a myriad of 
sources both internal and external of the organisation. It can be collected overtly or 
covertly, using different collection techniques. Information is available on everyone 
and everything. One just needs to know where to find it and how to find it. 
Information should be seen as the lifeblood of any organisational activity (Van 
Rooyen, 2008: 95). In the Western Australian (WA) casino industry, the collection of 
security information is everyone’s responsibility. An information awareness culture is 
created by the distribution of pamphlets, holding awareness workshops and using a 
common code of conduct for all employees at the Casino. LCD television screens 
are also used to encourage the general public to provide information to specific 
control points (Interview no 23).  
 
1.2.2  Intensify the collection of security information  
 
Once the threat or vulnerability has been defined, then the planning of the collection 
of security information starts. Collection of the required security information will have 
                                                          
1 Focus group interviews held on 10 April 2010 with security service employees from Gauteng at the 
University of South Africa. 
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to be intensified. Collectors will be tasked to collect the relevant security information. 
The collectors will have to ask questions of sources with knowledge of the defined 
threat or vulnerability (Clark, 2010: 10). The collection of the raw information is an 
important function in the entire security information management process. It requires 
understanding, knowledge, skills and courage. If adequate and proper information is 
not lawfully collected, the security information management process cannot be 
successful (Peterson, 1994: 270).  
 
A total of 387 273 (registered with the Private Security Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) 
as active) security officers are currently employed in the Republic of South Africa. Of 
this total, approximately 151 991 work in the province of Gauteng. In comparison 
there are about 160 000 operational police officers employed in the Republic of 
South Africa. This equates to an approximate ratio of one 1 police officer for every 
three 3 security officers privately employed and/or on contract (PSIRA, 2012). This 
large number of serving personnel in the security industry can help intensify and 
grow the security information collection capacity.  
 
1.2.3  Promote the sharing of security information 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides for Community Police 
Forums (CPFs) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). The 
CPFs are used by both the community and the police to share incident based 
information on crime tendencies and patterns. Security Managers have a 
responsibility to become part of CPFs in order to share information on crime 
incidents and threats. The South African Police Service shares crime information on 
incidents and threats with private security service providers on a need-to-know basis 
(Abrie, 2008: 22). In terms of section 3 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 
39 of 1994, crime intelligence may be provided to the SAPS in support of the SAPS’ 
policing function in terms of section 205 (3) of the Constitution.  
 
On 22 May 2007, in his departmental budget speech, the South African Minister of 
Safety and Security, Mr Charles Ngukala, announced that the private security 
industry had been drawn into partnership with the SAPS in the fight against crime. 
He indicated that talks between the police and private security had been initiated on 
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“partnership policing”. The Minister stated that a partnership between private security 
and the SAPS would be based on information sharing. He called for the “alignment 
of Private Security with SAPS operations”. He also stated that private security should 
make a start in enhancing their own information-gathering and sharing capabilities. 
Collected information should be directly shared with SAPS. On 15 November 2011, 
this statement was endorsed by the new Minister of Police,2 Mr Nathi Mthethwa, at 
the 2011 Annual Conference of the South African Security Industry Alliance (SIA). 
He also stated that an ongoing review and measurement of crime statistics during 
2010/2011 indicated a decline in both Cash-in-Transit heists and the cash loss as a 
result of these heists. He acknowledged that some of these successes were 
achieved through the contribution of the private security industry.  
 
Constitutionally, SAPS is the custodian of all crime information and crime 
intelligence. Private security service providers have a legal obligation to share crime 
information on threats and incidents with SAPS. Security information related to 
vulnerabilities and incidents of policy violations may be managed by individual 
private security service providers.  
 
Specific security information management companies which operate under the 
auspices of Business Against Crime (BAC) share information with SAPS. They 
include companies such as the: 
• South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC); 
• Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI); and  
• Consumer Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI) of the Consumer Goods Council of 
South Africa (CGCSA).  
 
However, this is limited to crime incident information, strategies and actionable crime 
information products. Information on vulnerabilities is managed by individual private 
security service providers (Maree, 2010). 
 
                                                          
2 Ministry renamed in October 2010. 
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Working relationships and trust need to be established among security personnel 
and between law enforcement and security service providers. This will help promote 
the sharing of security information (Nemeth, 2010: 89-90).  
 
1.2.4 Encourage workplace investigations 
 
In two High Court cases (of the Witwatersrand and Natal divisions) the Judges 
expressed their acceptance that workplace investigations can occur [See State vs 
Botha and others (1) 1995 (2) SACR 598 (W); and State vs Dube 2000 (1) SACR 53 
(N)]. In State vs Dube 2000 (1) SACR 53 (N), a private investigator set a trap for an 
employee of a vehicle manufacturer who was suspected of being involved in thefts. 
The investigator arranged for meetings and negotiations with the suspect to be 
photographed and tape-recorded. The court found that the private investigator acted 
within the law. In State vs Botha and others (1) 1995 (2) SACR 598 (W), the court 
ruled that it had not been improper for a corporation’s internal investigation unit to 
conduct an internal investigation (in this particular case in regard to the alleged 
defrauding of its pension fund). The court referred to the fact that various institutions 
conduct their own investigations and then hand the evidence over to the police for 
further action and possible criminal prosecution. This development has created new 
opportunities for all investigators whether in private, business (corporate) or 
government service. All indications are that the scope will increase.  
 
Workplace investigations will include the investigation of all crimes, security 
breaches and policy violations as determined by management. The Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Act, No. 56 of 2001 provides for the functions of an investigator 
in the security service. 
 
A workplace investigation is undertaken to establish whether an act, intention to act 
or omission may be labelled a crime or a policy violation (Newburn, Williamson & 
Wright, 2008: 426). There are two broad categories of investigation processes; 
reactive and proactive investigations. Reactive investigations are a traditional style of 
investigation. It includes the collection of information in search for evidence of a 
crime or irregularity. The primary focus is on identifying the perpetrators. This style of 
investigation requires the preservation and examination of the crime scene and the 
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search for witnesses. It also includes the evaluation of the collected information and 
the analysis thereof (Newburn et al., 2008: 426-427). 
 
Proactive investigation on the other hand is common to workplace investigators. 
Here the attention is on the perpetrators rather than the crime or the policy violation. 
The focus is on collecting information by making use of informers, surveillance and 
undercover operations. This style of investigation is focussed on the recovery of the 
financial benefits of crime or irregularities (Newburn et al., 2008: 427). Information 
collected during workplace investigations will enlighten management on the extent of 
unlawful activities and misconduct in their organisation.  
 
1.2.5   Encourage the analysis of security information  
 
According to Gottlieb, Arenberg & Singh (1994: 140), the analysis of crime to identify 
suspects, crime patterns, etc. can be traced back to the 19th century. Analysis can 
be done manually or through the use of computer systems (Reuland, 1997: 12). 
Block, Dabdoub & Fregly (1995: xiii), argue that the change from manual analysis to 
automated processing is important. It supplements the expertise of an experienced 
official. It is also because the knowledge and techniques accumulated over the years 
do not retire with a veteran official. They are there for others to build on.  
 
Analysis entails analysing the exact nature of the problem and the characteristics of 
the incidents. Important factors to consider include where the incidents are occurring, 
at what times, who is involved, how and why the problem is occurring and what 
solutions have been tried in the past. By determining the underlying causes of the 
problem through the collection of detailed information, more effective strategies can 
be developed. Such information can come from the police, outside agencies, experts 
and from the community itself and even from those offenders involved in the problem 
(Block, Dabdoub & Fregly, 1995: 3). If information is incomplete or inaccurate, then 
any subsequent analysis will be unreliable (Ainsworth, 2001: 59).  
 
There are four types of analysis most often used by law enforcement analysts. They 
include crime analysis, intelligence analysis, operations analysis and investigative 
analysis. Crime information plays a significant role in producing intelligence through 
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the systematic collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and dissemination of 
information on criminals, especially related to their associations and their 
identification with criminal activity of an organised nature (Gottlieb et al., 1994: 27). 
 
Computerised techniques are used by qualified analysts for the analysis and 
evaluation of collected security information. These qualified analysts use these 
techniques to identify system deficiencies, evaluate improvements and perform cost-
versus-effectiveness comparisons. This will assist the security service provider to 
implement well researched physical protection systems, strategies and/or actionable 
information products in line with the latest security trends. The computerised analysis 
capability will help in providing accurate analysis results. The use of accurate 
computerised analysis results to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent 
losses is not unique to modern times (Garcia, 2008: 8-9).  
 
1.2.6  Investigate the development of a Security Information Management 
Model (SIMM) 
 
Advances in information management in law enforcement during the 1970’s gave 
rise to modern intelligence practices for law enforcement. The Chiefs of Police from 
England and Wales in the Baumber Report, made it clear that, “intelligence” has to 
be understood as something more than simply information. It was also noted that 
“intelligence” as a modern police concept required that all collected information be 
put together with others and that intelligence analysis be performed in order to 
produce intelligence. Intelligence has since been accepted in law enforcement as the 
end product of a process often complex, sometimes physical, and always 
intellectual, derived from information that has been collated, analysed and evaluated 
in order to prevent crime or secure the apprehension of offenders (Newburn et al., 
2008: 32). 
 
‘Intelligence-led policing’ (also known as ‘intelligence-driven policing’), had its origins 
in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1990s, when traditional reactive methods of 
policing failed to cope with the rapid changes in globalisation, which had increased 
opportunities for transnational organised crime. The UK, National Intelligence Model 
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(NIM) used four elements as its tactical tasking in the implementation of intelligence-
led policing. These elements focus on: 
• targeting offenders (especially targeting of active criminals through overt and 
covert means) 
• management of crime and disorder hotspots; 
• investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents; and the 
• application of preventative measures,including working with local partnerships 
to reduce crime and disorder. 
 
The spotlight was to target the criminal and not the crime. This is because research 
has shown that a small percentage of repeat offenders (recidivists), commit a large 
amount of crime [National Crime Intelligence Service (NCIS), 2000: 14].  
 
In the late 1990s intelligence-led policing was implemented in Australia, driven by a 
number of police commissioners. The local adoption included a new accountability 
structure at a local level, a greater integration of intelligence and investigation, and 
improved targeting of daily police efforts through intelligence dissemination (Ratcliffe, 
2003: 1). 
 
Intelligence is a process, incorporating a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, 
collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback, prior to the next or refined task. This 
intelligence process is responsible for the generation of an actionable threat analysis 
product, which is designed to shape the thinking of the decision makers (Ratcliffe, 
2009: 92). 
 
The production of intelligence in intelligence-led policing has different stages: this 
includes direction to collect intelligence, evaluation, collation, analysis, 
dissemination and feedback. These form part of the intelligence cycle with a 
regular flow, whereby disseminated intelligence triggers operational responses which 
in turn produce new information to be fed back to the intelligence unit for new 
analysis and so on (Newburn et al., 2008: 203 and Ratcliffe, 2009: 105).  
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In practice intelligence led-policing involves the collecting of information about crime 
and disorder problems and using a problem-oriented policing approach to analyse 
the information and apply reductive interventions. The strength of intelligence-led 
policing as a means of collecting, storing and analysing information is in the use of 
computerised techniques and software that enables large amounts of data to be 
collected, stored and analysed and minute detail on written or visual data that might 
be invisible or not decipherable to the human eye. Computer software plays a vital 
role, as it enables accurate links to be made between many different pieces of 
information or incidents that, when considered in isolation might not appear serious 
or relevant but when linked together might reveal a more serious crime and disorder 
problem (NCIS, 2000: 14)  
 
According to Clark (2010: 260-261), a Security Risk Management Cycle (SRMC) is 
commonly used by security service providers as mandated by management. This 
cycle begins with the security risk manager identifying the assets to be protected. 
The risks associated with the asset are prioritised. It is followed by the analysis of the 
effects of the risks according to probability, impact and frequency. This results in the 
identification of alternative actions to reduce the risks.  
 
During the period 1995-1997, the Programme Group: Security Management at the 
Technikon South Africa (TSA)3 developed a Security Risk Management Model 
(SRMM) for their National Diploma in Security Management and for the newly 
instituted (1999) BTech degree in Security Risk Management. This Security Risk 
Management Model which specifically addresses crime risks was built on the work of 
other practitioners and customised to the security industry. It has since been applied 
by security risk managers within the South African environment. This model is based 
on the following steps: 
• identification of the problem of security (crime risks); 
• studying the policy of the organisation and obtaining a mandate; 
• conducting an orientation exercise; 
• undertaking a risk analysis exercise; 
                                                          
3  In January 2004 the TSA merged with the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the Programme 
Group became the Department of Security Risk Management which in January 2009 merged with 
Criminology to become The Department of Criminology & Security Science.  
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• conducting a security survey; 
• doing a return on investment exercise to implement security risk control 
measures; and  
• submitting a crime risk management report to top management of the 
company for a decision on the implementation of security measures  
(Rogers, 2008: 151-154). 
 
The SRMM was further adapted to the residential security environment with an 
additional step namely ‘maintenance and upgrade’ (Olckers, 2007: 103). Kole (2010: 
20), further adapted the SRMM with the addition of another step, namely ‘service 
level agreements’ which emanated from his masters research study on the 
protection of petrol stations.  
The SRMM is only implemented on approval and request by security management 
(Rogers, 2008: 151-154). Security risks are then identified using the SRMM if the 
need arises or if the financial situation warrants such an exercise (Kole, 2010: 16).  
A greater awareness of organised criminal activity in the world has led to the growth 
in uncertainty and risks confronting security service providers. Garcia (2006: 2-6), 
feels that reducing crime, increasing detection rates and preventing losses in 
organisations need effective and efficient security information management 
practices. Currently security information management is largely done on an ad hoc, 
situation or individual organisation basis and in a fragmented manner without any 
standardisation. There is an obvious need, not only nationally but also 
internationally, for the standardisation of the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of physical protection systems, strategies and/or 
actionable information products (Nemeth, 2010: 87).  
 
At agency level information in the law enforcement sphere is collected, analysed and 
implemented in a logical and structured manner using a crime information 
management model. Different types of analysis products are produced using the 
techniques of crime analysis, intelligence analysis, operations analysis and 
investigative analysis. Taking into consideration the advances made in information 
management and the different advantages derived from the systematic management 
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of crime information, the researcher is of the view that a security information 
management model will help the security industry to reduce crime, increase 
detection rates and prevent losses just as it assisted law enforcement. For this to be 
successful security information management should be standardised and regulated 
in the security industry (Newburn et al., 2008: 204; Reuland, 1997: 7).  
 
Upon taking into consideration the abovementioned intelligence/information 
management approaches, this study identified a Security Information Management 
Model (SIMM), for the management of security information in the security industry. 
Hopefully, it will serve as a standardised framework for the security industry in 
Gauteng, South Africa (refer to Paragraph 7.3). 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
An issue of concern that needs to be addressed in this study is the collection, and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures in the security industry.  
 
The collection of security information by security service providers in Gauteng is not 
guided by a strategic plan, organisational security strategy, security plan or a 
collection plan. This results in the wastage of human resources and technology to 
collect security information which is not need by the client. According to Garcia 
(2006: 1) and Garcia (2008: 26), a security plan should be used to define threats and 
vulnerabilities. This should direct the collection of information on the potential 
threats, vulnerabilities and incidents related to the threat.  
 
In the absence of a culture of information awareness, no specific effort is made by 
security officials to collect security information on specific matters within a specific 
context to address a specific threat. The flow of security information is not 
continuous. Security service providers gain some understanding of the state of 
security of the assets they protect through formal and informal sources of 
information. These sources include customer contacts, incidents at the workplace 
and information collected using human and technical means. Information from these 
sources is not always comprehensive in nature. The information may sometimes be 
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tacitly affected by the source’s own perception, knowledge, and other psychological 
factors. They are often forms of fragmented information that provides an inaccurate 
picture of the state or status of security. A security service provider can gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the current state of security and its deficiencies by 
means of security information management. Security information management will 
ensure that all incidents, threats and vulnerabilities are managed according to 
organisational standards and objectives (Johnson, 2005: 335). It is important that all 
the employees, security officials and clients of the organisation get involved in the 
collection of security information. The collection of security information in the security 
industry does not seem to be part of the organisational culture.  
 
The analysis function in the security industry is mostly left in the hands of security 
personnel. According to Garcia (2006: 1), for the sake of accuracy, reliability and 
validity analysts should be employed to organise the information into a threat 
assessment,4 vulnerability assessment and incident pattern analysis documents,5 so 
that it becomes usable as guiding instruments. Vulnerability assessment has been 
used by the United States Department of State for more than thirty years. Crime 
Pattern Analysis (CPA), consisting of all crime incident information, helps acquaint 
officers with the types of crimes being committed. CPA lists the days, times and 
location of a crime’s occurrence. It provides officers with information on any known 
suspects, suspect vehicle, modus operandi and lost property (Gottlieb et al., 1994: 
138).6  
 
Analysed results should be directed at addressing specific threats or vulnerabilities 
according to the organisational security strategy. According to Johnson (2005: 334), 
collected security information should be analysed timeously and security risk control 
measures should be implemented as soon as the threat or vulnerability analysis 
result is known. The security risk control measures may take the form of physical 
protection systems, strategies and actionable crime information products (Fischer et 
al., 2008: 173).  
                                                          
4  Threat assessment is used by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Western Australian 
Police (WAP) (refer to paragraphs 5.3.1 & 5.5). 
5  Incident registers for all incidents pertaining to violation of company policy is utilised by the WAP   
(refer to Paragraph 5. 5). 
6 CPA is used by SAPS, refer to Paragraph 5.3.1). 
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This study explored the existing practices carried out by security service providers 
regarding the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation 
of security risk control measures. The study identified problems in the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures. Neither a strategic plan nor a security plan is used to manage the threats 
confronting the organisation being protected. A collection plan is not used for the 
collection of security information. An organisational security strategy is not 
considered in the implementation of security risk control measures. Many Security 
Service Providers have been doing informal collection, analysis and the 
implementation of security risk control measures for many years. However, they still 
do not have a standardised framework to guide them in this regard. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following research questions were applied in this research:  
• What is the “status quo” of the collection and analysis of security information and 
the implementation of security risk control measures in practice? 
• What is the nature and extent of problems experienced in the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures?  
• Which solutions should be implemented to address the problems experienced in 
the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures?  
 
The research questions specify exactly what the researcher studied (security 
information). It clearly indicates on what the researcher wanted to focus on 
(collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security 
risk control measures). The research questions were applied to establish the status 
quo of the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. To also identify the nature and extent of problems 
experienced by security officials and to find solutions to address the problems.  
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1.5 RESEARCH GOAL  
 
Based on the problem statement and research questions there was a need to 
explore the management of security information in the security industry. 
 
1.5.1 Research objectives 
 
This study explored the management of security information in the security industry 
by undertaking the following: 
• establishing the ‘status quo’ of the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures in practice; 
• identifying the nature and extent of problems experienced in the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures; and the 
• discovery of a new Security Information Management Model (SIMM).  
 
1.6 DEFINITIONS  
 
In exploring a complex operational phenomenon, such as the ‘Security Information 
Management’, it is important to begin by developing an understanding of the various 
relevant concepts.  
 
1.6.1 Private Security  
 
Private security refers to those efforts by individuals and organisations to 
protect their assets from loss, harm or reduction in value, due to threats. These 
assets may include people, fixed and immovable property, business rights, 
information, company image, operational strategies, contracts, agreements and 
policy (Bosch, 1999: 4).  
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1.6.2  Security service 
 
“Security service” means one or more of the following services or activities:  
• protecting or safeguarding a person or property in any manner; 
• providing a reactive response service in connection with the safeguarding 
of a person or property in any manner; 
• giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of a person or property or 
the use of security equipment; 
• providing a service aimed at ensuring order and safety on premises used 
for sporting, recreational, entertainment or similar purposes; 
• manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of monitoring devices 
contemplated in Section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition 
Act, No. 127 of 1992; 
• providing services related to the functions of an investigator; 
• providing security training or instruction to a security service provider or 
prospective service provider; 
• monitoring signals or transmissions from electronic security equipment; 
• installing, servicing or repairing security equipment; 
• performing the functions of a locksmith; and 
• managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of any of the above 
services [Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, No. 56 of 2001: Section 
1 (1)].  
 
1.6.3  Security officer  
 
“In terms of Section 1 (1) security officer means any natural person” who is 
employed by another person, including an organ or department of the State and 
who receives or is entitled to receive from such other person any remuneration, 
reward, fee or benefit, for rendering one or more security services” (Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Act, No. 56 of 2001).  
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1.6.4 Security 
 
“Security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or 
group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of disturbance 
or injury” (Fischer et al., 2008: 31).  
 
1.6.5 Management 
 
Management may be defined as the process of planning, organising, leading and 
controlling the resources of an organisation to achieve the stated organisational 
goals as productively as possible (Smit & Cronje, 2002: 9). 
  
1.6.6 Risk  
 
According to Le Roux (2004: 19), risk is defined as the chance or likelihood of an 
undesirable event occurring and causing harm or loss. The key element of risk here 
is uncertainty, without which there is no risk.  
 
1.6.7  Risk analysis 
 
Addison (2002: 2), describes risk analysis as a form of security assessment. It 
focuses on the process of identifying the risks and their causes. It determines the 
consequences of the risks and their causes. It calculates the probability and impact 
of their occurrences.  
 
1.6.8  Information 
 
Information relates to any information, which you can hear (directly or indirectly), 
taste, smell, read, touch or see. It also includes rumours and so called “stories” (Van 
Rooyen, 2008: 218).  
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1.6.9 Security information 
 
“Security information may be defined as any information on incidents, threats or 
vulnerabilities which has the potential to exploit an asset or group of assets and 
thereby cause losses to an organisation” (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006: 25). 
 
1.6.10 Information collection  
 
Information collection is the act of collecting information that will enable an analyst to 
make a recommendation on the implementation of physical protection systems, 
strategies and/or actionable information products to mitigate security risks (Peterson, 
1994: 270).  
 
1.6.11 Incident  
 
Incident information refers to information of any event or occurrence resulting from a 
threat or policy violation (Allen, 1992: 597).  
 
1.6.12 Threat 
 
An individual or group with the motivation and capability for crime, terrorism, foreign 
intelligence, commercial or industrial competition and maliciousness or other 
malevolent acts that would result in loss of assets at a facility is a threat (Garcia, 
2001: 302). A threat refers to anything that has the potential to prevent and hinder 
the achievement of objectives or disrupt the processes that support them (Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008: 141).  
 
1.6.13 Vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability refers to an exploitable capability or an exploitable security weakness or 
deficiency at a facility of security interest. Exploitable capabilities or weaknesses are 
those inherent in the design (or layout) of the facility and its protection or those 
existing because of the failure to meet (maintain) prescribed security standards when 
evaluated against requirements for defined threats. If the vulnerability were detected 
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and exploited by an adversary, then it would reasonably be expected to result in a 
successful attack causing damage to the facility (Garcia, 2001: 303).  
 
1.6.14 Analysis  
 
Analysis is the reviewing of data and the comparison of it to other data to determine 
its meaning or relation to other data. This includes different forms of analyses such 
as evaluation, collation, threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and criticality 
assessment (Peterson, 1994: 270).  
 
1.6.15 Evaluation (verification)  
 
Evaluation (verification) of security information is the assessment of the reliability of 
the source and the quality of the information (Jordaan, 2003 (a): 59).  
 
1.6.16 Collation  
 
Information collation is the sorting, indexing and storing of information into a format 
from which it can be retrieved and analysed (Lyman, 1988: 153). 
 
1.6.17 Threat analysis 
 
It is a process in which information about a threat or potential threat is subjected to 
systematic and thorough examination in order to identify significant facts and derive 
conclusions there from (Garcia, 2001: 302). 
 
1.6.18 Threat assessment 
 
Threat assessment is a judgment, based on available intelligence, law enforcement 
and open source information, of the actual or potential threat to one or more assets 
(Garcia, 2001: 302). According to Le Roux (2004: 26), threat assessment is the 
identification of potentially undesirable events that could result in loss or harm.  
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1.6.19 Vulnerability analysis 
 
Vulnerability analysis is a method of identifying the weak points of a facility (Garcia, 
2001: 303).  
 
1.6.20 Vulnerability assessment 
 
It is a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and/or quantitative 
techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and to arrive at an effectiveness level 
for a security system to protect specific targets from specific adversaries and their 
acts (Garcia, 2001: 303). A vulnerability assessment involves a process or outputs 
associated with reviewing assets and or security systems to identify weaknesses. 
Usually conducted from a baseline on how they could fail or be successfully attacked 
(Talbot & Jakes, 2008: 150).  
 
1.6.21 Criticality assessment 
 
Criticality assessment attempts to prioritise organisational infrastructure, assets or 
elements by the relative importance or dependence on that element. In practice this 
is often related to the magnitude of downstream impacts created by the element’s 
destruction or disablement. Criticality assessment may be based on the magnitude 
of potential casualties, long term effects on organisational objectives and economic 
or socio-political impacts (Talbot & Jakes, 2008: 154).  
 
“The term has been defined as the impact of a loss as measured in Rands”. In 
addition to the cost of the item lost it also includes replacement costs, temporary 
replacement, downtime, discounted cash, insurance rate changes and the loss of 
market place advantage (Fischer et al., 2008: 157-158).  
 
1.6.22 Physical Protection Systems 
 
Measures implemented for the protection of assets or facilities against criminals, 
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, commercial or industrial competitors, 
malicious people or other malevolent attacks (Garcia, 2001: 298). 
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1.6.23 Strategies 
 
Overall methods planned by the adversary to achieve objectives (Garcia, 2001: 301). 
 
1.6.24 Actionable information products 
 
Strategic actionable information products are generally research oriented, involving 
inferential and multivariate statistics; they include crime trend forecasts, resource 
allocation and situational analysis. Tactical actionable information products involves 
pattern detection, linkage analysis for suspect-crime correlations, target profiling and 
offender movement patterns (Goldsmith, McGuire, Mollenkopf & Ross, 2000: 5). 
 
1.6.25 Dissemination 
 
Dissemination is the release of recommendations for the implementation of physical 
protection systems/strategies and/or actionable information products to a client 
under certain conditions and protocols (Peterson, 1994: 269).  
 
1.6. 26 Security risk control measures 
 
According to Rogers (2008: 152-161), security risk control measures refer to all the 
security measures that must be implemented for deterrence, deflection, detection, 
delay, reaction, identification, rectifying identified security weaknesses, detention of 
perpetrators and the recovery of losses from insurance. For the purpose of this study 
it will include physical protection systems, strategies and actionable information 
products.  
 
1.6.27 Feedback 
 
Feedback is the informing of the analyst of the outcome of the implementation of 
specific physical protection systems/strategies and/or actionable information 
products (Reuland, 1997: 36).  
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1.7 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and motivation for the research 
 
This chapter introduced the rationale for the study, problem statement, research 
questions, research goal, research objectives, definitions of concepts and the outline 
of the thesis.  
  
Chapter 2: Methodological exposition of the research design 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological framework, guiding assumptions, 
limitations, value of the research and ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 3:  Grounded theory: Generating categories and coding the data  
 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the data from the semi-structured and focus 
group interviews. The open, axial and selective coding procedures were used to 
generate a grounded theory. 
 
Chapter 4:  Security information management  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive literature study on the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures.  
 
Chapter 5:  Case studies on security information management  
 
In this chapter the case studies on Security Information Management in South Africa 
and Security Information Management in Perth, Western Australia are discussed. It 
identifies present-day standards. 
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Chapter 6:  Data analysis of questionnaires 
 
This chapter provides an analysis and interpretation of the survey questionnaires by 
using the univariate analysis process.  
 
Chapter 7:  Security Information Management Model: The Concept 
 
This chapter discusses the development of a practical Security Information 
Management Model (SIMM). The model is aimed at providing a standardised 
framework for the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
Chapter 8:  Findings and recommendations  
 
This chapter discusses findings and recommendations of this study. 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This study took into account government departments and other private 
organisations where private security officials are employed to provide a security 
service. Security was considered from an objective, subjective and symbolic 
perspective within these environments. The management of crime information and 
crime intelligence served as pillars in understanding the importance of security 
information management. The intelligence and crime information cycles used by law 
enforcement was used as a source of theory, discipline and practice in the 
investigation of a Security Information Management Model (SIMM) for the security 
industry.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODOLOGICAL EXPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The researcher followed the mixed methods approach using the exploratory mixed 
methods design in the research. The study explored the phenomenon (security 
information management) by using qualitative data and then testing it quantitatively 
in a questionnaire survey (Delport & Fouché, 2011: 441).  
 
A literature study was conducted to accommodate both the qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches (Fouché & Delport, 2011b: 134). It was used to 
formulate the rationale for the study, problem statement, research questions and the 
research objectives. The research questions were in turn used to formulate 
questions for the interviews.  
 
The grounded theory and case study research designs were used for qualitative data 
collection (Fouché & Schurink, 2011: 318-320). The data for the grounded theory 
design was collected using semi-structured one-on-one interviews and focus group 
interviews (Greef, 2011: 351-361). Semi-structured interviews were conducted using 
an interview schedule (See Appendices 1and 2). Senior managers from selected 
service providers and other stakeholders from the security services sector in the 
Gauteng province in South Africa were targeted for these interviews. Focus group 
interviews were conducted with security officers, supervisors and managers 
employed in Gauteng (See Appendix 5). This data was analysed using open, axial 
and selective coding procedures in an attempt to deliver a substantive grounded 
theory (Fouché & Schurink, 2011: 319-320). The researcher used interviews and 
focus groups to generate a substantive grounded theory. The purpose for using the 
case study design was to obtain a better understanding of security information 
management and the present day standards used by organisations. It facilitated the 
researcher’s gaining of knowledge about security information management both 
nationally and internationally (Fouché & Schurink, 2011: 322). Interviews were 
primarily used in the case study design.  
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Surveys were used in the non-experimental research design to collect quantitative 
data for this study (Fouché, Delport & De Vos 2011: 155-156). The quantitative data 
was collected using a questionnaire as an instrument (See Appendix14). Responses 
from the semi-structured interviews helped to facilitate the development of the 
questionnaire with closed- and open-ended questions. The questionnaire was used 
to evaluate the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation 
of security risk control measures by security service providers in Gauteng. The data 
analysis of the questionnaires was done using the mixed method data analysis 
strategy. The univariate analysis process was used to quantitatively analyse and 
interpret the data in the questionnaires (Kruger, De Vos, Fouché & Venter, 2007: 
217-245).  
 
This chapter provides a discussion on the methodological exposition of the research 
design. It puts specific emphasis on the methodological framework, guiding 
assumptions, limitations and the value of the research.  
 
2.2  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The researcher designed Figure 2.1 to provide an understanding of the 
methodological process used in this research. 
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Figure 2.1: Methodological process 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher used the mixed methods approach because it involved both the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The rationale for using the exploratory 
mixed methods design was to first explore the management of security information in 
the security industry before attempting to measure it quantitatively. It was used to 
seek convergence and corroboration of results from different methods and designs 
studying the same phenomenon. The exploratory mixed methods design was 
selected based on the research objectives, researcher’s expertise and available 
resources. Consideration was also given to the timing and the weight of the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches as well as the approach in mixing the two 
data sets. The mixed methods approach enabled the researcher to simultaneously 
address a range of confirmatory and exploratory questions. The answers helped to 
generate and verify the grounded theory.  
 
The sampling strategy stemmed logically from the research objectives and the 
research questions being addressed by the study (Delport & Fouché, 2011: 444-
446). In planning this study it was important for the researcher to consider the 
different world views in the social sciences research process for both the qualitative 
and quantitative approaches (Fouché & Delport, 2011a: 70).  
Mixed methods approach 
Exploratory mixed methods design 
Grounded theory design 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Focus group 
interviews 
Case study design 
• Semi-structured 
Interviews 
 
Non-experimental design 
• Self administered 
questionnaire 
survey  
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Three world views were used in this study, the world of everyday life, the world of 
science and the world of meta-scientific reflection (Mouton, 1996: 7-12). The mixed 
methods research encourages the use of multiple worldviews rather than the typical 
association of certain paradigms for quantitative researcher’s and others for 
qualitative researchers (Delport & Fouché, 2011: 436).  
 
Aspects important to the methodological framework are discussed. in the sections 
below  
 
2.2.1  Exploratory mixed methods design 
 
The exploratory mixed methods design was the most appropriate to explore the 
management of security information in the security industry. The exploratory mixed 
methods design worked well in this study, as the researcher needed to explore the 
concept “management of security information” in the security industry by using 
qualitative data before attempting to test it quantitatively. It was a two-phase design. 
Interviews and focus groups were used in South Africa as well as in Western 
Australia for the collection of information. The collected information was used to 
design the questionnaire for the quantitative study. The mixed methods design 
helped the researcher to find more accurate knowledge on how security information 
is managed in the security industry.  
 
The researcher collected qualitative data from selected security managers, security 
officials and other stakeholders of their own description of security information 
management concepts; and their practical experiences with security information 
management. Data was collected through one-on-one interviews in the form of 
written and spoken language using semi-structured interview schedules and through 
focus group interviews. The data was analysed by identifying and categorising the 
data into generalised themes and categories. This allowed the researcher to study 
selected issues in depth, openness (transparency) and detail, as he identified and 
understood the categories of information that emerged from the data. The study was 
flexible; data collection was less structured and more accessible. This helped to 
dimensionally reduce the data into sub properties, for example the category ‘sources 
used to collect security information’; its properties include open and closed sources 
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of information. Thus, open sources can include public documents and closed 
sources may include classified documents. Each of these documents can be further 
dimensionalised, if analysis calls for it. The researcher was able to make any 
necessary adjustments straight away. This allowed for the whole study to be more 
flowing, naturalistic, participatory and interpretive.  
 
The grounded theory, the case study and the non-experimental quantitative research 
designs were used within the context of the exploratory mixed methods design. The 
qualitative data from the semi-structured and focus group interviews facilitated the 
development of a questionnaire. The questionnaire was used in the non-
experimental design (Fouché et al., 2011: 144; Kerlinger, 1986: 294-295). The data 
from the grounded theory design and the non-experimental design together with the 
present day standards from the case study design and literature study were 
integrated, correlated and interpreted. This resulted in the findings and 
recommendations for this study. 
 
2.2.1.1 Grounded theory design 
 
The grounded theory design is concerned exclusively with the generation, rather 
than the testing of theory. It is positioned at the most extreme end of the continuum – 
after data collection (Creswell, 2007: 239). This required the researcher to collect 
and analyse data to generate a theory. According to Leedy & Omrod (2005: 140), the 
term “grounded” refers to the idea that theory is derived from and “grounded” in data 
that has been collected in the field. Patton (2002: 129), states that: “one of the 
strengths of the grounded theory is the inductive, naturalistic inquiry strategy of 
approaching a setting without any predetermined assumptions.” Grounded theory 
approaches aim to develop an often situation-specific emergent theory founded upon 
the interpretation and analysis of the actual research findings. In other words, as a 
research design, grounded theory seeks to generate a theory from (i.e. ‘grounded’ 
in) the empirical material through the ongoing interpretation of that material. 
However, the problem was how to approach the field of research in this study with an 
open mind by not having any pre-conceived theories or hypotheses. The sole 
purpose was to generate theory in this study by utilising the grounded theory design.  
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The researcher decided to use the grounded theory design within the interpretive 
research perspective of the qualitative approach (Straus & Corbin, 1990: 23). The 
reason being that this perspective makes the assumption that reality should be 
interpreted through the meaning that the research participants give to their life world. 
The ontology of the interpretive research perspective is that the real world can be 
discovered by means of a systematic, interactive methodological approach. Its 
epistemology is that knowledge will arise from the understanding of symbols and 
meaning through interaction. Ontology is the study of real world. In the qualitative 
approach the mind of a participant is referred to as the research domain (Mouton & 
Marais, 1990: 12). It has stocks of knowledge that we use in everyday life. It enables 
us to cope effectively with our daily tasks. This is the knowledge we have acquired 
through learning, experience, social interaction and self-reflection. Epistemology 
assumes that genuine knowledge must necessarily be certain and incorrigible 
knowledge. It should be subject to verification (Mouton & Marais, 1990: 14). Data for 
this study was collected according to this perspective by means of semi-structured 
and focus group interviews and systematically analysed and verified (Fouché & 
Schurink, 2011: 308-312). 
 
The grounded theory design was used in this study to derive a general abstract 
theory of a process, action and interaction grounded on the views of participants. 
This process required the use of multiple stages of data collection and the 
refinement and interrelationship of categories of information. Data from the semi-
structured and focus group interviews were simultaneously coded using the open 
coding, axle coding and selective coding procedures. This helped the researcher to 
reach a point where a theory emerged. Two primary characteristics of this design 
were the constant comparison of the data with emerging categories and the 
theoretical sampling of different groups to maximise the similarities and the 
differences of information (Creswell, 2009: 13).  
 
2.2.1.2 Case study design 
 
In contrast to the grounded theory design, the case study design was used to study 
present day standards in security information management both nationally and 
internationally. The researcher decided on using the collective case study type, 
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which according to Fouché and Schurink (2011: 322), “is an instrumental case study 
which may be extended to a number of cases.” The reason for using the collective 
case study type was to learn more about present day standards being used in other 
similar organisations. More specifically, to get to know how security information is 
managed both nationally and internationally. The case study design was used to 
explore, in-depth, the present day standards used by security service providers both 
in Gauteng, South Africa and in Perth, Western Australia. During the case study the 
researcher collected detailed information through interviews and observation. To do 
this, the researcher needed access to and the confidence of the participants. The 
end product of this exercise was an in-depth description of the processes used in 
security information management. The researcher conducted the case study 
research with sufficient background knowledge of the relevant security service 
provider, which helped to validate the responses.  
  
2.2.1.3 Non-experimental quantitative research design 
 
Fouché et al. (2011: 144), state that, “quantitative research designs may be 
classified into two main classes, namely experimental designs and non-experimental 
designs.” A researcher may carefully choose a research design to obtain appropriate 
data for investigating specific research questions. The non-experimental quantitative 
research design was chosen to conduct the self-administered questionnaire survey. 
Different categories of security service providers were selected to take part in the 
questionnaire survey. They were measured on all the relevant variables at a specific 
time and at a specific place. No manipulation of variables could take place, as a 
structured questionnaire was used to measure the variables. This design did not 
involve an experimental or control group.  
 
2.2.1.4 Literature review  
 
Literature review means locating and summarising the studies about a topic. The use 
of literature varies considerably depending on the research being conducted. There 
is no single way to conduct a literature review. Many students busy with literature 
research study proceed in a systematic fashion to capture, evaluate and summarise 
the literature (Creswell, 2009: 28-29). The review of literature has different purposes 
31 
and strategies depending on whether the researcher is conducting a quantitative or 
qualitative research project (Fouché & Delport, 2011: 133).  
 
The researcher decided on doing literature review during the title choice, designing 
the research questions and to validate statements. This also included a search for 
present day practices and to verify knowledge. It is therefore important that the 
research produces statements that are highly probable and for which the highest 
standard of inductive support, substantiation or confirmation could be demonstrated.  
 
The researcher searched different fields of study such as law, criminology, sociology, 
psychology, policing, private security, security services, investigation of crime and 
workplace investigations. The researcher also consulted within the Private Security 
Industry and at Crime Information Management Centre (CIMC) of the SAPS for 
literature on the same topic as the research. None of these sources revealed any 
literature on the same topic as the research.  
 
The researcher then divided the research topic into key concepts namely: collection 
and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures and repeated the above processes. In doing this, the researcher found 
literature relevant to the study. The researcher studied this literature to search for 
best practices in the national and international arena. On finding literature relevant to 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk 
control measures, the researcher created a literature map and then summarised the 
relevant articles, assembled them, structuring them thematically in an organised 
fashion. The researcher ended the literature review with a summary of the major 
themes and suggested how the particular study further adds to the existing pool of 
knowledge.  
 
2.2.2 Demarcation 
 
The Province of Gauteng in the Republic of South Africa was demarcated as the 
geographic area for this study. The reason was that most sectors of the security 
service are situated in Gauteng. They also operate as major security service 
providers in Gauteng with the highest number of operators nationally.  
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The study involved private and government security service providers in Gauteng. 
They were divided into different sectors according to the security service function 
they performed. They included security officials from the following sectors:  
• protection services;  
• in-house security; 
• retail;  
• public service entities; 
• mining; 
• contract companies; 
• financial institutions; 
• insurance companies; 
• city and metropolitan councils; 
• industrial sector; and 
• transport.  
 
Security managers, security officials and stakeholders from the security industry in 
the Province of Gauteng were sampled for the study. The research involved 12 
senior managers and 114 operational security officials employed by these sectors. 
Three focus groups consisting of an average of 12 persons per focus group were 
selected from the different security sectors in Gauteng.  
 
Three South African security information management companies from Gauteng and 
security representatives from Gauteng, South Africa and a comparative group from 
Perth, Western Australian were also sampled for the case study. Specific individuals 
were also identified for purposive interviews due to their experience and positions 
they hold in academia, professional bodies, security companies and law 
enforcement.  
 
2.2.3  Research techniques 
 
It was important to understand the reality in the security services environment. It was 
therefore necessary to study the collection and analysis of security information and 
the implementation of security risk control measures in all major categories of the 
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security service in Gauteng. Security information management was researched at a 
descriptive level using interpretive and application techniques (Mouton, Marais, 
Prinsloo & Rhoodie, 1985: 44).  
 
2.2.3.1 Descriptive 
 
The descriptive level was used to describe specific facts, observations and actions in 
this study. The study was focussed on the researcher’s contribution to the science of 
security (Mouton et al., 1985: 44). According to Van Heerden (1982: 7), “the 
application of science is not science itself, but merely the utilisation of scientific 
information in practical circumstances. An applied science, in contrast, takes 
conclusions that have been researched in other sciences, processes them in a 
scientific context which is distinctively its own and makes the resulting scientific 
knowledge available to the professional practitioner.” Since the security service 
function is a matter of fulfilling a specific social and economic function, the applied 
character of the subject is self-evident.  
 
2.2.3.2 Interpretive  
 
The study included the researcher’s interpretation of the qualitative data during and 
after data collection. The researcher was assisted by a statistician in analysing and 
interpreting the quantitative data. The interpreted data was related meaningfully to 
the research objectives and the research questions. It was also used to make 
findings and recommendations.  
 
2.2.3.3 Application  
 
This evaluation inevitably focussed on the findings and recommendations for the 
purpose of application. Purposive conversations with fellow researchers, academics 
from the University of South Africa (UNISA) and Edith Cowan University (ECU), 
experienced security officials and members of professional bodies and regulatory 
agencies were used to support and confirm the findings and recommendations for 
the purpose of application. 
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2.2.4   Population and sampling procedures 
 
According to Strydom (2007: 194), “a sample, thus comprises elements of the 
population considered for actual inclusion in the study. It can be viewed as a subset 
of measurements drawn from a population in which the researcher is interested.”  
 
Whitt (1991: 410), is of the view that; “decisions about whom to interview or what to 
observe should be based not only on the aim of the research but also on the 
potential of the person or event to help the researcher gain insight and 
understanding about the phenomena”.  
 
In order to establish the size of the research group the view is that it should be a 
proportional representative of the universe. The perception also exists that it is not 
the size of the research group that determines the reliability, but rather if the 
research group is representative of the universe (Van Vuuren, 1992: 9). Le Roux 
(2004: 12) agrees with Van Vuuren, that no guarantee can be given that the 
representative group are in all respects representative of the whole security 
community or that the results will stay unchanged unless the security community is 
involved with this investigation.  
 
The entire number of security officials from the security service in South Africa was 
the universe of this study (refer to Paragraph 1.3.2 supra). According to Bailey 
(1987: 81-82), “universe includes all individuals or cases of a certain type.” Ideally, 
the researcher would have liked to study the entire universe, to give more weight to 
the findings. Due to financial, time and other constraints, the researcher could not 
study the entire universe. The researcher decided to choose the security officials 
from the security service in Gauteng as the study population for this research. 
Population, on the other hand, is a term that sets boundaries on the study units. It 
refers to individuals in the universe who possess specific characteristics (Akrava & 
Lane, 1983: 27). The population itself was too large to study. It was therefore divided 
into a representative sample (Powers, Meenaghan & Toomey, 1985: 235).  
 
According to Steyn (2002: 71), results of a research study can be generalised to 
groups that participated in the research. The results need not be generalised to the 
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private security industry in general. The aim of the researcher was to study a 
representative number of people and to generalise the findings to the security 
industry of the Gauteng province and not to generalise the findings to the security 
industry nationally. National generalisation was not of concern in this research, 
because there was clearly scientific value to gain from investigating some single 
category of individuals or group. However, whenever research is undertaken, the 
findings should not only be generalised to fit the specific individual; group or event 
studied but also to generally provide an understanding about similar individuals, 
groups and events. Since it is not a pure quantitative study with random sampling, 
generalisation is not at all an objective of the study (Berg, 2009: 330). The sample 
groups selected for the case studies and the interviews were valid, representative 
and selected without any bias.  
 
The researcher used non-probability sampling together with the purposive, 
convenience (accidental) and snowball sampling methods, to select representative 
groups for this study (Strydom, 2007: 202). It can be said that the representative 
groups in this study are in all probability accurately representative. 
  
2.2.4.1 Semi-structured interviews  
 
It was decided to limit the study population by doing non-probability sampling using 
the purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling is based entirely on the 
judgment of the researcher (Strydom, 2007: 202). Researchers rely on their own 
experience, ingenuity and/or previous research findings to select participants in such 
a manner that the sample obtained may be regarded as representative of the 
relevant population (Le Roux, 2004: 12). In this study the researcher used two basic 
criteria to purposively sample security service providers for the semi-structured 
interviews. The first criterion was based on the kind of security service being 
provided by the security service provider. The researcher considered the security 
service provided in terms of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 
2001, registration with PSIRA, reputation of the business entity, period of existence 
of the security service provider and the environment in which they provide security 
service/s. The second criterion was that of representativeness or typical attributes for 
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example, senior security officers in management positions. The judgment of the 
researcher was a prominent factor in this type of sampling.  
 
Twelve security service providers were identified for the semi-structured interviews 
from the following sectors: 
• protection services;  
• in-house security; 
• retail;  
• public service entities; 
• mining; 
• contract companies; 
• financial institutions; 
• insurance companies; 
• city and metropolitan councils; 
• industrial sector; and  
• transport.  
 
The researcher also used his own judgment and identified police officers from the 
SAPS, other stakeholders and academics using the purposive sampling method. 
They were selected according to their official capacity, experience and their potential 
contribution to the study.  
 
The concept “sufficiency” was used as the criteria to determine the number of 
participants as a sufficient number for the semi-structured interviews. A sufficient 
number was needed to reflect the range of participants and sectors that made up the 
population. This provided those outside the sample with a chance to connect to the 
experience of those in it (Greef, 2007b: 294).  
 
2.2.4.2 Focus group interviews 
 
Security officers from Gauteng were used as the population for the focus group 
interviews. It was decided to limit the study population by doing non-probability 
sampling using the purposive sampling method. The purposive sampling method 
37 
was used to select a representative sample of private security officials registered 
with PSIRA and employed as a security official in Gauteng. The sample group was 
considered representative of the population, because all private security officials are 
registered in terms of the same policy requirements, undergo the same or similar 
training and function according to the same policy and standards nationally (Private 
Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001). According to Strydom, (2007: 202) 
purposive sampling is based entirely on the judgment of the researcher. The sample 
group should be composed of elements that contain the most characteristics and 
representativeness or typical attributes of the population. In this case the sample 
group were all registered security officials, performing a security service in Gauteng.  
 
The researcher held three collective interviews with focus groups consisting of at 
least 12 persons per focus group.  
    
2.2.4.3 Case study 
 
The semi-structured interviews were used to identify security information companies 
that manage security information (crime incidents, threats and vulnerabilities) for the 
specific security sector. This also helped to create a link with the specific security 
sector and the company identified for the case study. According to Baker (1988: 
159), the snowball sampling method in non-probability sampling, involves 
approaching a single case that is involved in the phenomenon to be investigated in 
order to gain information on other similar cases. In turn this person is requested to 
identify further people who could make up the sample. In this way the researcher 
proceeded until he had identified a sufficient number of cases to make up the 
sample.  
 
The researcher looked for companies’ co-ordinating crime incident information, 
threats and vulnerabilities. The researcher could not find any company that manages 
security information on threats and vulnerabilities for security service providers. This 
function had to be done individually by the different security service providers, using 
their own in-house personnel (contracted individuals), resources and skills. However, 
there was several companies managing crime incident information for specific 
security service providers for example the banks, petroleum and oil companies, 
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insurance companies, tourism industry, retailers and casinos. Owing to a limited 
number of such companies being well established and organised only three security 
information management companies were selected for the case study. Non-
probability sampling using the purposive sampling method was used to delimit the 
companies for the purpose of this study.  
 
The identified companies were aligned to their clients in the semi-structured 
interviews. This was done to draw specific inferences on their line of communication 
and impact on crime relevant to the specific service provider; for example bank 
robberies, petrol station robberies and business robberies at retail stores.  
 
The information received in the case studies also reached saturation, whereby any 
further case study with similar companies would have resulted in the repetition of the 
same practices. This is because all the security information management companies 
perform the same functions and provided the research with similar information on 
their practices for security information management.  
 
2.2.4.4 Questionnaire survey  
 
Security officials from Gauteng were identified to complete the self-administered 
questionnaires from the following sectors: 
• in-house security at ‘security’ estates/villages; 
• residential and commercial complexes;  
• financial and insurance institutions;  
• petroleum and oil companies;  
• retail;  
• mining;  
• government departments;  
• casinos;  
• public service entities;  
• university campuses; and  
• contract security service companies.  
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It was decided to limit the population by doing non-probability sampling by using the 
accidental sampling method to interview security officials employed by the different 
sectors of the security industry in Gauteng. Strydom (2011: 232), refers to accidental 
sampling as a convenient, availability or haphazard sample and adds that the 
respondents are usually those who are nearest and most easily available. The 
accidental sampling procedure was applied to all security officials registered with 
PSIRA and employed by these security service providers, who were easily 
accessible to the interviewer. All such security officials were included in the sample 
until the desired number was obtained. The researcher used this procedure to 
ensure that the different groups or segments of the population acquired sufficient 
representation in the sample. The sample for this study consisted of security officials 
who were easily accessible to the interviewer.  
     
2.2.5  Data collection  
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (200: 158), qualitative researchers may use multiple 
forms of data collection methods in any single study. Different kinds of data 
collection methods – interviews, case study and literature study were used in this 
study. Delport and Roestenburg (20: 171), state that: “quantitative data-collection 
methods often employ measuring instruments.” In the social and human sciences, 
“measuring instruments” refers to such instruments as structured observation 
schedules, structured interviewing schedules, questionnaires, checklists, indexes 
and scales. A questionnaire was used in this study as a quantitative data collecting 
method. All biases were acknowledged in the research report, so that readers could 
take them into account when reading the report. Mixed method research eliminates 
different kinds of bias, explains the true nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation and improves various forms of validity or quality criteria (Delport & 
Fouché, 2011: 436).  
 
According to Greef (2007b: 293), qualitative studies typically employ different types 
of interviews in research. Since interviews are one of the most commonly recognised 
forms of the qualitative research method the researcher used the semi-structured 
interviews for one-on-one interviewing. Semi-structured interviews were also used in 
the case studies to identify present day practices in South Africa and Australia. 
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Focus groups were used for collective interviews. Self-administered questionnaires 
were used as a quantitative data collection method. A literature study was referred to 
for present day standards both nationally and internationally.  
 
2.2.5.1 Semi-structured interviews  
 
The semi-structured interviews were piloted with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
companies who had extensive national and international experience in the security 
service. Some of these CEOs are managing a chain of security companies in 
Gauteng. The pilot study helped to understand some of the practical aspects of 
establishing access, making contact and conducting the interviews, as well as 
becoming alert to one’s own interviewing skills (Greef, 2007b: 294).  
 
Twelve senior managers from the Security Service in Gauteng were identified by 
their CEOs for semi-structured interviews. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with the senior managers using an interview guide to direct the interview. Questions 
for the interview guide were derived from the research questions and literature study. 
The questions consisted of main questions, probing questions and follow up 
questions relevant to the research questions. The interview was focussed and 
discursive. It allowed the researcher and the participants to explore the collection 
and analysis of security information and the application of security risk control 
measures (Greef, 2007b: 293).  
 
The semi-structured interviews assisted the researcher to obtain an understanding of 
the existing practices being used by security service providers in Gauteng. The 
interviewer had the advantage of building empathy between himself and the 
interviewee, resulting in greater involvement and better quality data (Robson, 2000: 
90). Even if this did not occur, the interviewer was in a position to assess the degree 
of the interviewee’s interest and involvement. Data obtained under these 
circumstances could be more easily compared, with less risk of bias occurring, as 
different people are asked the same questions.  
 
Semi–structured, one-on-one interviews were used to gain a detailed picture of the 
nature and extent of problems being experienced in the collection and analysis of 
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security information and the implementation of security risk control measures. 
Interview guide used for the semi-structured interviews is attached (See Appendix 1). 
Consent forms were also completed by both the interviewee and the researcher, to 
conduct the semi structured interviews with the necessary confidentiality (See 
Appendix 2.  
 
Purposive interviews were also carried out with the SAPS, other stakeholders from 
the security service environment and academia to determine individual perceptions, 
opinions, facts, forecasts and their reactions to initial findings and potential solutions 
(Greef, 2007a: 202). The purpose was to understand the experience of security 
managers and other stakeholders in the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of security risk control measures (Greef, 2007b: 
293). Letter requesting permission from SAPS together with approval letter are 
attached (See Appendices 3 and 4).  
 
2.2.5.2 Focus group interviews 
 
Focus groups were used to evaluate the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of security risk control measures in the security 
service. Participants were selected from among security officers registered with 
PSIRA and employed by security service providers in Gauteng. The researcher 
decided to hold focus group discussions at a neutral setting. It is believed that this 
type of setting would motivate respondent participation. The focus group discussions 
were held at the UNISA campus in Pretoria, Gauteng.  
 
The focus group discussion was facilitated by the researcher, with the assistance of 
a scribe who took notes. The focus group discussion started by the researcher 
introducing himself as the facilitator. The scribe was introduced to the participants. 
The facilitator outlined the purpose of the focus group discussion. All participants 
introduced themselves and mentioned the security service provider they work for in 
Gauteng. Participants were informed that if they felt uncomfortable or felt the 
questions were becoming too sensitive, they could exit the focus group discussion at 
any time.  
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The researcher used questions, consisting of main questions, probing questions and 
follow-up questions relevant to the research questions (Greef, 2007b: 293). The 
questions posed to the participants were in everyday, non-professional language to 
generate rich descriptions and authentic data. The focus group discussions were 
also audio-taped for future reference. Throughout this process the researcher’s 
essential motivation was a desire to listen and learn from the participants. It helped 
the researcher to explore the collection and analysis of security information and the 
application of security risk control measures. It also helped uncover new facts and to 
understand the practices within the security environment. The researcher also 
understood how security officials interpreted security information management 
concepts in practice. There was an atmosphere of trust and openness. Participants 
shared their experiences voluntarily.  
 
Focus group responses were used as a supplementary source of data to the semi-
structured interviews conducted with an interview guide (Morgan, 1997: 2). This 
method of collective interviewing with security officers from Gauteng was used to 
validate the semi-structured interviews.  
 
According to Greef (2011: 370), pilot testing focus group questions is difficult, 
because questions used in focus group interviews are hard to separate from the 
environment of the focus group. A pilot test was still conducted by testing the first 
focus group with the participants. There were no shortcomings identified.  
 
Interview guide used to facilitate the focus group interviews is attached (See 
Appendix 5).  
 
2.2.5.3 Case Study  
 
In conducting semi-structured interviews with senior managers from the security 
industry in Gauteng, all information was recorded using a tape recorder and in the 
field journal of the researcher, for easy reference during the interpretation and 
analysis phase of the research. Further meetings were held to clear ambiguities or to 
request any additional documentation. During the course of conducting these 
interviews, the researcher learnt of specific security information management 
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companies in South Africa. These are security information management companies 
such as the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), Petroleum 
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Consumer Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI). These 
security information management companies provide strategies and/or actionable 
crime information products to clients, partners and stakeholders to mitigate specific 
security risks. There are a limited number of such companies in South Africa. Many 
of them are in their infancy, not fully established and organised. This made it difficult 
for the researcher to obtain approval to conduct research at such companies. Some 
of the companies refused to assist in this study, because of the sensitive nature of 
the information handled by them.  
 
It was decided to conduct case studies with well-established companies who 
manage security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. Specifically 
those that have been in existence for a reasonable period of time. Interviews were 
arranged with specific managers of the companies with written permission from the 
respective CEOs. Semi-structured interviews were conducted. Documentation such 
as policies and operating procedures, information flow documentation and actionable 
crime information products were also reviewed. Site observation was also conducted 
at the facilities, checking on how information is received, analysed and prepared for 
application in the form of strategies and actionable crime information products. 
These companies managed security information on crime incidents and not on 
threats and vulnerabilities.  
 
The case study strategy was used to explore the activities of such companies for 
best practices, processes and models. It helped obtain a better understanding and 
insight of the current practises in security information management companies.  
 
It is not the primary responsibility of these security information management 
companies to collect crime information. However, some of the information 
management companies collect information to enrich the data on hand. The 
responsibility to provide information on crime incidents rests with their clients. The 
security information provided to these companies is on daily crime incidents that take 
place at the business sites of their clients. These security information management 
companies are responsible for security information management, analysis and 
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providing strategies and/or actionable crime information products for application by 
their clients, partners and stakeholders.  
 
The case studies were general in scope, offering approximately equal weight to 
information management, analysis and implementation processes.  
 
The case studies provided an understanding of the security information management 
concepts used by the companies. The concepts were fully explored within the 
parameters of the security information management company policies. It also 
provided details on security information management, crime analysis and application 
processes in practice. The nature and extent of the problems experienced and the 
steps implemented to address the problems were also discussed for consideration 
as best practices.  
 
Semi-structured interviews with the clients of the specific companies assisted in 
understanding the flow of information from the clients to the security information 
management companies. Some of these clients were, for example South African 
Synthetic Oils and Liquids (SASOL), Pick-and-Pay and Nedbank.  
 
Due to legislative imperatives, these security information management companies 
are not allowed by law to manage and implement crime intelligence. Their focus is 
only on crime incident information reported by their respective clients. Letters 
requesting permission from the security information companies together with 
approval letters are attached (See Appendices 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Interview guide 
used for the case study is similar to that used for the sem-istructured interviews (See 
Appendix 1). Consent form used for the case study is similar to that used for the 
semi-structured interviews (See Appendix 2). The consent forms were completed in 
order to conduct the case study research with the necessary confidentiality.  
 
The researcher also attended the SAPS Provincial Crime Combating Forums in the 
Province of Gauteng. Security information management companies are also 
represented at these forums. The security information companies managed crime 
incident information, analysed them and formulated strategies and actionable crime 
information products to share with their clients, partners, the SAPS and other 
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stakeholders. This security information is shared with the SAPS in order to reduce 
crime rates, increase detection rates and prevent losses in businesses (Mzwandile, 
2011: 28-29; Reddy, 2010). 
 
The researcher also visited Edith Cowan University (ECU) at Joondalup, Perth, 
Western Australia. Semi-structured interviews with academics, researchers and 
security service representatives were conducted in Perth. These interviews were 
arranged by the School of Computer and Security Sciences in the Faculty of 
Computing, Health and Science. The semi-structured interviews were conducted 
using an interview schedule to explore how security information on incidents, threats 
and vulnerabilities is managed. Observation was also conducted at facilities, 
checking on how information is received, analysed and prepared for application in 
the form of strategies and actionable information products. The aim was to look at 
present day standards for security information management as used by security 
service providers in Western Australia. Letter requesting permission from ECU 
together with approval letter is attached (See Appendices 12 and 13). The interview 
guide used for the case study in Western Australia is similar to that used in the case 
study in South Africa (See Appendix 1). Similar consent forms to that used in South 
Africa was used for the case study in Western Australia (See Appendix 2). The 
consent forms were used in order to conduct the case study research with the 
necessary confidentiality. 
 
2.2.5.4 Questionnaire survey 
 
One-hundred-and-fifty questionnaires were prepared and handed out to security 
officials employed by the different sectors of the security industry in Gauteng. Only 
114 were received back from the respondents.  
 
The discussions from the focus group interviews, the responses to the semi-
structured interviews and the literature study were used to design the questions for 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to guide the respondent and the 
researcher. This guided the researcher to understand the construct at hand and to 
know what additional clarification questions to ask to cover the construct. The 
questionnaire provided for closed and open-ended questions as required by the 
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mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2009: 17). The questions were focussed to 
ensure that the respondents gave the specific information required to answer the 
research questions (Greef, 2007b: 296-297).The questionnaire was divided into six 
sections. The sections were divided as follows:  
• first section covered the respondent’s demographic details,  
• second section was about the security service details, 
• third was on the collection of security information, 
• fourth on the analysis of security information, 
• fifth on the application of security risk control measures; and  
• sixth section was on general issues the respondent intended to discuss.  
 
The following was kept in mind when developing the questionnaire:  
• biased and leading questions were avoided; 
• negative questions were avoided; 
• length of the questions and the questionnaire were considered, giving 
preference to shorter questions; 
• loaded phrases that suggested certain responses were avoided; 
• response categories were made easy to remember; and 
• ensured that the response categories offered a real range of alternatives 
(Delport & Rostenberg, 2011: 192).  
 
The researcher personally took the questionnaires by hand to the relevant security 
service providers. At the start of the survey the researcher explained to the 
respondents the nature and purpose of the study, the duration of the questionnaire 
as well as what will be done with the data. The importance of each individual’s 
contribution to the study, was emphasised, the sampling method used and why they 
were chosen and that they were free to ask questions at any time during or after the 
completion of the questionnaire. They were assured that all the information would be 
treated as confidential and anonymous. The researcher was open and honest about 
the purpose of the research and strived to maintain high levels of competence 
throughout the research (Whitt, 1991: 414).  
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Due to the practical nature of the work being performed by the security officials at 
different facilities in Gauteng, it was also financially viable and appropriate to use 
their senior managers to conduct the survey. In these instances, the researcher 
made appointments with the senior managers of the security companies, so that the 
questionnaires could be completed by security officials at the respective 
companies/plants. The managers who assisted with the interviews were given a full 
description of what the study was all about. General guidelines and procedures were 
discussed. Each question in the questionnaire was handled separately, with the 
senior manager. The researcher gave the senior managers specific guidelines on 
how to conduct the survey. The senior managers’ efforts were carefully controlled by 
the researcher. All these questionnaires were collected not more than 48-hours after 
completion.  
 
A pilot study was carried out on the questionnaires with persons other than the 
sample group. The respondents in the pilot study were asked to complete the 
questionnaires rather than to read through it for errors. The pilot study achieved two 
objectives: it improved the face and content validity of the instrument and secondly, it 
estimated how long it would take to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was presented to the full sample after the necessary modifications were made 
following the pilot test (Greef, 2007b: 294).  
     
The self-administered questionnaire used in the quantitative survey is attached (See 
Appendix 14). Consent form used in the quantitative survey is attached (See 
Appendix 2). The consent form was used to conduct the quantitative survey with the 
necessary confidentiality.  
 
2.2.6 Data analysis  
 
According to Delport and Fouché (2011: 447), data analysis in mixed methods 
research consists of analysing the quantitative data using quantitative methods and 
procedures and the qualitative data using qualitative methods and procedures. The 
mixed methods research has seven data analysis stages that a researcher should 
follow when analysing mixed methods research data, namely:  
1. data reduction (reducing the dimensionality of the of the qualitative data); 
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2. data display (describing pictorially the qualitative data and quantitative data); 
3. data transformation (where qualitative data is converted into narrative data 
that can be analysed qualitatively, where quantitative data are converted into 
numerical codes that can be represented statistically); 
4. data correlation (quantitative data is correlated with the qualitative data and 
vice versa); 
5. data consolidation (both qualitative and quantitative data are combined to 
create new data sets); 
6. data comparison (comparing data from the qualitative and quantitative data 
sources); and 
7. data integration (quantitative and qualitative data is integrated into a coherent 
whole or two separate sets). 
 
Qualitative data analysis transforms data into findings. It brings order, structure and 
meaning to the mass of collected data (Patton, 2002: 432). Qualitative data analysis 
is a search for general statements about relationships among categories of data; it 
builds grounded theory (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 150). The aim of this analysis 
was to come up with a detail and systematic recording of the themes and issues, 
which had been addressed during the interviews and to link themes together within a 
category system.  
 
According to De Vos (2007: 340) open coding, axial coding and selective coding are 
used in conducting data analysis on the grounded theory design. The analysis of 
data using the grounded theory is limited to the use of logic, sensitivity and three 
basic types of coding procedures. The codification process will be discussed, so that 
it can throw light on how it related to this study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 180).  
 
Step 1: Open coding  
 
Open coding is an interpretation process during which the data is separated through 
analysis. Open coding creates opportunities for the researcher to obtain new insight 
by looking at data in another way. The purpose of using open coding was to discover 
new phenomena, to develop themes in terms of features and dimensions and to 
provide names for the themes. Concepts of similar or concurrent happenings and 
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interactions are grouped together to form a category or sub-category (Creswell, 
2009: 184). An example of such categorising and sub-categorising in security 
information collection is to check on the availability of guards and the cameras on the 
facility. The researcher conceptualised this happening for the ‘Collection of security 
information’, which may be subdivided into specific activities and dimensions. 
‘Methods of collecting security information’ as a category may be sub-categorised 
into CCTV cameras and spotters.  
 
Step 2: Axial coding  
 
Axial coding was used to directly bring together the categories and sub-categories 
which were developed in the open-coding and positioning it under one category 
within a theoretical model. As this process goes ahead, new categories are 
developed. The researcher must be continuously on the lookout for such indications. 
If the researcher does not collect and analyse the data on the turn, it may result in 
the theory consisting of gaps (Creswell, 2009: 184). It is therefore important to 
conduct follow-up interviews to address the gaps. In the light of the aforementioned 
discussion the following example is provided. In this study the sub-category “CCTV 
cameras” is connected with the category ‘Methods of collecting security information’. 
The question is whether there is a connection between CCTV Cameras and 
‘Methods of collecting security information’. If this question is verified and supported 
by the data the question changes into a hypothesis/proposal, namely: CCTV 
Cameras are used covertly as a method of collecting security information. Axial 
coding refers to a set of procedures whereby data is put back together in new ways 
after open coding, by making connections between categories, utilising a coding 
paradigm involving conditions, context, action or interactional strategies or 
consequences. 
 
Step 3: Selective coding  
 
Selective coding refers to the process of selecting the core category, systematically 
relating it to other categories, validating those relationships and filling categories that 
need further refinement and development. The purpose of selective coding is to 
integrate the themes, or categories on a dimensional level in a way that a 
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substantive theory (low order) is developed. To validate the integration of the 
relationship, all identified gaps need to be addressed. This relationship is tested with 
data by the development of an assumption, which is continuously compared with 
data and adjusted where necessary. The assumption which repeatedly appears in 
the data will be reflected in the substantive theory. Contradictory data must not be 
excluded, because it may indicate a possible variation. Selective coding is a process 
which consists of different steps. The first step is to allow a story line to unfold. 
Secondly, additional categories may be connected to the core category by way of 
paradigms. The third step indicates the relationship between categories on a 
dimensional level. Fourthly, the relationship between the core category and other 
categories are validated by data. The fifth step consists of incorporating further 
categories, with the aim to further refine and develop a theory. The core category 
represents the central theme of the phenomenon under study. The other categories 
are kept connected with the core category in relation to circumstances, 
actions/interactions, strategies or consequences. Every category and sub-category 
of a declared theory must have conceptual depth. If this is not the case, the 
researcher must go back to the field or field notes in order to obtain data to fulfil the 
gaps (Creswell, 2009: 184). The development of a grounded theory according to 
Strauss and Corbin (1990: 424), is limited to the controllability thereof.  
 
In this study, the researcher applied open, axial and selective coding of the data 
collected during the semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews. The 
application of the selected coding method resulted in the selection of the core 
category; ‘management of security information’. The themes, concepts, categories 
and processes led to the unfolding of a substantive grounded theory in relation to 
security information management. The theory is that, ‘security officers operate 
without a standardised framework to manage security information’.  
 
The challenge facing security service providers in Gauteng, is simply whether or not 
security information management can be approached in a much more structured, 
integrated and user friendly manner. Threats have an impact not only on economic 
loss, but also on human suffering through injury. According to Valsimakis, Vivian and 
Du Toit (1996: 12), a need exists for a different approach to manage security 
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information more effectively – with the objective of eliminating the causes of the 
threats and the vulnerabilities.  
 
According to Kruger et al. (2007: 217-245), the simplest form of data analysis is 
univariate analysis. The univariate analysis process was used to analyse the 
variables from the questionnaires, mainly with the view to describing them. All the 
data gathered on the variables were summarised. The summary was displayed in a 
tabular form. Frequency distributions were used to describe the data. This summary 
displayed useful information to the researcher and provided the foundation for more 
sophisticated analysis at a later stage.  
 
2.2.7  Guiding assumptions  
 
The seven analysis stages that a researcher should follow in analysing mixed 
method data were followed. The findings of the grounded theory design were 
validated against the findings of the non-experimental quantitative research design.  
 
According to Mouton and Marais (1990: 157), what is called hypothesis in 
quantitative research may be termed suppositions/assumptions, expectations or 
statements concerning anticipated results in qualitative research. Qualitative 
researchers use assumptions in their studies as a broad explanation for behaviour 
and attitudes and it may be complete with variables, constructs and hypothesis 
(Creswell, 2009: 61). The researcher made assumptions during the development of 
a substantive grounded theory. These assumptions were considered when 
determining the findings and making recommendations 
 
2.2.8  Reliability and validity 
 
According to Bless and Higson-Smith (1995: 129), reliability is the extent to which 
the observable measures that represent a theoretical concept are accurate and 
stable when used for the concept in several studies. Reliability of data is influenced 
by four variables: the researcher, the participant, the measuring instrument, the 
research context and the circumstances under which the research is conducted 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 92).  
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To achieve reliability, the researcher ensured that the interviews were carried out in 
a consistent manner, without any bias. The researcher ensured that the questions on 
the interview guide and the questionnaire were standardised from one situation or 
person to the next. All the items in the interview guide and the questionnaire were 
tested (piloted) to check whether it was consistent to yield similar results.  
 
Validity means that the data and the methods must be right. The research data must 
reflect the truth and reality and cover crucial matters (Denscombe, 2002: 301). Face-
and-content validity (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 92) of the questions on the interview 
guide and the questionnaire were tested. These were checked to see if the questions 
reflected on the collection and analysis of security information and the application of 
security risk control measures in appropriate proportions. Respondent validation was 
obtained from the participants in the purposive interviews by simply asking if they 
agreed with the conclusions. The researcher made sure that the data collection 
methods were administered in a consistent fashion and that the methods used to 
collect the data were accurate, honest and on target.  
  
Criterion validity was used in this regard to test whether the results of the interviews 
and case study correlated with the literature review (Leedy & Omrod, 2005: 92).  
  
Specific criteria were established to dictate the kinds of judgments the researcher 
made. One can measure something accurately only when one can also measure it 
consistently. In other words, in order to have validity one must also have reliability. 
The researcher ensured that each of the methods used was carefully monitored to 
prevent bias. Steps were taken to make sure that reliability became the central 
consideration of validity during the process of data collection. Opinions of 
experienced and skilled personnel from the security service and SAPS were 
obtained whenever subjective judgments were made of the data. The researcher 
remained as objective as possible throughout the research.  
 
2.2.9  Field notes (Journal) 
 
Noak and Wincup (2004: 171), state that: “the process of data collection, analysis 
and writing are intricately bound”. In line with the qualitative elements of the 
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research, field notes were kept from the beginning of the research. The field notes 
included a description of the events, the researcher’s own feelings and responses to 
it and linkages to potential research themes. They also contain the researcher’s 
thoughts regarding connections to the literature and prompts for future research and 
investigation. Regular face-to-face meetings were maintained to keep day-to-day 
contact with the activities of the security officials. According to Denscombe (2002: 
274), this is sometimes called an audit trail to test reliability.  
 
Taking down field notes or writing in a ‘field journal’ is an important vehicle for the 
researcher, as some of the information relayed on the tape might be lost for example 
during an interview if the telephone rang or people came to make enquiries and the 
researcher had to turn the tape recorder off. The researcher took notes during the 
case studies and during all the interviews in the event of data being lost. This 
procedure was explained to the respondents and they had no objections. In this way 
data could be verified at a later stage (Morrison, 2004: 13). 
 
2.2.10  Limitations of the study 
 
2.2.10.1 Limited literature  
 
The researcher conducted a literature search on information concerning security 
information management in the security industry. Security service providers and the 
SAPS were consulted. None of these sources revealed any literature specifically on 
the same topic as the research. The researcher had to divide the research topic into 
concepts such as collection and analysis of security information and the application 
security risk control measures. This helped to find literature relevant to the concepts.  
 
Sufficient literature was not available on the collection and analysis of security 
information and the application of security risk control measures. This research had 
to draw data using a combination of methods namely; interviews, case studies and 
literature study.  
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2.2.10.2 Sensitivity of information 
 
The researcher was personally responsible for the gathering of data. Being an 
academic, respondents were not always keen on sharing security information. This 
was especially so in the case of information on collection methods, security products, 
security technology, strategies and actionable information products. Some 
respondents did not want to comment on undercover and surveillance methods used 
to collect security information, because of the sensitivity of the information.  
 
Initially the researcher decided to do semi-structured interviews with security officials 
at grassroots level using an interview schedule. After, piloting several such 
interviews, it was found that the security officials could not provide all the required 
information. It was then decided to first conduct semi-structured interviews with 
senior managers from the security industry to help in designing a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was designed consistent with the responses from the senior 
managers. The senior managers also facilitated the interviews with the security 
officials at grassroots level. This helped to obtain an authentic picture from the 
security officials at grassroots level.  
 
2.2.10.3 Non-participation in case study 
 
Initially it was planned to conduct a case study with the Special Investigations Unit 
(SIU) situated within the office of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for best 
practices on the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures. Although SIU granted permission, 
the case study interviews did not materialise because of their unavailability. One 
meeting was arranged by SIU, but cancelled at the last minute. According to 
Montesh (2007: 140), the SIU does not have intelligence collection powers and 
functions. Based on this finding it was decided not to pursue the SIU for a case 
study. They were subsequently replaced with the Consumer Goods Risk Initiative 
(CGRI) and the Petroleum Security initiative (PSI), who were better suited for the 
case study.  
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2.2.11  Value of the research 
 
This research was able to establish the status quo of the collection and analysis of 
security information and the implementation of security risk control measures. It 
identified the nature and extent of problems experienced by security officials in the 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk 
control measures. Solutions were also identified to address the problems. The 
findings and recommendations of this research will benefit the security industry. The 
security service provider will benefit in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes in the 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk 
control measures. The South African community will benefit from a much safer and 
more secure environment.  
 
2.2.11.1 Operational clarification value 
 
It is hoped that this research will lend itself to and facilitate the creation of an 
“information awareness culture” in organisations, companies and other agencies. 
Such would then lead to every member of staff (including contracted personnel), as 
well as security officials, to look out for security information with operational 
clarification value. Security officials to then follow proper procedures and ethics in 
security information management. Security service providers will ensure that the 
information is legally collected, entered timely into a database and analysed by 
qualified analysts. Recommendations by analysts will be valued by management and 
considered for the application of security risk control measures. 
 
2.2.11.2 Original contribution to the disciplinary field of study  
 
The relevance of this study is to provide a standardised framework to the security 
industry for security information management (Mouton & Marais, 1990: 14). The 
purpose will be to enhance the present crime combating strategies and create new 
opportunities for research. Security information is not always lawfully and ethically 
collected keeping in mind ‘a service standard of excellence’, neither is it correctly 
evaluated/verified, collated, analysed and implemented to mitigate security risks. It is 
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not shared in a regulated manner with all security service providers, the SAPS and 
other stakeholders in the security services industry either.  
 
Although security service providers are regulated through PSIRA, the functioning of 
the security service provider in terms of his/her activity as an investigator, guard, etc. 
is not always information driven. Information collection is the starting point for a 
successful prosecution in a court of law or a disciplinary hearing. This research is 
important to empower the security official in this regard.  
 
Much of the security information is being collected on an ad hoc basis. The 
information is mostly handled in an unregulated manner. Information is sometimes 
passed onto the SAPS. Information is also passed onto security officers and human 
resource managers for disciplinary purposes.  
 
Emanating from this research was a practical Security Information Management 
Model (SIMM) designed and developed for the better management of security 
information in the security industry. The new model considers the implementation of 
physical protection systems, strategies and actionable information products to 
mitigate security risks. It will also leave a paper trail for monitoring and evaluation 
purposes.  
 
2.2.12  Ethical considerations 
 
Participants were not exposed to physical or psychological harm. Potential 
interviewees were informed of the nature of the study to be conducted and given the 
choice of either participating or not participating. Permission was also obtained from 
security service providers to conduct interviews and to carry out case studies. 
Interviewees were requested to sign a consent form. Participants had the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time. Participation in the study was strictly voluntary. 
Each participant’s right to confidentiality and privacy was respected. All findings were 
done in a complete and honest fashion, without misrepresenting what had been 
done or intentionally misleading others as to the nature of the findings (Leedy & 
Omrod, 2001: 107-108). No confidential information shared by respondents with the 
researcher was revealed.  
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides a methodological exposition of the research design by 
discussing mixed methods research, exploratory mixed methods research design, 
the grounded theory design, case study design and the non-experimental 
quantitative research design. Special emphasis was placed on the population and 
sampling techniques, data collection and data analysis procedures used. The 
exploratory mixed method research design helped integrate the qualitative and 
quantitative data for interpretation. It brought out the philosophical worldview 
assumptions of both the ontological and epistemological dimensions of this study 
taking into consideration the limitations, values of the study and the ethical 
considerations. The approaches, design and data collection methods followed in this 
research were found to be reliable. Triangulation of the information collected using 
different data collection methods helped to build a coherent justification for validity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GROUNDED THEORY: GENERATING CATEGORIES AND CODING THE DATA 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The researcher held a social constructivist worldview that security officials 
understand the world in which they live and work better than anyone else not 
specifically working in this industry or allied services like the police. Therefore the 
researcher relied as much as possible on their responses. Accordingly, there was a 
need to understand the problems identified by the participants and to interpret their 
meaning, so that a theory or pattern of meaning may be generated and inductively 
developed (Creswell, 2009: 8). The grounded theory design was used so that a 
grounded theory could be inductively developed to contribute to the scientific body of 
knowledge for this specific discipline. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect 
data from selected security managers. Focus group interviews were used to collect 
data from grassroots security officials and supervisors. The reason for using two 
different interviewing techniques, targeting two different echelons of the security 
service was to obtain meanings that are varied, diverse and multiple. This helped the 
researcher to look for a complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a 
few categories or ideas. The purpose was to obtain the everyday life and lay 
knowledge of how security information is collected, analysed and implemented as 
security risk control measures.  
 
This chapter focuses on the conceptual construction and the categorisation of the 
data from the semi-structured and focus group interviews. The open, axial and 
selective coding procedures were used to generate the grounded theory.  
 
3.2  CONCEPTUAL CONSTRUCTION AND CATEGORISATION OF DATA: A 
THEMATIC EXPOSITION  
 
According to Patton (2002: 14), the researcher is the instrument and the methods 
used are part of the process. Qualitative research, under which the grounded theory 
resorts, required the researcher to personally collect and analyse the data (Whitt, 
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1991: 408). Semi-structured interviews together with focus groups were used as data 
collection techniques for this purpose. The researcher conducted semi-structured 
interviews and focus group interviews with two different sample groups to achieve an 
unbiased outcome. Reliability and validity was obtained by asking respondents in the 
semi-structured interviews and the focus group interviews similar questions and 
comparing the responses during categorisation. The researcher processed data 
immediately, clarified and summarised data as the study evolved and explored 
inconsistent responses. This also contributed to the reliability and validity of the data 
(Merriam, 1988: 19). 
 
The researcher found the grounded theory design to be a systematic way of 
developing and integrating scientific knowledge and information. This involved 
generating themes and categories of information, selecting subcategories and 
positioning it within specific categories and themes within a theoretical model. It then 
involved explicating a story from the interconnection of these themes and categories 
and establishing a core category. The grounded theory was generated from the 
themes, categories and the story line. 
 
3.2.1  Open coding, axial coding and selective coding process 
 
The researcher designed Figure 3.1 to provide a structure of coding frame. 
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Figure 3.1:  Structure of coding frame 
 
The grounded theory was generated using the following steps: 
• generating themes and categories of information (open coding); 
• selecting sub-categories and positioning them under specific categories and 
themes within a theoretical model (axial coding);  
• explicating a story line from the interconnection of these categories and 
themes resulting in a core category (selective coding); and  
• by studying the different themes, categories and the story line a substantive 
grounded theory was generated (Creswell, 2009: 184).  
 
During open coding, the researcher read through all the data from the semi-
structured interviews (See Appendix1) and the focus group interviews (See Appendix 
5). The researcher obtained a general sense of the information and reflected on its 
overall meaning, according to what was said by the respondents. This involved the 
process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews Focus group interviews 
Interview notes Focus group minutes 
Generating categories and 
coding the data 
1. Open coding 
• Labelling of 
phenomena 
• Discovering categories 
• Naming a category 
• development of 
categories 
 
 
 
 
2. Axial coding 
• Makes 
connection 
between 
categories and 
sub-categories 
• Identifying the 
story line 
 
 
3. Selective coding    
• Core category 
• Grounded theory 
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data. The data from the semi-structured interviews and the focus group interviews 
were closely examined and compared to each other for similarities and differences, 
and questions were asked about the phenomena as reflected in the data. Specific 
themes and categories were developed with this scientific information  
 
According to Straus & Corbin (1990: 96-97), in axial coding, subcategories are linked 
to a category in a set of relationships denoting causal conditions, phenomena, 
context, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies and consequences. Axial 
coding was followed by putting together data in new ways, by making connections 
between categories and sub-categories using a coding paradigm involving 
conditions, context, action or interactional strategies and consequences. This 
process enabled the researcher to think systematically about data and to link them in 
more complex ways. 
 
After some time of collecting and analysing the data, the researcher was confronted 
with the task of integrating the categories to form a core category. Selective coding 
was used to select the core category by systematically relating it to other categories, 
validating those relationships and filing in categories that needed further refinement 
and development.  
 
Practically, the open coding, axial coding and selective coding process was used for 
coding and analysis of the scientific data in the grounded theory design. The semi 
structured interview guide (See Appendix1) and the focus group interview guide (See 
Appendix 5) were used to gather scientific data. For the sake of reliability and validity 
the questions were similar on both Appendices 1 and 5. The same items were being 
measured using two different instruments and groups. The respondents in the semi-
structured interviews were senior managers from different sectors of the security 
industry. The respondents for the focus group interviews were security officers from 
different levels of the security industry. Both the measuring instruments proved to be 
reliable as they produced similar measurements. The responses from both the semi-
structured interviews and the focus groups were broken down, examined, compared, 
conceptualised and categorised manually. Flip chart sheets were used to 
thematically categorise and sub categorise properties belonging to the same 
category. Subcategories were linked to categories in a set of relationships denoting 
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causal conditions, phenomena, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction 
strategies and consequences. The process unfolded into three main themes and 
categories which were aligned to the research questions. This conceptual 
construction and categorisation helped determine underlying processes in relation to 
the three themes, which resulted in the emergence of specific storylines 
(assumptions) for the three themes. The thematic exposition, categories and the 
storyline was used to develop a core category, which eventually gave rise to a 
grounded theory.  
 
The data collected during the semi-structured interviews (See Appendix1) and focus 
group interviews (See Appendix 5) was broken down and conceptualised. Each 
piece of information was taken apart and given a name, something that represents a 
phenomenon. According to Straus and Corbin (1990:63) this is called the labelling 
phenomena. The next step was to group concepts around the phenomenon. This 
process of grouping concepts that pertains to the same phenomenon is called 
categorising. Categories have conceptual power because they are able to pull 
together other groups of concepts, processes or subcategories. This is how 
categories were discovered. The researcher gave the categories names that seemed 
most logically related to the data it represented and which is commonly used in the 
security industry.  
 
A category was developed in terms of its properties which were then 
dimensionalised. Properties are the characteristics or attributes of a category, and 
dimensions represent locations of a property along a continuum (Straus and Corbin, 
1990: 63). Open coding stimulated the discovery of categories, properties and 
dimensions. Properties also had sub-properties; each inturn was dimensionalised as 
directed by the analysis process. The researcher in this study decided on doing word 
for word analysis of the interviews by closely examining each response as recorded 
in the interview notes and field journal. Open coding may be done in various ways. 
Each person must find the method that works best for him (Straus and Corbin, 
1990:67). 
 
During the axial coding process the open coded data was put in new ways by 
making connections between categories and sub-categories. This was done by 
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giving consideration to conditions, contexts, action/interactional strategies and 
consequences. The open and axial coding process is outlined hereunder: 
 
3.2.1.1 Theme 1: Collection of security information  
 
Security information collection is not about collecting information at random. The 
collection drive must provide a plan and a focus so that that security information is 
collected to address specific threats, vulnerabilities and risks confronting the 
organisation/company. It is essential that the sources for the collection of security 
information should be approached with a description of the security information, 
which is likely to be useful in analysis. The integrity and quality of the information 
collected should always be borne in mind (Ekblom, 1988: 11).  
 
Category 1: Sources used for the collection of security information  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the sources used for the collection of 
security information:  
1. Information reports from organisations, companies, forums and networks  
2. Risk assessment reports 
3. Internal incident statistics 
4. Hotline (telephone) 
5. Whistle blowing 
6. Community police forums 
7. Loss reports 
8. Investigation reports  
9. Media reports 
10. Suggestion boxes 
11. Public/Staff  
12. Security staff are expected to record all suspicious activities 
13. No structured way of collecting information 
14. External sources 
15. Internal sources 
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The responses in Category 1 indicate that security officials use different sources to 
collect security information on various aspects.  
 
Information is the lifeblood of any organisation. Information is available on everyone 
and everything. One needs to know where and how to find it (Van Rooyen, 2008: 
95). According to Van Rooyen (2008: 218), a source is the actual point from where 
information is obtained. First hand information may be sourced from a person, 
publication, thing or activity. The collection of security information must cover the 
organisation in totality. There should be no shortcuts. Security information is usually 
collected by accessing internal and external sources of information (Fischer et al., 
2008: 148-156). 
 
Category 2: People tasked to collect security information  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to people tasked to collect security 
information:  
1. Security managers 
2. Security supervisors 
3. Investigators 
4. Crime risk officers 
5. Security officials at grassroots level are not entrusted with investigations 
6. No security information collection units exist 
7. Management do not listen to security officials at grassroots 
 
The responses in Category 2 indicate that only specific individuals such as 
managers, supervisors, risk managers and investigators are tasked to collect 
security information. In some security companies grassroots level security officials 
are not entrusted with workplace investigation neither are they tasked to collect 
security information. Collection units do not exist in some companies.  
 
According to Van Rooyen (2008: 95), successful investigators are seen as effective 
information collectors. In countries such as China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, information collection units have been set up by government departments 
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to collect information on security related issues from specific sources (Clark, 2010: 
88).  
 
Category 3: Types of security information commonly collected 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the types of security information 
commonly collected:  
1. Information on crimes/criminals 
2. Security breaches 
3. Policy violations 
4. Information on marches/demonstrations/strike action 
5. Information on technical problems  
6. Auditing information 
7. Security information on special events  
8. Information on contractors 
9. Occupational Health and Safety 
10. Information on cheating 
11. Information on physical protection systems 
 
The responses in Category 3 indicate the types of security information commonly 
collected in the security industry. Mainly incident and physical protection systems 
related information is collected. It is clear that security officials do not collect 
information on potential threats and existing vulnerabilities. Reactive information on 
incidents is prioritised for collection. 
 
Categories of incidents which are commonly investigated to gather evidence 
includes the following:  
• Violation of law (an example of an incident of rape); 
• Accidental (an example of an incident where a customer falls on a slippery floor 
in a retail store); 
• Anecdote (an example of an incident of a guard on night patrol at the back of the 
plant, surrounded by woods, where a bat swiped onto his bald head almost 
dropping him to the ground. It caused bruising to his head); and 
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• Violation of policy (an example of an incident of a security guard who fell asleep 
at 03:00 am in the morning while on access control duty. He was reported to the 
supervisor) (Opolot, 1999: 6-7).  
 
Security information of any circumstances or event with the potential to cause harm 
to the systems, personnel, assets, facilities and viability of a business, industry or 
institution by destruction, disclosure or denial of service is referred to as threat 
information. It may require proactive or reactive action (Simonsen, 1998: 203). 
Security information on any weakness or flaw in the physical layout of an 
organisation, procedures, management, administration, hardware or software that 
may be exploited to cause harm to the institution, business or activity is referred to 
as vulnerability information. It may require proactive action (Simonsen, 1998: 202) 
 
Category 4: Methods used to collect security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the methods used to collect security 
information:  
1. CCTV cameras 
2. Interviews 
3. Collection methods are not always used to collect security information 
4. Overt and covert methods are used to collect security 
5. Forensic auditing is used to collect information in fraud investigations  
6. Informers  
7. Spotters 
8. Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
9. Obtaining statements in investigations 
10. Networking  
 
The responses in Category 4 indicate that technical and human methods are used 
to collect security information.  
 
According to Ferraro and Spain (2006: 13), physical surveillance, electronic 
surveillance, undercover operations, interviews and interrogations, forensics, 
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research and internal audit are the most commonly used methods for collection of 
information. 
 
Category 5: Steps followed for the collection of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to steps followed for the collection of 
security information:  
1. Receive voluntary information from third parties  
2. Information is recorded in pocket books  
3. Supervisor is informed verbally.  
4. Supervisor enters the information in a register (occurrence book) in the 
control room 
5. Forward to intelligence unit 
6. Supervisor informs management of the information  
7. Store security information in electronic systems 
 
The steps in Category 5 show that security information is collected, but not referred 
to qualified analysts (trained analytical and experienced experts). Some of the 
respondents mentioned that it is referred to intelligence units. The intelligence unit 
referred to in this context includes SABRIC, PSI and CGRI. 
 
According to Reuland (1997: 7), information management includes the collection of 
information, collation of the information, analysis, dissemination, implementation and 
feedback. The outcomes of the collection of security information should be 
inextricably related to the focus areas in the security plan. In fact, it is the potential 
and intended outcomes that largely determine the focus areas (Ferraro & Spain, 
2006: 79). 
 
This security information is usually collected by conducting an asset assessment, 
threat assessment, security risk analysis, security survey, general departmental 
evaluations, operational audits or site visits as determined by management (Fischer 
et al., 2008: 148-156). 
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Category 6: Levels of classification used for the protection of security 
information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the levels of classification used for the 
protection of security information:  
1. Management do not want anyone to know about the information so they 
sometimes do not record it 
2. Information access is restricted to most security personnel 
3. Management do not trust security personnel working at grassroots level 
4. Information is classified, using confidential, top secret, secret, restricted and 
not allowed access 
 
The responses in Category 6 indicate that security service providers utilise means to 
protect security information, even at the expense of not informing their grassroots 
level officials. Sometimes information is not recorded due to mistrust among security 
officials. No mention is made of any minimum information security standards 
framework used for the classification of security information.  
 
Category 7: Advantages in collecting security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the advantages of collecting security 
information:  
1. Eliminates or reduces risks 
2. Provides investigators with information to solve cases 
3. Gives businesses a competitive edge 
4. Encourages the sharing of information 
5. Decision makers can provide appropriate resources to address problems 
6. Makes management aware of risks and trends  
7. Reduces losses 
8. Ensures safety of employees 
9. Makes personnel alert 
10. Creates security awareness 
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The responses in Category 7 are widespread. It reflects on many different 
advantages for the organisation being protected. The most important advantage is 
the reduction of losses. 
 
Category 8: Disadvantages in collecting security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the disadvantages of collecting security 
information:  
1. Cost of collecting security information 
2. Information is not operationalised 
3. Time consuming 
4. Infringement on human rights and privacy 
5. Disinformation and information trade offs 
6. Risky, can be assaulted or killed  
7. Clients do not want to fund information collection 
8. Mistrust among personnel 
9. Leakage of information 
10. Misleading information 
 
The responses in Category 8 indicate that many of disadvantages are related to 
poor management and control in the absence of standing operating procedures.  
 
Category 9: Problems experienced in the collection of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to problems experienced in the collection 
of security information:  
1. Personnel do not have skills to identify risks 
2. Unable to take down statements 
3. Poor communication skills 
4. Legal restrictions on the collection of intelligence 
5. Staff are reluctant to provide information due to intimidation and fear of 
being labelled as an ‘impimpi’ (derogatory Zulu term for informer or ‘sell-out’ 
from the pre-1994 era of political contestation in the townships) 
6. Infringement of people rights 
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7. No policy for the collection of security information 
8. External databases not accessible 
9. Personnel shortage to collect information 
10. Do not get feedback  
11. Management do not trust security personnel working at grassroots level  
12. Not all information is stored and maintained in a computer database 
13. Information is retained by people rather than by systems   
14. Investigators possess wealth of information. 
 
The responses in Category 9 indicate that many of the problems are management 
related and relevant to human and physical resource support.  
 
Category 10: Solutions to overcome the problems in the collection of security 
information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to solutions to overcome the problems in 
the collection of security information:  
1. Personnel to be trained to collect security information 
2. Improve communication skills of personnel 
3. Closer working relationship with SAPS and NPA 
4. Create awareness on the importance of information  
5. Identity of information source to be protected 
6. Motivate personnel on the collection of information 
7. Improve networking with service providers 
8. Information sharing to be encouraged  
9. Accessibility to external databases to be negotiated 
10. Payment of incentives for information 
11. Provide the required human, physical and financial resources 
12. Proper rewarding of informers 
13. Keep track with new technology and advancement 
14. All collected information should be placed on a database 
15. Disciplinary action with penalties for non compliance 
16. Collection of security information should be included in service level 
agreements and job descriptions 
17. More academic research is essential to improve on the collection of security 
information 
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The responses in Category 10 indicate management related solutions relevant to 
financial, human and physical resources. Memorandum of understanding may be 
used to improve networking with service providers. 
 
3.2.1.2 Theme 2: Analysis of security information  
 
When an incident is reported or a threat is identified, the next stage is to analyse the 
incident or threat information. Many corporate managers leave this important 
function to law enforcement, which presumably has sufficient resources to deal with 
these issues. In reality this is not always the case. Many law enforcement 
departments have neither the resources nor the capability to effectively examine 
incident or threat information as thoroughly as is needed. It is therefore important for 
security service providers to have their own analysis capabilities (Montgomery & 
Majesky, 2005: 612).  
 
Category 1: Analysis of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to analysis of security information:  
1. Investigators are tasked to do analysis on information received 
2. In many instances analysis is done manually by management 
3. Computer software programs for analysis is only used by big security service 
providers 
4. Clerks are used as data analysts  
5. Unaware of any analysis centres established by security service providers to 
analyse security information 
6. Information is analysed to calculate risks 
7. Special investigation units are used as analysis centres 
 
The responses in Category 1 indicate that trained analysts are not used to analyse 
security information. It would seem that there is more use being made of clerks and 
investigators than trained analysts to carry out the analysis functions. Knowledge of 
analytical concepts and methods in information management and crime analysis 
equips security officials better to perform security information management tasks, 
duties and responsibilities. This is why the majority of the people who undergo 
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analytical training are investigators. They are not interested in analytical career paths 
but want to utilise the proven techniques of analysis in their cases under 
investigation (Peterson, 1994: 6). According to Ratcliffe (2009: 160), it is increasingly 
accepted that analysts should make recommendations for future courses of action or 
activity based on the findings of the assessment undertake. Analysts are not merely 
data-entry clerks, nor do they work in or for quality control. Data cleaning should 
always be the norm (Reuland, 1997: 27). 
 
Category 2: Steps followed in the analysis process  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to steps followed in the analysis process:  
1. Verify the information 
2. Interpret the information 
3. Decide on action 
4. Discuss with management for implementation 
5. Security officials who provided information are not involved in the analysis 
 
The steps in Category 2 do not indicate an analysis capability. This implies that 
security information is not analysed by qualified analysts.  
 
According to Gotlieb et al. (1994: 137), analysis is the examination and processing of 
information which is directed at providing timely and pertinent information products 
relative to patterns and trend correlation. It is done by trained and qualified analysts 
using analytical computer software. 
 
Category 3:  Analysis products commonly used by security service providers  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the analysis products commonly used 
by security service providers:  
1. Statistical information on incidents  
2. Specific and recurring modus operandi patterns 
3. Geographic concentration patterns on incidents  
4. Security risk analysis report 
5. Security assessments  
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6. Criminal reports 
7. Alerts 
8. Profiles 
 
The responses in Category 3 indicate that security service providers commonly use 
security risk assessments, risk analysis reports and actionable information products. 
No mention has been made of tactical strategies or physical protection systems to 
avert threats and vulnerabilities.  
 
Engaging in the process of analysis suggests that patterns of crime can be identified 
among offenders, offences, victims and places (Newburn et al., 2008: 208). Analysis 
of information by experienced analysts will be able to assist the police and security 
officials with the most appropriate analysis results that will enable them to tactically 
plan operations to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses  
 
In the majority of cases analysis products are never obtained directly from analysts, 
instead they are obtained from supervisors and managers. Security officials are not 
always given the opportunity to directly task the analyst on their analysis needs. This 
breakdown in communication between a security official and an analyst leads to 
misunderstanding and mistrust, specifically when requesting additional information 
for the enrichment of the information on hand. These are some of the many 
problems that confront security officials on a daily basis, which require managerial 
interventions. These problems have to be addressed directly by management 
(Ratcliffe, 2009: 129). 
 
Category 4:  Advantages in the analysis of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the advantages in the analysis of 
security information:  
1. Identify vulnerability areas 
2. Provides risk mitigation strategies 
3. Provides operational responses to crime 
4. Directs investigations 
5. Improves security measures 
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6. Directs training 
7. Helps us to understand the collected security information 
 
The responses in Category 4 indicate that there are many advantages for the 
organisation which is being protected, if security information is analysed by trained 
and experienced analysts.  
 
Category 5:  Disadvantages in the analysis of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the disadvantages in the analysis of 
security information:  
1. Time consuming 
2. Incorrect recommendation by analysts 
3. Inexperienced analysts 
4. Costly exercise 
5. Inaccurate information is provided to analysts 
6. Validity and source of the information is not tested 
7. Insufficient information is given for analysis 
 
The responses in Category 5 indicate that management does not do much to 
manage data integrity and quality control the analysis result before it is passed onto 
the security officials for application.  
 
Category 6: Problems experienced in the analysis of security information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to problems experienced in the analysis of 
security information:  
1. No indexing, sorting and storage of collected security information takes place 
2. Information is manually recorded in registers by supervisors 
3. No policy framework for the analysis of security information  
4. Many security service providers do not have analysts in their employ 
5. Shortage of trained analysts  
6. Shortage of computers  
7. Shortage of computer software programs to do specific analysis 
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The responses in Category 6 indicate to management related problems relevant to 
the absence of a policy framework and the need for human and physical resources. 
 
Category 7: Solutions to overcome the problems in the analysis of security 
information 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to solutions to overcome problems in the 
analysis of security information:  
1. Need for analysis computer software programmes  
2. Qualified experience personnel should be used to do analysis 
3. Training of analysts  
4. Develop collection plans in consultation with analysts 
5. Establish a data analysis centre to monitor incidents 
6. Analyse information in a structured way 
 
The responses in Category 7 indicate to management related solutions which will 
need the formulation of a policy framework to handle analysis in a structured way 
and physical and human resource interventions.  
 
3.2.1.3 Theme 3: Implementation of security risk control measures  
 
The security officer responsible for the implementation of the specific security risk 
control measure should be in the best position to reach a reasoned conclusion on 
the most likely security risk control measure, to obviate or minimise the identified 
threat (Montgomery & Majeski, 2005: 598).  
 
Category 1:  Implementation of security risk control measures  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the implementation of security risk 
control measures:  
1. Prevent crimes  
2. Mitigate risks 
3. Reduce and recover losses 
4. Apprehend perpetrators 
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5. Future planning 
6. Corrective action 
7. Supervisor makes a decision on how to handle the information 
8. Physical security is improved if the budget is available  
9. Supervisors investigate the report 
10. Forward to SAPS for action 
11. Investigate disciplinary irregularities 
12. Use in awareness programme 
13. Forward to information management companies such as SABRIC, CGRI 
and PSI. 
 
The responses in Category 1 indicate that implementation of security risk control 
measures is operationalised on the decisions made by a supervisor. Security risk 
control measures are implemented for a variety of reasons and not related to a 
specific organisational security strategy. It is clear that there are no standing 
operating procedures on which decisions may be made by security officials at 
grassroots level for the implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
The decision by a supervisor to implement a specific security risk control measure or 
solution is subjected to a rigorous return-on-investment exercise, during which 
process the financial benefits of the security measure is quantified. This exercise 
assists in identifying and in isolating the most cost-effective security measure for 
possible intervention. This is important in order to contribute to the decision-making 
process and to overcome resistance from top management in terms of obtaining 
their approval for funding and implementation of the recommended security risk 
control measures (Rogers, 2008: 152-153). The implementation of the security risk 
control measure is more quantitatively driven in terms of cost than the qualitative 
designing of the security risk control measure to deter, detect, delay and respond to 
the intruder. 
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Category 2: Intended users of the security risk control measures 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the intended users of the security risk 
control measures:  
1. Security personnel 
2. Investigators 
3. Police 
4. Auditors 
5. Legal services 
6. General personnel  
7. Visitors to facility  
8. Management  
 
The responses in Category 2 indicate that the intended users of the security risk 
control measures include security personnel, staff from the organisation/company 
being protected and police personnel.  
 
To promote a culture of applying creative strategies, the American policing agencies 
have introduced an increasingly popular strategy of providing police officers with 
crime analysis information in the form of crime maps. The aim is to encourage 
officers to use crime information, determine problem areas and modify their 
strategies accordingly. This goes together with training and resources to allow for the 
full capability of crime mapping to be realised (Paulsen, 2004: 234). 
 
Category 3: Dissemination of recommendations for the implementation of 
security risk control measures  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to the dissemination of recommendations 
for the implementation of security risk control measures:  
1. Reports 
2. Meetings 
3. Emails 
4. Handouts 
5. Telephonic conversation 
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6. It takes about 24hours to disseminate recommendations for operationalisation 
7. The outgoing shift disseminates information to the incoming shift, so that they 
become aware of any incident that occurred.  
8. Information is disseminated on a need-to-know basis 
 
The responses in Category 3 indicate that verbal and written communication 
methods are used to disseminate recommendations for the implementation of 
security risk control measures. The cause for concern is that information takes about 
24hours to be operationalised. There seems to be no regulated way in which security 
information is disseminated for application.  
 
Jordaan (2003a: 59) refers to dissemination as vital, as it encompasses information 
that was gathered and analysed and which must be packaged and delivered to the 
clients who can use it. Dissemination of the recommendation for application of 
specific security risk control measures is the first stage of the application process. 
Dissemination can be carried out in several different ways, namely, by attending 
briefings and strategy sessions, presenting verbal reports, providing written reports, 
having face-to-face contact with investigators and whenever the need arises. Public 
information systems – both the written and electronic media may also be used to 
disseminate security risk control measures (Reuland, 1997: 35). 
 
Category 4: Feedback on the implementation of the security risk control 
measures  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to feedback on the implementation of the 
security risk control measures:  
1. Reports 
2. Meetings 
3. E mail 
4. Telephonic communication  
5. In many instances no feedback is given 
6. In urgent cases feedback is given over the phone and followed up with a 
written report 
7. Feedback is important 
8. Feedback to be given in a form of a memo 
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The responses in Category 4 indicate that verbal and written communication 
methods are used to give feedback. It would appear as though feedback is given as 
determined by individual end-users of the security risk control measures 
 
According to Reuland (1997: 36), feedback is the informing of the crime analyst of 
the outcome of the information or crime analysis product.  
 
Category 5: Advantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to advantages of the implementation of 
security risk control measures:  
1. Helps planning on operational and strategic levels 
2. Planning budget for future year 
3. Keeps abreast with trends and methods 
4. Gives competent edge  
5. Adds value to customer needs 
6. Protects own interest 
7. Reduces security risks 
8. Keeps facility safe  
 
The responses in Category 5 indicate that there are many advantages, for the 
organisation being protected, in the implementation of security risk control measures. 
The most important advantage is the reduction of risks. 
  
The implementation of the security risk control measures should benefit the 
organisation by being able to detect an adversary, delay the adversary and be able 
to provide timely responses by security personnel (Garcia, 2008: 5). 
 
A layered security strategy built around all aspects of an organisation will make sure 
that security risk control measures are applied accordingly (Johnson, 2005: 334). 
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Category 6: Disadvantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures  
 
Conceptual construction in relation to disadvantages of the implementation of 
security risk control measures:  
1. Use of illegally obtained information  
2. Incorrect information may lead to arrest of innocent persons and civil claims 
3. Selling of information to criminals  
4. Leakage of information 
5. Abuse of security information 
6. Need experienced personnel to apply strategies 
7. Physical security protection systems may be unaffordable 
8. Incompetence  
9. Language barriers 
 
The responses in Category 6 indicate that the implementation of security risk control 
measures is not managed according to a standardised framework.  
 
Category 7: Problems experienced in the implementation of security risk 
control measures 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to problems experienced in the 
implementation of security measures:  
1. No policy framework for the implementation of security risk control measures 
2. Feedback is given informally 
3. No evaluation on the implementation of the security risk control measures 
4. Shortage of personnel  
5. No budget 
6. Clients are not prepared to fund physical security protection systems 
7. No training is provided for the implementation of security risk control 
measures 
8. Lack of understanding 
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The responses in Category 7 indicate that the problems are management related 
and refer to human, financial and physical support problems.   
  
Category 8: Solutions to overcome the problems in the implementation of 
security risk control measures 
 
Conceptual construction in relation to solutions to overcome problems in the 
implementation of security risk control measures: 
1. Employ the correct people for the job 
2. Better communication between management and end-users 
3. Have a separate unit for the implementation of the security risk control 
measures 
4. Need to have a structured way of dealing with information control measures 
5. Marketing the need for the implementation of specific security risk control 
measures 
 
The responses in Category 8 indicate to management related solutions which will 
require human and physical resource support. 
 
3.2.1.4  Development of the grounded theory  
 
The themes, categories, concepts and processes which have been discussed under 
Paragraph 3.2.1.1, 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 above, led to the unfolding of a storyline in 
relation to the collection, analysis and the implementation of security risk control 
measures. The researcher looked at what was most striking in each of the areas of 
this study and considered that to be the storyline. Once the researcher had 
committed himself to a storyline in each of the areas of study, he moved beyond 
description to conceptualisation of the storyline by analysing the story and giving the 
central phenomena a name and as a category related it to the other categories. The 
lists of categories were used to identify a category which was abstract enough to 
encompass all that had been described in the story. This helped identify the core 
category. The themes, categories and a storyline (assumptions) which led to the 
core category and the development of the grounded theory are schematically 
provided in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 below, which was designed by the researcher.  
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Figure 3.2:  The underlying processes in relation to the collection of security 
information 
 
Theme 1: Collection of security information 
 
1. Collection Sources 
 
2. Personnel Tasking 
 
3. Types of information 
 
4. Methods of collection 
 
5. Steps followed in the collection process 
 
6. Levels of classification 
 
7. Advantages of collection 
 
8. Disadvantages of collection 
 
9. Problems with collection 
 
10. Solutions to overcome problems 
 
 
 
Storyline 1: There seems to be no communication between the client and the 
collector of the security information. A security plan has not been mentioned as the 
guiding instrument on the type of security information to be collected. Security 
officials do not know the focus areas of the organisation and the needs of the client. 
As a result money, human resources and technology is wasted on collecting security 
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information which is not a need to the client. This wastage of resources is not good 
for an organisation whose reason for existence is profit making. It amounts to 
fruitless expenditure. The assumption is that the collection of security information is 
not strategically driven by a strategy or a plan.  
 
Figure 3.3:  The underlying processes in relation to the analysis of security 
information  
 
Theme 2: Analysis of security information 
 
1. Analysis of security information 
 
2. Steps followed in analysis 
 
3. Analysis products 
 
4. Advantages in analysis 
 
5. Disadvantages in analysis 
 
6. Problems in analysis 
 
7. Solutions to overcome problems 
 
 
Storyline 2: No indication that a threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and 
incident pattern analysis is being done. It would seem as though the focus is on 
looking at incident information which can be analysed by investigators and security 
supervisors. There seems to be no need for analysed information by the clients, as 
the analysis is not directed at addressing specific threats or vulnerabilities. No 
mention is made of automated system software used for analysis. The assumption 
(hypothesis) is that qualified analysts are not employed to do analysis on threats, 
vulnerabilities and incidents.  
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Figure 3.4:  The underlying processes in relation to the implementation of 
security risk control measures  
 
Theme 3: Implementation of security risk control measures 
 
1. Implementation decision 
 
2. Intended users 
 
3. Dissemination 
 
4. Feedback 
 
5. Advantages 
 
6. Disadvantages 
 
7. Problems in the 
implementation of security 
risk control measures 
 
8. Solutions to 
overcome problems 
 
 
Storyline 3: The implementation of security risk control measures is not considered 
in conjunction with the organisation’s security plan. Security information is collected 
randomly (without any structure, benchmarks or integration) without knowing the 
client’s specific security needs. A criticality assessment to implement the analysed 
security risk control measures is only done after money, human resources and 
technology had been invested on the collection and analysis of the security 
information. Management only decides during the implementation phase not to 
implement the analysed security risk control measures due to the costs involved. 
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The implementation of the security risk control measures is then shelved. Much of 
the analysed security risk control measures are not qualitatively assessed by 
evaluating its deterrence, detection, delay and response capabilities (and impact 
after application). The assumption is that objectives such as the reduction of crime, 
increase in detection rates and the prevention of losses are not considered in the 
implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
Selective coding is a process of selecting the core category. The process unfolded 
by systematically relating to other categories, validating those relationships and filling 
in categories that need further refinement and development. The selective coding 
process resulted in the following conclusion: the core category that emerged after 
coding was the security officials’ “management of security information”. According to 
Glaser (1992: 155) and Straus and Corbin (1990: 23), for the grounded theory to 
qualify as a theory, it must satisfy the following requirements:  
1. It must be applicable to the phenomenon under study. 
2. The theory must be understandable.  
3. The theory must be applicable and relevant to the substantive themes under 
study.  
4. The theory must be adaptable or controllable.  
 
The coding process discussed under Paragraph 3.2.1 above, led to the development 
of a grounded theory in relation to security information management. The grounded 
theory is that security officials do not manage security information by using a 
standardised framework (De Vos, 2007: 345). The grounded theory for security 
information management is explained and described together with its important 
points in a schematic presentation (Figure 3.5). 
86 
3.3 SCHEMATIC PROPOSAL OF THE GROUNDED THEORY  
 
The grounded theory for security information management is presented 
schematically in Figure 3.5, which was produced by the researcher. 
 
Figure 3.5:  Security information management: grounded theory 
SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
 
   COLLECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION 
   Collection sources 
- Internal/external sources 
   Personnel tasking 
- Security managers/Supervisors 
 Risk managers/Investigators 
 Phase1  Types of information 
- Incident information 
- Information on physical protection systems 
   Methods of collection 
   - Technical methods  
   - Human methods  
   Collection process 
- Receive voluntary information from third parties  
- Information is recorded in pocket books  
- Supervisor is informed verbally 
- Supervisor enters the information in a register 
(occurrence book) in the control room 
- Forward to intelligence unit 
- Supervisor informs management of the information  
- Store security information in electronic systems 
Protection of information 
- Unregulated information protection measures 
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   ANALYSIS OF SECURITY INFORMATION  
   Analysis process 
   - Verify the information 
   - Interpret the information 
 Phase 2  - Decide on action 
   - Discuss with management  
   - Security officials who provided information are not 
involved in the analysis 
Analysis products 
- Actionable Information products     
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL 
MEASURES 
Decision to implement security risk control measures 
    - Supervisors decide on the implementation of security risk 
control measures  
   Identify intended users  
 Phase 3  - Security personnel 
   - Personnel from the protected organisation 
   - SAPS 
    Dissemination  
- Verbal and written communication 
   Feedback  
- Verbal and written communication 
 
3.3.1  Exposition of the grounded theory in security information management 
 
The grounded theory around security management which was outlined in Figure 3.5 
is explained hereunder: 
 
Management of security information is divided into three phases, namely:  
i) collection phase; 
ii) analysis phase; and  
iii) implementation phase.  
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The first phase cannot stand on its own, as it is influenced by the analysis and 
implementation phases. The collected information must be analysed and 
implemented as security risk control measures to complete the security information 
management chain.  
 
Phase 1: Collection of security information 
 
Collection of security information is the first phase of the security information 
management chain. Security information is collected on incidents and physical 
protection systems. Security information is collected from internal and external 
sources by security managers, supervisors, risk managers and investigators. 
Security service providers employ technical and human methods to collect the 
information. Voluntary information received from human sources is recorded in the 
security official’s diary. The supervisor is informed of the information. Supervisor 
enters the information in a register (occurrence book) in the control room. If the 
company has an intelligence unit, it is forwarded to the intelligence unit for collation, 
analysis, interpretation and the obtaining of missing additional information (if deemed 
necessary). If the organisation is linked to an information management company 
such as SABRIC, PSI or CGRI, the information on the incident is sent to them for 
further management, i.e. adding to information received from other entities or 
organisations serving the same sector. The supervisor informs management of the 
information. The information is classified using different classification methods for the 
sake of protection. The classified information is stored in a database. 
 
Phase 2: Analysis of security information 
 
The analysis phase is the second phase of the security information management 
chain. This phase refers to the analysis of the collected information. The collected 
information is passed onto supervisors for a decision. The supervisor verifies and 
interprets the information, decides on the most appropriate action, discusses it with 
management when necessary and implements the relevant security measures. 
Security officials who provided the information are not involved in the analysis and 
decision making of the collected information. Only some of the large organisations 
have the requisite infrastructure with qualified analysts. Smaller security service 
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providers do not find it financially viable to have an infrastructure with analysis 
capabilities within their organisation/company. Those that do have analysis 
capabilities mainly produce actionable information products for implementation. 
 
Phase 3: Implementation of security risk control measures 
 
The third phase of the security information management chain is the implementation 
of security risk control measures. Here a decision is made by the supervisor on 
whether to apply security risk control measures or not. If a decision is made to apply 
specific security risk control measures, it is disseminated using verbal or written 
communication to the intended user/s. The intended users include the security 
personnel, personnel from the organisation being protected or the SAPS. Feedback 
is also requested from the end user. Feedback is usually given using verbal or 
written communication.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This process of building a grounded theory, unfolded by means of the analysis of the 
data obtained via the semi-structured and focus group interviews. The data was 
analysed using open coding, axial coding and selective coding processes. This 
helped determine the status quo of the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures by security service 
providers in Gauteng. The grounded theory was generated. The grounded theory 
assisted the research to further understand the status quo and the existing problems 
in security information management. The researcher achieved reliability and validity 
by making certain there was no drifting of the definitions of the codes and the 
meaning of the codes during the process of coding. Data was constantly compared 
with the codes and by making notes about the codes and their definitions/meanings. 
Themes and categories with definitions and meanings were also checked with the 
participants, to obtain the participants contribution on their accuracy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
 
4. 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been said that:  
…security is both a state of being and a means to that end. As a state of 
being, security suggests two quite distinct objective and subjective 
conditions. And as an objective condition, it takes a number of possible 
forms. Firstly, it is the condition of being without threat: the hypothetical 
state of absolute security. Secondly, it is defined by the naturalisation of 
threats: the state of being protected from. Thirdly, it is a form of 
avoidance or non exposure to danger ….. As a subjective condition, 
security again suggests both the positive condition of feeling safe and 
freedom from anxiety or apprehension defined negatively by reference to 
insecurity (Zedner, 2003: 155). 
 
For the purpose of this study, security information is referred to as information 
related to any incident, threat or vulnerability which has the potential to exploit an 
asset or group of assets and thereby cause losses to an organisation (Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006: 25). Security information is important to reduce crime, increase 
detection rates and prevent losses. For many years society has relied exclusively on 
the police to prevent and control crime. It is now the time for the security services to 
play a greater role in the prevention and control of crime than ever before (Fischer et 
al., 2008: 41). Due to limited literature on security information and the similarities 
between security information on threats and incidents of crime, literature on the 
collection, analysis and implementation of crime information will also be discussed.  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive literature study on the collection and 
analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures.  
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4.2  SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CULTURE 
 
4.2.1  Security awareness culture  
 
Despite the efforts by the police, community programs and private security, crime 
continues to be a major concern for most citizens in South Africa (Van Rooyen, 
2008: 2). There is close relationship between the rise of private security and changes 
to mainstream policing. Community expectations about the ability of the police to 
control and regulate crime have dropped and fear of crime has risen. Awareness has 
grown that paying for private security services is acceptable and sensible for 
individuals and corporations (Smith & Natalier, 2005: 112-113).  
 
According to Louw (2001: 4), the absence of an “information culture” in the SAPS 
gave rise to problems in policing. The events of the September 11, 2001, attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., have 
changed the face of security operations in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
A culture of security awareness became a common theme considered by almost 
every person in the world (Fischer et al., 2008: 1).  
 
A culture of security is the logical conclusion to a well-driven security awareness 
programme. Once people become aware of incidents, threats and vulnerabilities 
affecting the assets of an organisation, it is in their nature to react to it. Well 
motivated people want to solve a problem if they feel concerned about it. A culture of 
security is not an objective in itself; it is a state of mind and ‘the way things are done 
around the organisation’ which supports achievement of broader organisational 
objectives. Establishing or even defining a security culture that will do this is not 
simple. Many attributes are involved to shape behaviours, attitudes and trust. Given 
the similarities between safety and security, we should consider the idea that a high 
performing security culture is also equally an informed culture (Talbot & Jakeman, 
2008: 62).  
 
Security cultures are highly dependent on the knowledge gained from rare incidents, 
mistakes and near misses. Organisational culture on the other hand plays a key role 
in incident reporting. The key element here is that the organisational culture has to 
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support a no blame environment where people feel safe to report near misses or 
minor events that might otherwise go unnoticed (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 66).  
 
4.2.2  Security management culture 
 
Because of their positions in organisations and companies, security managers need 
to play a primary role in creating a thriving environment for the awareness of security 
information. According to Fischer et al., (2008: 149), “being aware of all possibilities 
is the characteristic of a good security manager. The best manager can think like a 
thief and thus is able to consider policies to reduce the vulnerability of company 
property. Therefore, a manager must develop the ability to analyse threats and 
vulnerabilities.”  
 
Managers are found in all areas of work and at different levels within an organisation 
ranging from supervisor to chief executive officer. They are responsible for running 
the organisation, developing strategies, setting targets and objectives, overseeing 
projects and co-ordinating activities. This is done to achieve performance targets and 
to ensure that everything runs smoothly. The size and scope of the responsibility 
may differ, depending on the size of the organisation, department, project, team or 
small business. There are certain common skills which managers need in order to 
manage security information effectively and efficiently. Managers need to: 
• plan-decide how best to achieve the targets for a particular responsibility area; 
• organise-decide on the most suitable ways of using resources (people, money, 
material and information) to maximise efficiency and profitability; 
• direct-communicate effectively and guide others towards the organisational goals 
and objectives; and 
• control-monitor and evaluate how the security plan is being carried out. This will 
involve setting timescales and target dates for goals and objectives and 
measuring progress at each stage. There may also be a need to adjust the plan 
to correct for delays and take advantage of new opportunities (Burt, 2004: 10-11) 
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4.3  COLLECTION OF SECURITY INFORMATION  
 
The first step in security information management is collection. This study involves 
the collection of security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. The 
collection of security information must follow specific legal procedures and 
processes. Information collection must involve all personnel and customers who 
come into contact with the organisation. It must cover the entire organisation. There 
should be proper management and control of the collected security information at all 
levels of the organisation. To put money into security information management is 
investing in the company’s future (Fischer et al., 2008: 148-156).  
 
Currently, very little notice is taken of threats and vulnerabilities on a day to day 
basis. If this information is immediately collected and acted upon, it will result in the 
eliminating, disguising or lessening of the vulnerabilities, so that threats do not 
materialise. The local environment may provide information about the threat for a 
specific organisation. Conditions outside the organisation and inside the organisation 
should be considered in this regard. Conditions outside the organisation such as the 
general attitude of the community, whether the surrounding area is urban or rural 
and the presence of well known extremist groups, can provide information on 
threats. Conditions inside the organisation, such as the workforce, labour issues, 
industrial relations policies, security awareness and human reliability programs, may 
also affect the potential threat (Smit, 1989: 4-5).  
 
An environmental scanning of the local and national population can be useful in 
determining a potential threat to a specific organisation. Any discontented and 
disgruntled group of the population should be addressed. Special attention should be 
given to war veterans, technically skilled people, political extremists and employees 
with experiences in or access to similar organisations. There are several features of 
an organisation that may make it more or less attractive to an adversary if there is a 
perception that these features can be used to his/her advantage. Geographic and 
structural differences of the organisation, the attractiveness of specific assets and 
the adversaries’ assessment of vulnerabilities are a few of these features (Garcia, 
2008: 32).  
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Two types of information on crime is important, the first is information as knowledge, 
which is provided first hand by victims, complainants, witnesses and offenders which 
can be related directly to investigators and the courts. Information may also come 
from those who do not have first hand knowledge of a crime, such as those from 
informants or opinion from experts. The second type is information as data, most 
often in the form of objects, documents, images, recordings and scientific samples 
from which investigators and courts can infer facts about the case (Stelfox, 2009: 
86).  
 
Crime information must be timely, because the chances of apprehending an offender 
responsible for a series of cases depend on quick identification of the crime pattern 
(Goldsmith et al., 2000: 4).  
 
Recorded crimes suffer from problems of under-reporting and are also highly 
variable in their accuracy and quality, particularly in the way addresses and locations 
are geographically referenced (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001: 239). Even where crimes 
are reported and recorded by the police, the police record may contain a number of 
vague or inaccurate pieces of information. In some instances the inaccuracies may 
be as a result of the interpretation put on the information by the recording official 
(Ainsworth, 2001: 78-79). According to Gardner (2005: 352), the quality of the 
processed information depends largely on how well a police service can store and 
access data. 
 
Reuland (1997: 9) mentions that most organisations probably have few options for 
obtaining external information, since they have little control over external data bases. 
According to Block et al. (1995: 3), the absence of a close working relationship with 
the community, incorporating an effective and mutual exchange of information, 
seems to be a problem in a community.  
 
The following problems were discovered in the SAPS, pertaining to the collection of 
crime information at station level:  
• the recording of exactly where crimes happened; 
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• the classification of certain crimes, e.g. aggravated versus common robbery, 
serious assault versus attempted murder; and 
• updating the SAPS data sheet that provides information on the outcome of a 
case once it has been to court (i.e. whether a conviction was achieved, whether 
the case was withdrawn, etc.) (Louw, 2001: 4).  
 
In many instances deductive or inductive arguments and rational reconstruction are 
not applied to collected information in the investigation of cases. Most detectives 
work in a routine and repetitive fashion, relying on knowledge information of 
complainants, victims, witnesses and suspected persons (Altbeker,1998: 28). 
According to Altbeker (1998: 30-36), the proper collection and analysis of crime 
information in the investigation of crime will increase detection rates.  
 
Paulsen (2004: 234) states that the field of policing has had an uneasy relationship 
with technology, often being slow to adopt new technologies despite their potential 
benefits to policing. Police agencies in the USA rely on the electronic transfer of 
data, laptop computers transmitting data through radio frequencies or scan forms to 
ensure receipt of timely crime data (Goldsmith et al., 2000: 4). According to Reuland 
(1997: 12), although computers have had limitations in the past, an organisation 
needs to decide on the kind of technology that will be required for this purpose. The 
use of mainframe computers and micro-computers should be compared before 
making a choice. Mainframe computers are faster in their searching ability and can 
store far more data than their micro-computing counterparts. Mainframes are 
valuable, however, for storing and archiving data, as long as they can be easily 
assessed by microcomputers (smaller machines).  
 
4.3.1  Kinds of security information 
 
This study is directed at information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities.  
 
Smit (1989: 5) describes information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities as 
follows: 
• incidents (crime/policy violations); 
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• threats (crime, terrorism, foreign intelligence, commercial or industrial; 
competition and maliciousness or other malevolent acts); and  
• vulnerabilities (outcome of the failures, non application, under-application, 
erroneous application or superficial application of security risk control 
measures).  
 
According to Talbot & Jakeman (2008: 66), all incidents of crimes and policy 
violations that had taken place in the organisation should be subject to investigation 
by the police or the organisation where the incident took place. An incident register 
should be used to record all reported incidents. The management of security 
incidents should be addressed in some detail in a policy document on incident 
management and reporting. The particular focus should be on the operationalisation 
of the information. According to DeKock (2011), all crime incidents in the SAPS are 
recorded in registers and computer systems for analysis. This information is 
subsequently used to develop a Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) document for use by 
police officials in their day to day operations. He is of the view that the record of all 
incidents may also be used to develop an Incident Pattern Analysis (IPA) document, 
similar to the CPA. The IPA may also be used by security officials in their day to day 
operations. 
 
Information on vulnerabilities may be collected during vulnerability assessments, site 
survey/inspection or implicitly by observation and complaints received from clients or 
personnel. Information must be collected on any weakness or flaw in the physical 
layout of the organisation, procedures, management, administration, hardware or 
software that may be exploited to cause harm to the institution, business or activity 
(Simonsen, 1998: 202). This information may be used to develop a vulnerability 
assessment document (Garcia, 2006: 306). 
 
Procedure on collecting information on threats begins with a strength, weakness, 
opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis conducted by top management of the 
organisation. Management should prepare a security plan identifying the threats that 
have the potential to adversely affect the organisation. Security information on 
incidents and vulnerabilities should also be considered by management in the 
97 
preparation of the security plan. The identified threats should be grouped according 
to their source, motivation and method of operation. This should be used to develop 
a threat assessment. The recorded incidents and the vulnerability assessment 
should be used to enrich the threat assessment. The threat assessment should be 
used to identify the targets to be addressed. A collection plan should be developed 
from the security plan for the collection of security information on the identified 
threats. This plan should be developed and managed by the senior security manager 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 33).  
 
4.3.2 Collection plan 
 
The Security Manager must develop and manage a security information collection 
plan related to the threats. Security information on incidents and vulnerabilities must 
be taken into consideration in the preparation of the collection plan. The Security 
manager must identify the threats that can become security risks of specific assets. 
The focus areas of the collection plan should be directed at the assets that are 
essential for the organisation to perform its function. It should be grouped according 
to the threat and consequent risk posed (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 33).  
 
According to Peterson (1994: 36), and Bozza (1978: 1), a systematic plan of action 
for the collection of information forms the basis of any security project. A collection 
plan shows what needs to be collected, how it is going to be collected and by what 
date. A collection plan may include a survey instrument, a chronological table and 
possible hypotheses which one intends to prove or disprove. A collection plan is 
usually approved by top management of the organisation being protected (Peterson, 
1994: 36).  
 
4.3.3  Collection sources, methods and techniques  
 
4.3.3.1  Sources 
 
Sources for security information include intelligence sources, crime analysis, studies, 
professional organisations and services, published literature, government directives 
and legislation (Garcia, 2008: 32). 
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According to Smit (1989: 8-10) vulnerability may give way to a security risk. 
Vulnerabilities can be typified as security weaknesses. Different types of 
vulnerabilities may present themselves where no or inadequate security risk control 
measures are in place. Examples of such vulnerabilities include unmaintained 
fences, rusted burglar bars, holes in fences, outdated alarm systems, poor 
supervision of personnel, insufficient security personnel on duty, vehicles not 
properly searched. Information on vulnerabilities also includes information on 
irregular and negligent acts. This information presents itself mostly as physical 
evidence. Security information may be collected on the following actions: 
• failure to act (an omission)while in the employ of the company; 
• legal duty was not carried out; 
• breach of duty; 
• foreseeable Injury to other employees; and 
• actual harm or injury to other employees (Fischer et al., 2008: 131).  
 
Information on the issue of crime may be described as “crime-specific elements that 
distinguish both one criminal incident from another and one group of offences, 
related in one or more ways, from a larger group of similar offences” (Reuland, 1997: 
7). Pre-defined crime data elements that may be collected include for example the 
modus operandi such as points and methods of entry, the suspect’s action, use of 
force or threats. It will also include information on a weapon and suspect’s physical 
descriptors (Reuland, 1997: 11). According to Van Heerden (1986: 216), crime 
information entails solid or liquid material which could establish an associative 
relationship between a person, weapon or vehicle and the crime or the victim. Crime 
information may present itself as either testimonial evidence or forensic evidence 
(Gardner, 2005: 7). The collection of crime information is important, to assess the 
nature and distribution of crime, in order to efficiently allocate resources and 
personnel.  
 
Workplace investigations are undertaken to establish whether an act, intention to act 
or omission may be labelled a crime or an irregularity. This creates an opportunity for 
management to get to know the activities taking place in an organisation. The 
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information collected during the course of an investigation should be stored in the 
database and analysed with other information (Newburn et al., 2008: 426-427).  
 
Before collecting information in any investigation, the investigator should prepare 
himself by obtaining all the relevant information that can assist him in interviewing 
witnesses. Information such as organisational charts, electronic files, personnel 
listings for potential interviews, financial statements, operational statements, public 
documents, press releases and internet postings may be used for this purpose, 
depending on the type of investigation being conducted. If there were anonymous 
tips, complaints or letters, this would be the time to obtain them as well (Van 
Rooyen, 2008: 98).  
 
Corporate investigators are sometimes faced with intricate investigations such as 
white collar crimes and protracted fraud investigations. They need to gather as much 
information as possible, from as many different sources as possible. In any 
investigation, information is the key to success and a start, to the gathering of 
information must be made right from the beginning of the investigation (Montgomery 
& Majeski, 2005: 510). 
 
According to Fischer (2004: 1), investigating officers should have the ability to 
recognise, collect and use crime information in investigations. Crime information 
collected in the investigation of crime will assist the investigating officer to 
reconstruct the incident, ascertain the sequence of events, determine the mode of 
operation, uncover a motive, discover what property was stolen, find out all that the 
criminal may have done and recover physical evidence of the crime (Fischer, 2004: 
48).  
 
Reuland (1997: 10); Vellani and Nahoun (2001: 27); Ainsworth (2001: 63-65); 
Hirschfield and Bowers (2001: 11), identify and discuss the different internal sources 
of crime information used by police agencies internationally. Table 4.1 shows the 
manner in which some of the internal sources may be used to assist in investigation.  
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Table 4.1: Collection of crime information from internal sources 
Internal sources Uses 
Offences/Crime incident 
reports 
Provide information on the crime-specific elements of 
a particular offence and serve as the basis of crime 
analysis.  
Field interview cards Become the primary source of field intelligence about 
suspicious persons interviewed at specific locations 
and times and about the activities of known offenders.  
Evidence reports Determine availability of latent fingerprints.  
Selected calls for service 
 
Identify times during which alarms were triggered in 
areas.  
Investigative supplements Provide additional crime-specific elements that result 
from follow-up investigations and interviews.  
Arrest reports Describe known offenders and the details of how 
crime was committed.  
Traffic citations Provide information about vehicle movements in key 
areas 
Teletypes from local 
agencies 
Track crimes across jurisdictional boundaries 
Confessions from 
arrestees 
Confirm exact modus operandi of offenders.  
Intelligence files Provide information on drug abusers and organised 
crime groups.  
Reuland (1997: 10). 
 
External sources refer to databases under the control of other institutions and 
agencies. It is used to collect and store information that may be relevant to the 
decision makers of another institution or agency. External sources can provide 
valuable information on adult career criminals and known offenders (Reuland, 1997: 
8-9). According to Block et al. (1995: 87), external data sources or data banks are 
often geographically based and information from parole and probation officers, 
mental health outpatient clinics, social services offices and similar agencies located 
in the most probable areas, can also prove to be of value. For example, a serial 
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rapist in New York City emerged as a suspect after the investigator checked parolee 
records for sex offenders.  
 
Reuland (1997: 9) and Block et al. (1995: 87), identify and discuss the different 
external sources of crime information used by police agencies internationally. Table 
4.2 shows the manner in which some of the external sources may be used to assist 
in investigation.  
 
Table 4.2: Collection of crime information from external sources 
External sources Uses 
School records Identify and track problem children, identify potential 
serious habitual offenders 
Bail information Identify suspects committing crimes while on bail 
Parole information Provide information to officers about the release of known 
offenders into the community 
Probation information  Provide information to officers about conditions of 
probation related to associates, places, alcohol use, etc.  
Furloughed prisoners  Track appearance of old modus operandi over a series of 
weekends 
Other agencies Identify and track crimes and offenders across 
jurisdictional boundaries 
Census data Understand the demographics of a given area 
Reuland (1997: 9). 
 
According to Reuland (1997: 9), an inter-agency database was created in 
Jacksonville, United States of America, along with the juvenile courts, probation 
officers and social service agencies, to share offender-oriented information. In a 
short time, information about truancy, referral rates for absences, tardiness, 
behaviour problems, student conduct violations and academic history was made 
available for the purpose of creating a multi-agency supervision and intervention 
plan. A clear picture of disruptive incidents and trends emerged, along with additional 
knowledge of how youths interact with other students. From such an analysis, 
troubled youths could be identified more quickly and appropriate interventions 
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applied more broadly. Such efforts were not possible previously, because the 
participating agencies had believed for a long time that information could not or 
should not be shared. The result was the maintenance of separate and usually 
incomplete files. Currently, most jurisdictions allow inter-agency sharing of juvenile 
information.  
 
The Chicago Police Department is supported by a Geographic information system 
(GIS) called a Geoarchive. Characteristics of the Geoarchive are address-based 
data, information on both law enforcement and the community and an analysis that is 
used at community level (Block et al., 1995: 222). The Geoarchive acts as an 
institutionalised memory for law enforcement, holding not only law enforcement 
information, but also community information that is not always readily available to the 
local law enforcement official. The community data comes from a variety of city, state 
and federal agencies. The law enforcement data and the community data can be 
used together for decision-making and problem-solving (Block et al., 1995: 223-226).  
 
Open source information from interviews with employees, neighbours, competitors, 
fire and ambulance crews, union representatives, security officers, postal 
employees, regular delivery drivers/suppliers and community members may serve as 
vital collection points (Broder, 2000: 93).  
 
4.3.3.2 Methods 
 
Security service providers generally use a security survey instrument to conduct a 
security assessment of the organisation being protected. In addition to the 
information included on the security survey instrument, the security official is 
required to use observation and interviews to obtain pertinent information that may 
not have been required by the security survey instrument itself. Security surveys can 
take the form of a standardised checklist compiled at the discretion of management 
or a complex report. These assessments are carried out whenever the need arises 
(O’Block, 1981: 254). A security survey is a critical on-site examination and analysis 
of an industrial plant, business, home, public private institution carried out in the light 
of a prevailing criminal threat. The security survey will determine the present security 
status, identify security deficiencies or excesses, determine the level of protection 
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needed and make recommendations to improve overall security (Fennelley, 2004: 
141).  
 
Early in 1994, Computer Statistics (Compstat) crime reduction strategy was instituted 
by William Bratton, in New York City. It started by collecting information, analysing 
the information and implementing strategies to reduce crime. Electronic pin-mapping 
software and the mainframe computer network was used to manage the crime 
information. It is a process which can be adopted in areas other than policing. It has 
since been adopted and adapted to improve other local government agencies in the 
USA. In practice, the development and use of the Compstat as a data source is a 
prime example of information led policing. It uses information technology to analyse 
crime, collate individual crimes in different policing areas and develop crime patterns 
which can indicate linkages to show the work of individual offenders, criminal gangs 
or syndicates and allows resources to be targeted effectively to deal with crime and 
the criminals (Edwards, 2011: 300-301). Managing the growth and improvement of 
the Compstat process is challenging, especially with regard to technology and 
software changes. Computer hardware, operating systems and mapping software 
change at a very rapid pace. The department does not adopt every software revision 
and operating system upgrade. Eventually, some changes do take place. In some 
instances new hardware may not support older software and vendors may 
discontinue technical support for their older products. An ongoing assessment of 
changing technology and its impact has become a routine part of managing the 
Compstat process (Goldsmith et al., 2000: 12-13).  
 
During workplace investigations information is collected using different information 
collection methods. This task may be given to a corporate investigator in an 
organisation. A corporate investigator’s function is highly skilled and challenging. As 
a corporate investigator he/she should have the knowledge and skills in information 
collection and fact-finding methods. It is the responsibility of the corporate 
investigator to select the most appropriate information collection method/s and use 
them properly to achieve the investigative objective (Smit, 1989: 4). According to 
Ferraro & Spain (2006: 97), although each information collection method may be 
used alone, the best investigation results are usually achieved by combining them in 
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some logical fashion. Some of the methods that can be used in collecting security 
information include the following:  
 
Physical surveillance 
Physical surveillance takes place by either foot or vehicle, in order to follow a subject 
or subjects and this is called “mobile” or “tailing” or the investigator remains in a fixed 
position to observe a subject or subjects and this is called a “stakeout” or “static” 
surveillance (Ferraro & Spain, 2006: 120).  
 
Electronic surveillance 
Electronic surveillance, which is similar to that of physical surveillance except that it 
is carried out with electronic technology, for example CCTV cameras, etc. (Van 
Rooyen, 2001: 98) 
 
Research and auditing 
Research involves the examination of information from external sources for example 
public records. Auditing applies to those records and documents internal to the 
organisation – specifically the examination of documents and information that would 
not normally be available to someone outside the organization. These might include 
attendance records, productivity reports, personnel files, etc. (Ferraro & Spain, 2006: 
128).  
 
Forensic analysis 
Forensic analysis includes all forms of information gathering and analysis that 
employs science or scientific method. Examples include bodily fluid analysis, 
chemical and substance analysis, fingerprint examination and comparison, accident, 
crime or incident reconstruction, computer forensics, various deception and detection 
methods (including polygraph) and forensics document examination (Ferraro & 
Spain, 2006: 140). Ribaux, Girod, Walsh, Margot, Mizrahi and Clivaz (2003: 58), 
mention that there is considerable potential to combine forensic data within 
geographical information.  
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Undercover investigations 
Undercover investigations, although complicated and difficult at times, can be of 
great value to the protection and preservation of corporate assets. However, 
undercover investigations should only be chosen as a measure when no other 
alternatives are available and when the company can reasonably expect a significant 
return on the investment. Therefore, knowing when and how to employ undercover 
investigations with the assistance of the SAPS and the National Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP) is critical for its success (Van Rooyen, 2008: 275-279).  
 
Interviews and interrogation 
Van Rooyen (2008: 318-319), states that investigators experience the “information 
seeking interview” and the “admission seeking interview”. There are a few skills more 
important to the fact finder than the ability to obtain information through effective 
interviews and Interrogation. Although volumes have been written on the subject, 
one need to examine interviewing and interrogation as an investigative tool to gather 
information in workplace investigations. The terms interviewing and interrogations 
mean different things to different people. Often these terms are used 
interchangeably, confusing both the user and the public. Many practitioners define 
interviewing as non accusatory. This technique is used to gather information. 
Alternatively, the interrogation technique is seen as accusatory and its purpose is to 
gain the truth (Ferraro & Spain, 2006: 187).  
 
4.3.3.3 Techniques (means) 
 
MacHovec (2006: 8), states that security officers also do electronic sweeps to detect 
“bugged” rooms, vehicles or equipment to prevent theft of trade secrets (e.g. a 
competitor’s agent working undercover as an employee within the rival 
company/business). They also protect executives from harassment, injury, 
kidnapping or terrorist attacks. As undercover employees or consultants they can 
prevent fraud, theft, property damage or criminal acts by suppliers, employees or 
outsiders. Industrial security protects offices, factories, warehouses or prized 
possessions against damage or theft. Cyber-crime investigators detect and prevent 
hackers from planting viruses or stealing credit card numbers or accessing a 
company’s information and operational databases.  
106 
The techniques or means used to collect crime information for the investigation of 
crime typically include the overt crime information collection technique, which can be 
generally defined as personal interaction with people and the covert crime 
information collection method. This is commonly known as intelligence gathering. 
The overt information collection technique is used to collect crime information 
through open means (Stelfox, 2009: 95). Open means of crime information collection 
takes place by means of personal interaction with people and the perusal of public 
information sources. Many of the people who may provide open source information 
are complainants, witnesses to crimes, victims of crimes, suspects, journalists and 
representatives from agencies/institutions (Van Rooyen, 2008: 218). Open means 
also include the collection of security information from the television, radio, scientific 
journals, news bureau, current affairs, grey literature, databases, images, maps, 
libraries, literature, academic public reports, private companies and people (Lyman, 
1988: 147). Scenes of crime may also be an open means for the collection of crime 
information as this is the location of observable information which is gathered before 
it can be processed as evidence (Marais & Van Rooyen, 1990: 19).  
 
The covert crime information collection technique is used to collect crime information 
in a clandestine way or closed means. Closed means of collecting crime information 
refers to actions of people who are generally known as informants or agent 
provocateurs. These informants or agent provocateurs carry out clandestine 
operations to obtain crime information for the investigation of crime (Matthews, 1986: 
189). According to Lyman (1988: 147), closed means include the use of physical 
surveillance, electronic surveillance, informants and undercover officers, for the 
purpose of reducing crime, increasing detection rates and prevention of losses.  
 
According to Altbeker (1998: 34), in order to move against the leader of a criminal 
group or syndicate, it is necessary to have information and evidence. Information can 
be obtained through closed means, namely, electronic interception of 
communication, from informers and agents. If recordings of conversations or 
intercepted mail are to be used as evidence, permission must be obtained for these 
procedures and information supplied by an informer or agent can only be used in 
court if the person is prepared to testify. For that reason the police tend to use 
agents, because, as paid police officials, they are certain to testify. Informers, on the 
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other hand, who are associates of the subjects, usually refuse to testify or may be 
discredited when they do. Police officers can provide valuable advice on the 
application of covert information techniques (Stelfox, 2009: 123-124).  
 
Despite the potential for the use of closed means, there are resource constraints 
when using these means, as they are costly, require high levels of commitment and 
skill and most importantly, require visionary and innovative managers. Confidential 
sources need to be employed in a more proactive, strategic and targeted way, so 
that the benefits may outweigh the risks (Ratcliffe, 2009: 134-135). For these 
reasons, closed means are mainly used to guide investigations into syndicate crime. 
The difficulty, however, is ensuring that the information gathered can eventually be 
used as evidence in court (Altbeker, 1998: 34).  
 
4.3.4  Security information collection capacity 
 
The National Strategic Intelligence Act, No 39 of 1994 was legislated to carry out the 
functions as stipulated in section 210 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, No.108 of 1996. This national legislation empowers specific government 
agencies to maintain an intelligence collection capacity, for the sake of national 
security. SAPS have a crime intelligence gathering unit which gathers intelligence for 
the purpose of policing (De Kock, 2011). Private security industry is excluded from 
this legislation. The Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, No.56 of 2001 does not 
provide for the management of security information in the security industry in South 
Africa.  
 
Security information management in the South African security industry is not given 
the same attention as risk management. Emphasis is placed on the identification of 
vulnerabilities, studying of risks and optimising risk management alternatives. 
Human resources and technology are seldom used to obtain information on 
incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. According to Garcia (2008: 15), to understand 
an organisation, information on many different aspects of the organisation must be 
obtained and reviewed.This includes obtaining information on the threat definition as 
well as the target that need to be protected. The required information need to be 
defined by management and organised to make it usable. The information of 
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adversaries may include information on motivation, potential goals based on targets, 
tactics, numbers and capabilities. Sources of information should include intelligence, 
crime studies, professional organisations, published literature, policy and legislation 
and many more (Garcia, 2008: 32-34). 
  
In the United States of America the collection of security information in the private 
security industry is authorised by management. The information is directed at 
safeguarding an organisation’s assets against threats. Information is collected on 
incidents, threats and vulnerabilities that may exploit the assets of an organisation 
and result in losses (Fischer et al., 2008: 149). Many security service providers use 
investigators to collect security information. Investigators need to master the art of 
information collection. Information is everywhere; investigators need to know what to 
look for and whom to ask. It is therefore important to encourage workplace 
investigations in order to maintain such a collection capacity (Nemeth, 2010: 87). 
Security officers only collect security information when conducting investigation on 
incidents for the sake of disciplinary investigations or reporting to the police.  
 
Information collected on a daily basis is very seldom analysed or enriched as 
intelligence for implementation. This is because many security service providers do 
not have an analysis capability. This information is handled by supervisors and given 
to the police where necessary. According to Jordaan (2003b: 59), timely and 
actionable security information must be enriched into intelligence or evidence by the 
intelligence unit/collection unit or the investigator, who may add value to the 
collected information (Jordaan, 2003b: 59).  
 
Companies also use security information companies to collect information for them. 
Some security companies also have their own security information collection 
capacity. Common businesses and industries create central repositories of security 
information deemed important to all their common interest nationwide and make it 
available in various ways to their separate groups (Fischer et al., 2008: 38-39).  
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4.3.5  Sharing of security information  
 
Information-sharing is the act of exchanging information between collectors, analysts 
and end users to help function more effectively and efficiently. In South Africa the 
need to share security information with the SAPS is a necessity to ensure a 
reduction in crime rates and an increase in detection rates. Simultaneously, users 
need to protect the information made available to them. The inability or unwillingness 
to share this information was recognised as a weakness by the Minister of Safety 
and Security. He called for partnership policing between the police and the private 
security to improve in the sharing of information. This call, which proved to be 
excellent in facilitating greater information sharing, is a start to shaping policy and 
governance around information sharing between the private security industry and the 
SAPS (refer to Paragraph 1.3.3). The abovementioned statement by the Minister of 
Safety and Security was endorsed during 2011, by the Minister of Police when he 
acknowledged that private security companies contributed in reducing crime for 
2010/2011(refer to Paragraph 1.3.3).  
 
Clark (2010: 54-55) states that: “ Fusion Centres and War Rooms were originally 
started to share information in support of homeland security in the United States of 
America (USA). The short-fuse synthesis (often called fusion) differs from normal 
synthesis and analysis only in the emphasis that time is of the essence. Fusion is 
aimed at using all the data sources to develop a more complete picture of a complex 
event, usually with a short deadline. The analyst is there to fit in any new or 
additional incoming data as well as anything that is immediately accessible to them 
in a database or in memory.” The security information management companies in 
South Africa use the fusion centre approach to handle current incident based 
information, to support ongoing operations and to allow additional collection to be 
done in a shorter period of time. The need for this type of information has 
domestically led to the creation of Fusion Centres to support their clients, 
beneficiaries, the SAPS and other stakeholders. These Fusion Centres integrate 
information coming from business, private security providers and SAPS (SABRIC, 
2011).  
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SAPS also have Fusion Centres which have been created along the lines of a war 
room. The SAPS War Rooms handle diverse sources and types of information on 
threats. These war rooms exist provincially in SAPS. Some of the so called war 
rooms have done very little fusion work with the private sector (De Kock, 2011).  
 
The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001 of South Africa, 
provides for the promotion of a legitimate private security industry. It acts in terms of 
the principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable laws. It directs the 
industry to act in the public and national interest in rendering security services. 
Section 5 of the Act, read with section 6, provides for the governance of the Private 
Security Industry (PSI) by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. The 
private security industry in South Africa has for many years played a supportive role 
in helping the SAPS to combat crime. As a fast-growing industry, the question that 
comes to mind: ‘Is the private security industry doing enough to support SAPS in the 
sharing of information of an operational and strategic value?’ If not, what are the 
challenges and what should be done to overcome these challenges? Security 
information on threats and vulnerabilities should be collected on a daily basis by 
security service providers. It should be shared as raw information, products, 
techniques, strategies and/or actionable information products on an informal or 
formal basis with the SAPS. It will assist them in the prevention and control of crime.  
 
According to Minnaar and Ngoveni (2004: 57), to promote partnership policing it is 
felt that not only the raw information should be shared but that the collection, 
analysis and the dissemination of information should be managed on a formal and 
organised basis (specifically by means of an Information Protocol).  
 
4.3.6  Ethics in the collection of security information 
 
In the collection of security information the gatherer must respect the law and the 
fundamental principles of privacy (Nemeth, 2010: 87). Information must always be 
collected in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act, 
No. 108 of 1996 and any legislation that regulates the obtaining of such information. 
Whenever it becomes necessary to use an information collection method, the 
investigator should consult with the legal advisor of the corporate for legal advice.  
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In the South African context, information and facts should be collected in accordance 
with the following legislative requirements:  
• National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 39 of 1994 
• Protection of Information Act, No. 84 of 1982 
• Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000 
• Protected Disclosures Act, No. 26 of 2000 (the so-called Whistle-blowers 
Act) 
• The Constitution, Act, No. 108 of 1996 
• Interception and Monitoring Act, No. 127 of 1992 
• Section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act, No.51 of 1977 
 
There have been a few visible problems with the misuse of information in South 
Africa. This led to strong public and media criticism (De Kock, 2011). In hindsight, it 
is apparent that most of these problems were the result of poor management of 
security information.  
 
Du Preez (1996: 16-17), states that: “the continued possession of information, from 
the time it is first collected until it is presented in court as evidence, must be assured 
– as well as its control, coordination and cumulative use”. It is important to ensure 
the integrity of information collected. This will avoid legal restrictions that may 
prevent the introduction of such information as evidence at a trial or the development 
of a solid case for prosecution (Gardner, 2005: vii).  
 
The collection of information for the investigation of crime must be conducted in a 
lawful way, so that the evidence being presented will indeed be admissible as 
evidence. The evidence must also be of such a nature that the unlawful act of the 
accused is demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt. For this reason, systematic 
and planned action is an essential part of criminal investigation (Van Heerden, 1986: 
187).  
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4.4 ANALYSIS OF SECURITY INFORMATION 
 
There are four types of analysis which are often used by law enforcement in 
combating crime. They include crime analysis, intelligence analysis, operational 
analysis and investigative analysis. These types of analysis may also prove to be 
useful to security practitioners for reducing crime, increasing detection rates and 
preventing losses (Gottlieb et al., 1994: 11). 
 
Traditionally much of the analysis was carried out mentally by seasoned managers 
who used to pass down techniques to colleagues by word of mouth. The advent of 
the modern computer has, however, allowed the police and other agencies to have 
more sophisticated systems to help understand crime patterns (Ainsworth, 2001: 82). 
Analysis can be done manually or through the use of computer systems, though 
many agencies prefer the automated approach. Reuland (1997: 12), is of the opinion 
that expensive computer applications are not the answer, as they are no substitute 
for analytical creativity. It is usually the analyst’s skill, experience and creativity that 
determine what to look for and computers only expedite the process.  
 
Manual processing of actionable crime information products can be traced back to 
the early 1900s, when August Vollmer introduced the English technique of 
systematic classification of known offender Modus Operandi (MO). Manual analysis 
entails the systematic manual analysis of daily reports of serious incidents. This is 
done to determine the location, time, special characteristics and similarities to other 
similar incidents. It can also help with various significant facts that may help to 
identify either a criminal or the existence of a pattern of criminal activity (Block et al., 
1995: 221-222).  
 
Block et al. (1995: xiii) state that the change from manual analysis to automated 
analysis is important, not only because it supplements the expertise of experienced 
officials, but also because the knowledge and techniques accumulated over the 
years do not retire with a official. They are there for others to build on. Ainsworth 
(2001: 82), states that crime mapping and geographical profiling (which is manually 
done on a map by using a selection of different-coloured pins, each of which 
represents a crime or incident that has taken place) are useful in showing crime 
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hotspots and allowing decision makers to see at a glance where crime is 
concentrated. Such information assists managers to allocate their resources more 
effectively and to focus their policing on those areas which appear to have the 
highest rates of crime.  
 
One of the most important purposes of crime information analysis in the investigation 
of crime is to identify and generate crime information products needed to assist in 
the investigation of crime (Goldsmith et al., 2000: 4). An analyst is responsible for 
turning the raw security information into timely and actionable crime information 
products, which can be used by an investigator for the investigation of crime. The 
timely and actionable crime information product is enriched into court-directed 
evidence by the investigator, who adds value to the crime information product  
(Atkin, 2000: 3). During the analysis stage, staying objective and keeping a broad 
perspective is crucial to success (Clark, 2010: 290). 
 
Clarke and Eck (2003: 1), are of the view that personnel appointed as analysts 
should be accustomed to provide the kind of analysis results needed to support the 
end user. This means that analysts should: 
• know how to use modern computing facilities and how to access and 
manipulate comprehensive databases; 
• know how to use software to map incidents, to identify hotspots and to relate 
these to demographic and other data;  
• be able to routinely produce actionable crime information products such as 
charts showing weekly or monthly changes in crime at force and beat level, 
perhaps to support Compstat style operations; 
• be accustomed to carry out small investigations into such topics as the 
relationship between the addresses of known offenders and local outbreaks of 
car theft and burglary; 
• carry out some before-and-after evaluations of crackdowns, say, on 
residential burglaries or car thefts;  
• have some basic knowledge of statistics and research methodology such as 
that provided by an undergraduate social science degree; and  
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• be able to recommend security risk control measures for consideration by 
management.  
 
Analysts must think of themselves as experts, knowing what works in the 
investigation of crime, promoting problem-solving, learning about environmental 
criminology, developing research skills and communicating effectively (Clarke & Eck, 
2003: 2). Individual analysts should be appointed to service a team of investigators 
specialising in specific investigations, so that there is continuous collection, analysis 
and recommendations on security risk control measures (Goldsmith et al., 2000: 4).  
 
It is evident from Reuland (1997: 64), and Redpath (2004: 36), that an organisation 
working with security information should have its own Security Information Analysis 
Unit (SIAU) with appointed analysts functioning under the control of a Manager. A 
SIAU ought to be seen as a sub-component of security information management. 
Hirschfield and Bowers (2001: 23), mention that the use of automated systems also 
demonstrates that with a little effort and very little analysis know-how, it is possible 
for an analyst to produce actionable information products by following directions on 
the computer system.  
 
Most departments have at least three choices. One option is to develop an in-house 
analysis system. Another option is to contract with an independent vendor who 
would custom-design a system for the organisation. The third option is a system 
transfer, here the agency obtains a portion of a computer software application that 
was developed for or by another agency. The extent of the transferred information 
can occur at one of three levels, namely, concept transfers, design transfers and 
operational transfers (Reuland, 1997: 13).  
 
As microcomputers become the preferred analysis platform, system transfers from 
more advanced departments to less advanced ones will undoubtedly become more 
prevalent. The advantages of the transfer option include the specificity of these 
programs to security information and the low cost associated with working directly 
with another security service provider (Reuland, 1997: 13). According to Block et al. 
(1995: 160), because microcomputers have become more affordable and powerful, 
computer applications have become a practical tool in analysis.  
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Analysing the information needed by investigating officers can also pose problems, 
especially in terms of the investigating officers’ needs, the level of training of the 
analyst and the technical support (in terms of the operating systems, hardware and 
software) (Block et al., 1995: 161). The final impact of the analysis lies in the 
monitoring and evaluation of the application of the security risk control measures. 
One of the most important responses developed to overcome obstacles has been 
the effort to create systems of information management, as well as methods of 
prioritising potential suspects so that investigations can proceed in the most effective 
and efficient manner possible (Block et al., 1995: 67).  
 
Peterson (1994: 6) states that knowing analytical concepts and methods in security 
information management will equip investigators better. This is why the majority of 
the people who undergo analytical training are investigators. They are not interested 
in analytical career paths but want to utilise the proven techniques of analysis in the 
investigation of cases.  
 
4.4.1 Evaluation/verification  
 
All security information collected from different sources must be evaluated/verified 
before undergoing any form of analysis. This will avoid unnecessary costs, time and 
energy.  
 
According to Talbot and Jakeman (2008: 142), “the Admiralty Scale is commonly 
used as a technique to quality control security information received from sources. 
The scale provides a means of rating the reliability and accuracy of collected 
information through a graduated alphanumeric scale, hence determining the 
usefulness of the information.” The reliability of the information source is assessed 
on criteria such as the previous quality of information provided by the source, the 
situation, the location and likely access of the source at the time to the information 
collected. Each item of information received is assessed for accuracy before the 
collected information is analysed for application. 
  
 
 
116 
Table 4.3:  Admiralty scale 
Reliability 
of source 
 Accuracy of 
information 
 
A Completely reliable 1 Confirmed by other sources 
B Usually reliable 2 Probably true and accurate 
C Fairly reliable 3 Possibly true and accurate 
D Not usually reliable 4 Doubtful 
E Unreliable 5 Improbable 
F Cannot be judged or 
assessed 
6 Cannot be judged or 
assessed 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 142). 
 
Once evaluated and verified the security information may undergo analysis (Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008: 142). 
 
4.4.2  Collation 
 
All evaluated/verified security information is collated by the analyst or a data capturer 
using an automated system with the relevant computer software. Collation is defined 
as the indexing, sorting and storage of raw information (Reuland, 1997: 11-13). Raw 
information in itself is seldom of much value. Only when similar information is 
collected and considered together can the analyst provide meaning to the 
information (Gottlieb et al., 1994: 27). Effective threat information collation requires 
communication with the client that originated the threat and the interpretation of the 
information requirements. A limitation of many existing police collation strategies is 
the dominance of only the internal source of information. Over-reliance on just the 
internal law enforcement information sources places considerable limitations on the 
quality of the information (Ratcliffe, 2009: 128). To improve the quality of the 
information, analysts will have to enhance the collation mechanisms with information 
from external organisations and this brings us back to information sharing. 
Information collation is therefore seen as a challenge to modern policing. This 
includes improving of information sharing, the question of whether liaison officers 
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can resolve information sharing problems and the role of information from 
confidential informants in strategic decision-making (Ratcliff, 2009: 129-130).  
 
4.4.3  Incident Pattern Analysis  
 
Incident Pattern Analysis (IPA) in the security industry will consist of incident patterns 
of both crime incidents and policy violation incidents. Since no literature could be 
found on incident pattern analysis of policy violations in the security environment, the 
researcher decided on using the crime pattern analysis process employed by police 
agencies. According to Gottlieb et al. (1994: 161), crime pattern analysis contains 
information relative to continuing occurrence of particular criminal activities. This 
crime pattern analysis acquaint officers with the types of crimes being committed; 
lists the days, times and locations of their occurrence; and provides officers with any 
known suspects, suspect vehicle, modus operandi and/or property loss information. 
Information concerning the preferred target of attack (victim and/or property) should 
also be included, as should results of past analyses or predictions as to when and 
where suspects may strike again. Alerts should be updated until suspects are 
arrested or the pattern comes to an end. These crime patterns are used by officers 
on patrol to create directed patrols or tactical action plans. Patrol officers are given 
as much information as possible to enable them to develop a strategy which 
effectively deals with a problem (Reuland, 1997: 80). This is accomplished by 
providing patrol officers with a narrative description of the incidents, a map depicting 
past and future locations of occurrence and any graphs that clarify the problem 
(Paulsen, 2004: 234).  
 
The geographic identification of patterns of crime means that certain types of similar 
crimes occur frequently at particular spots. By applying the Geographic Identification 
System (GIS) a crime pattern analysis document can be retrieved from the GIS for 
application by end users (Horne, 2009: 73). 
 
4.4.4 Threat Assessment  
 
Once the security information on the threats has been identified, the key is to 
consider the specific threats in a given situation. Each individual organisation has 
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threats that are unique. Therefore individual managers must develop the ability to do 
Threat Assessments (TA). A thorough threat assessment, if comprehensive and 
accurate will lead to the implementation of effective security risk control measures 
(Fischer et al., 2008: 149).  
 
Threat is usually assessed and described using a combination of intent and the 
capability of a threat actor, whether individual or organisational, to attack or 
adversely impact on an organisation or its assets (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 141). 
Threats may vary from one organisation to another. In addition one organisation may 
face several different threats compared to another. This will depend on the nature of 
the organisation and the operations being conducted by the organisation. Threats 
are usually directed at specific targets. A threat also includes anything that has the 
potential to prevent and hinder the achievement of objectives or disrupt the 
processes that support them (Garcia, 2008: 26). The first activity in any security 
information management process is to understand the threat. It has to be determined 
beyond all reasonable doubt if the threat exists and the risks posed by the threat to 
the organisation and its assets. If the threat poses a risk, the targets for attack must 
be determined, so that security risk control measures may be applied (Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008: 141).  
 
People, mechanical failures or management systems can create threats. People are 
not only capable of deliberate actions to release hazards or cause loss, but also 
have the capability of applying creative intellect to their miss-deeds (Fischer et al., 
2008: 149). The ability to apply intelligence enables human beings to identify and 
evaluate any existing security barriers and to devise and test ways of bypassing 
them (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 141).  
 
During the analysis of security information the threat is discussed with subject matter 
experts and intelligence officers. Analysts review past incidents related to the threat. 
Open source information is also collected of the threat. Such an approach almost 
invariably involves some element of subjective estimation. In such situations, one 
way of determining the likelihood of threat occurrence is to rely on the knowledge 
and experiences of subject matter experts and information/intelligence collection 
units. All attempts to fill in the information holes should be based on their considered 
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contributions. Once a threat assessment has been completed, typical processes 
related to the application of security risk control measures would commence (Talbot 
& Jakeman, 2008: 142).  
 
“Two twin drivers which are used to determine threat are intent and likelihood. They 
are likely attributes of the threat actor which motivates him/her to function” (Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008: 143). Understanding the difference between motivation (strategic 
objectives) and general or specific intent is a key challenge, but one which offers 
insights into early countermeasures.  
 
To identify the security risks posed by the threats, there are three specific methods 
which may be used to do the threat analysis. Threat analysis is an organisational 
security risk analysis process. A threat analysis is conducted by security risk 
professionals who are informed by generic risk analysis information (Talbot & 
Jakeman, 2008: 32-34).  
 
1. In the first method the analyst must determine if the source has the potential, 
motive and operational capability to carry out the threat (Table 4. 4).  
 
Table 4.4:  Source, motive and method of operation 
Source Motive Method of operation 
Criminal Profit Theft, robbery, assault, fraud, 
Disclosure 
Terrorist Political manipulation Bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, 
Assassination 
Foreign 
Intelligence 
Services 
Strategic, military, political or 
economic advantage 
Espionage, sabotage, 
subversion, 
Disclosure 
Commercial 
or industrial 
competitors 
Profit, competitive edge Industrial or economic 
espionage 
Malicious 
people  
Revenge, fame, discredit  Disclosure, destruction and 
Vandalism 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 33). 
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2. In the second method the analyst should focus on the assets (functions, 
resources and values) that are essential for the organisation to perform its role 
and group them according to the threat and consequent risk posed (Table 4. 5).  
 
Table 4.5:  Organisations assets, risks and threats 
Organisations 
assets 
Risks Threats 
Buildings, 
facilities 
Destruction, damage, 
unavailability of the building 
or facility 
Fire, explosion, hoaxes, power 
failures, contamination, 
unauthorised access 
Information 
systems 
Loss or compromise of 
security classified material, 
loss of confidentiality, 
availability or integrity of 
information 
Unauthorised users, forensic 
disc examinations, careless 
handling of printout, careless 
transmission 
 
Management’s 
confidence in the 
business unit or 
program 
Loss of management or 
public confidence in the 
business unit or program or 
its processes 
Mishandling of sensitive data, 
inconsistent policy or service 
delivery, adverse media 
coverage. 
Organisational 
reputation 
Loss of organisational 
reputation 
Poor service, mishandling of 
sensitive data, inconsistent 
policy or service delivery, 
adverse media coverage 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 33). 
 
3. In the third method the analyst should look at the organisational exposures or 
vulnerabilities and to then use them to review the suitability of existing security 
controls (Table 4. 6).  
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Table 4.6: Asset group and possible exposures or vulnerabilities identified 
Asset Group Possible exposures or vulnerabilities identified 
People assets Assassination 
Bombing  
Civil Crime disorder  
Disgruntled employees 
Discrimination/prejudice 
Attack, assault or harassment 
Sexual harassment  
Domestic violence 
Inadequate procedures/training/vetting 
Loyalty/coercion/collusion/corruption,  
Mismanagement  
Reluctance to adopt security policy 
Workplace violence  
Public perception  
Staff attraction  
Conferences/exhibitions 
Cultural or religious differences 
Financial stress or gain 
Impersonation as staff member 
Information assets Destruction or corruption 
Disruption of service 
Inadvertent disclosure 
Leakage 
Manipulation of data/information  
Staff loyalty 
Fire/arson 
Sabotage 
Fraud 
Physical assets Information 
and communication 
technology 
Break-in 
Hacking 
Fire 
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Maintenance  
Vandalism  
Theft 
Commercial espionage-electronic surveillance/ 
listening device 
Inadequate emergency management procedures  
Failure of equipment, e.g. maintenance and 
reliability  
Inadequate threat details 
Procurement methodology  
Mail handling  
Funding 
(Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 34-35).  
 
4.4.5  Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Physical Protection Systems (PPS) includes all security products and technology. 
The primary functions of these PPS are detection, delay and response. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of Vulnerability Assessment (VA) may be 
conducted on PPS. It is very important to determine before the start of the 
assessment whether a quantitative or qualitative assessment method will be used. 
Quantitative assessments are recommended for facilities with huge asset losses. 
Qualitative assessment can be used if the asset values are much lower. When 
performing VA, the general purpose is to evaluate each component of the PPS to 
estimate their performance as installed at the organisation. Once this is done an 
estimate of the overall system performance is made. The key to a good VA is 
accurately estimating component performance (Garcia, 2006: 9).  
 
When using a quantitative approach, this is done by starting with a tested 
performance value for a particular PPS component, such as a sensor and degrading 
its performance based on how the device is installed, maintained, tested and 
integrated into the overall PPS. For qualitative analysis, performance of each 
component is degraded based on the same conditions, but the performance of the 
device is assigned a level of effectiveness, such as high, medium or low rather than 
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a number. In addition, component performance must be evaluated taking into 
consideration the weather conditions, the existing condition of the organisation and 
all the threats affecting the organisation (Garcia, 2006: 9).  
 
When vulnerability assessment is dealt with as part of the security management 
cycle, it should be a continuous process (Garcia, 2006: 10). 
 
A vulnerability assessment is carried out by collecting information on the PPS. The 
specific PPS is checked if it could detect an intrusion, generate an alarm and then 
transmit that alarm to a location for assessment and response. The organisation is 
reviewed to determine if it conformed to all legal and administrative compliance 
requirements. A checklist is used to document the presence or absence of 
components and component parts. A deficiency report is prepared with notes if the 
component is out of compliance. The VA report summarises these findings and the 
organisation makes improvements according to its organisational policy (Garcia, 
2006: 32). 
 
4.4.6  Criticality Assessment  
  
According to Talbot & Jakeman (2008: 154), criticality assessment is a vital step in 
the identification of risks. It assists in the prioritisation of threats and understanding 
of an organisations’ vulnerability to those threats. It also assists with risk 
identification as well as analysis and the application of security risk control measures 
in order to focus on priority assets that are of utmost importance to an organisation. 
Criticality assessment determines the probability of loss due to an incident, threat or 
vulnerability and the impact the loss will have on the organisation. 
 
4.4.6.1 Probability 
 
Once security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities have been 
collected and analysed, it is essential to determine the probability of loss. When 
security managers are confronted with a series of problems, they must determine 
which problems need immediate attention. According to Le Roux (2004: 19-27) and 
Fischer et al., (2008: 157), probability is a mathematical statement concerning the 
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possibility of an event occurring. Unfortunately such mathematical precision must 
wait until various subjective security measures can be turned into numerical values.  
 
The best we can do today is to make subjective decisions about probability. Such 
decisions should be based on data such as the physical aspects of the incidents, 
threats and vulnerabilities being studied. For example criminal acts, spatial 
relationships, location and composition of the structure. Procedural considerations 
must be studied together with the policies of the organisation. The history associated 
with the industry is of great importance, particularly the incident, threat or 
vulnerability being studied. The essential question is: How likely is it that a particular 
threat event will take place? Has the product been a target before? What is the 
current situation regarding the threat (Fischer et al., 2008: 157). 
 
4.4.6.2 Impact 
 
To separate the security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities into finer 
categories, security managers use the principle of criticality. The term has been 
defined as the impact of a loss in Rands (South African currency of money). The 
impact of the threat is an approximation based on the organisation’s prior 
experiences and the experiences of similar companies in similar situations. Rands 
are the customary measure of impact. The security manager must take into 
consideration the costs of replacement, repair, lost productivity, forfeiture of business 
opportunity, clean-up, litigation, damage to reputation and undermining of customer 
goodwill. Even when the impact is upon human life, the yardstick is a Rand value 
(Fischer et al., 2008: 157). The impact is also determined by the following:  
1. replacement cost (other indirect costs); 
2. temporary replacement (hiring costs); 
3. downtime (business is not as usual); 
4. discounted cash (withdrawals from investment); 
5. insurance rate changes (increase in premiums); and 
6. loss of marketplace advantage (product cannot be delivered on time) (Fischer 
et al., 2008: 157-158).  
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Impact is an extremely important concept for security managers to understand. In 
general, company managers who usually think in terms of cost/benefit analysis will 
not be interested in spending money for security if the cost is greater than the 
potential loss of money. Impact, much like probability, is a subjective measure, but it 
can be placed on a continuum. Using the rankings generated for probability and 
impact and devising a matrix system for various security risks, it is possible to 
quantify security risks somewhat and to determine which risks merit immediate 
attention. Using the matrix, probability and impact alphanumerical values can be 
assigned to each security risk. If a choice has to be made, impact should take 
precedence over probability. If for example the security risk is Robbery, then the 
criticality assessment may be interpreted in terms of the Table 4. 7 as 1D (probability 
of occurrence is virtually certain and the impact will be serious) (Fischer et al., 2008: 
157-159).  
 
Table 4.7: The Probability/Impact matrix 
Probability Impact 
1. Virtually certain A. Fatal 
2. Highly probable B. Very serious 
3. Moderately probable C. Moderately serious 
4. Probable D. Serious 
5. Improbable E. Relatively unimportant 
6. Probability unknown F. Critically unknown 
(Fischer et al., 2008: 159). 
 
4.5  IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
 
The analysis of the collected security information will identify specific risks that will 
need security planning. These risks will require the implementation of specific 
security risk control measures. The security risk control measures may take the form 
of physical protection systems, strategies and actionable crime information products 
(Fischer, 2008: 173).  
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4.5.1  Determine objectives for security risk control measures 
 
The first step in the process is to determine the objectives for security risk control 
measures. To formulate these objectives, the designer must understand the 
organisations operations and conditions, define the threat and identify the target 
(Garcia, 2008: 15). 
 
4.5.1.1 Organisational description  
 
A thorough description of the organisation and the processes within the organisation 
is required. This information can be obtained from different sources, including the 
organisational design blueprints, process descriptions, safety analysis reports and 
environmental impact statements. A tour of the organisation and interviews with the 
personnel are necessary. This will provide an understanding of the physical 
protection requirements for the organisation as well as an appreciation for the 
operational and safety constraints. Additional consideration will also include an 
understanding of liability and any legal regulatory requirements, which must be 
followed. Each organisation is unique, so this process should be followed each time 
a need is identified (Garcia, 2008: 3) 
 
4.5.1.2 Threat definition 
 
In defining the threat, specific information needs to be considered. If this information 
has not yet been collected, additional tasking needs to be given for the collection of 
this information. The additional information needs to answer three questions about 
the adversary:  
1. What class of adversary should be considered? 
2. What is the range of the adversary’s tactics? 
3. What are the adversaries’ capabilities?  
(Garcia, 2008: 4). 
 
Adversaries can be separated into three classes: outsiders, insiders and outsiders 
working in collusion with insiders. For each class of adversary, the full range of 
tactics (deceit, force, stealth or any combination of these) should be considered. 
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Deceit is the attempted defeat of a security system by using false authorisation and 
identification; force is the overt, forcible attempt to overcome a security system; and 
stealth is any attempt to defeat the detection system and enter the facility covertly. 
For any given facility there may be several threats, such as a criminal outsider, a 
disgruntled employee, competitors or a combination of the above. The PPS must be 
designed to protect against all these threats. Choosing the most likely threat, 
designing the system to meet this threat and then testing to verify the system 
performance against the other threats will facilitate the process (Garcia, 2008: 4).  
 
4.5.1.3 Target identification 
 
Finally target identification should be performed for the organisation. Targets may 
include critical assets or information, people or critical areas and processes. A 
thorough review of the organisation and its assets should be conducted. Such 
questions as “What losses will be incurred in the event of sabotage of this 
equipment?” will help identify the assets or equipment that are most vulnerable or 
that create an unacceptable consequence (Garcia, 2008: 4).  
 
4.5.2  Design security risk control measures 
 
Given the information obtained in the facility characterisation, threat definition and 
target identification, the designer can determine the protection objectives of the PPS. 
Examples of protection objectives may be to detect and arrest the adversary, prevent 
the criminal conduct or irregularity of the adversary, create awareness to prevent 
losses (Garcia, 2008: 4).  
 
4.5.2.1 Physical protection systems  
 
The next step in the process, if designing a new PPS, is to determine how best to 
combine elements such as fences, barriers, sensors, procedures, communication 
devices and security personnel into a PPS that can achieve the protection 
objectives. The resulting PPS design should meet these objectives within the 
operational, safety, legal and economic constraints of the facility. The primary 
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functions of the PPS are detection of an adversary, delay of the adversary and 
response by security personnel (Garcia, 2008: 5).  
 
4.5.2.2 Strategies 
 
Some situations may require immediate action and prompt intervention. Some are 
cyclical, managerial and are amenable to technical solutions and problem solving 
methods. Others are chronic, endemic difficulties that require the application of 
strategies over time, to change conditions and move an organisation ahead. The 
security manager needs to know the differences amongst these, what knowledge is 
required and how to access it though personnel or other means. Additionally, the 
security manager must explore the adequacy of the concepts from the knowledge 
base and how and when to apply them (Opolot, 1999: 144). The challenge is for 
security managers to stay current on innovative design strategies to couple this 
knowledge with the latest information on issues of changes in cultural values, crime, 
technology, market conditions and political conditions (Opolot, 1999: 229). Some 
examples of strategies may include crime prevention through environmental 
designing, business watch, car guard watch, neighbourhood watch, awareness, 
sharing of information, electronic networking with other service providers and 
organisations. Many of these have served as best practices in the law enforcement 
environment.  
 
4.5.2.3 Actionable crime information products 
 
According to Peterson (1994: 29-59); Goldsmith et al., (2000: 6); Hirschfield and 
Bowers (2001: 4-6), crime information products commonly used by law enforcement 
are as follows:  
• case docket analysis: this is the overall study of investigation dockets to 
provide recommendations for its successful completion;  
• activity flow charts: these are used to explain the paper trail in complex 
investigations, such as money laundering, commercial fraud, etc.; 
• tables: all data is placed in tabular format to ascertain any commonalities or 
patterns. In a series of armed robberies, for example, the factors may include: 
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time of day, location, type of establishment robbed, number of perpetrators, 
use of weapons, language spoken, manner of dress of perpetrators and the 
type of financial instruments taken;  
• matrices: these are used in analysis to organise data in such a manner that it 
can be compared to similar data. The triangular matrix is commonly used as 
an association analysis matrix. For example, with names of crimes on one 
side and the names of places where the crimes occur on the top side, thus 
connecting at a triangular point, indicating a connection or commonality;  
• collection plan: this is a preliminary step towards completing a strategic 
assessment, which shows what needs to be collected, how it is going to be 
collected and by what date;  
• criminal profile: this is the product of criminal investigation analysis in which 
indicators of behaviour and activity are used to create models. A profile is 
created by gathering all possible information on a type of behaviour or 
occurrence and then analysing and comparing that behaviour to cases or 
incidents on hand;  
• assessments: these are a product of the strategic analysis process. They are 
written reports which can include the results of surveys, independent 
research, information gathered from independent case dockets and data 
received from other law enforcement sources;  
• analytical briefings: these are oral presentations of findings or products based 
on the data analysed;  
• maps: these depict the location of offences, victims and, occasionally, 
offenders. They can provide information concerning the location of crime 
hotspots or high levels of reported crimes; 
• crime analysis: traditional crime analysis includes both the breaking down of 
criminal incidents into their composite parts (factors) to determine patterns 
and similarities, which may lead to the apprehension of the perpetrator(s) and 
also the statistical analysis of crimes to forecast future crimes. Information on 
a series of crimes which have been committed is used to complete a crime 
analysis. This information may include victim data, suspect data, dates, times 
and location of crimes, physical evidence, weapons used and the fruits of the 
crimes;  
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• linkage analysis: correlates a suspect to one or more incidents. It can narrow 
search areas by identifying known criminals or other suspects who reside 
within a certain distance from incident locations. The objective of linkage 
analysis is the apprehension of suspects and case clearance;  
• association analysis: depicts the relationships among people, groups, 
businesses or other entities in a way that provides the investigator with 
information on the nature of the group and the manner in which the group 
interacts;  
• criminal investigative analysis: this entails the use of components of a crime 
and/or the physical and psychological attributes of a criminal, to ascertain the 
identity of the criminal. This technique has been used by the FBI in the area of 
homicide and sexually motivated crimes. Some analysts refer to it as profiling. 
In fact, a profile of a criminal is a product developed as a result of the criminal 
analysis process;  
• statistical analysis: this is a review of numerical data to summarise it and to 
draw conclusions about its meaning;  
• pie charts: these are used to give a graphic depiction of the parts of a whole; 
the pie equals the whole of something and the slices equal smaller parts. 
They are applied by law enforcement to show the occurrences of particular 
crimes in relation to the overall crime rate or the relative amounts/percentages 
of income from illegal sources. A bar chart is a graphic depiction of a certain 
activity in relation to or in comparison with another factor such as time, cost or 
another occurrence – both of which can generally be measured in numbers. It 
can be used in conjunction with a number of other analytical techniques;  
• composite tables: all data is placed in tabular format to ascertain any 
commonalities or patterns. In a series of armed robberies, for example, 
factors may include: time of day, location, type of establishment robbed, 
number of perpetrators, use of weapons, language spoken, manner of dress 
of perpetrators and the type of financial instruments taken. The information 
known about each of the armed robberies committed could then be put in 
tabular form. The table would then be reviewed for possible patterns, 
commonalties and differences. Conclusions about the persons responsible for 
the robberies might then be drawn;  
131 
• automated mapping: automated pin-mapping, hotspot analysis and radial 
analysis are a few of the most extensively used. They can be used to identify 
the locations of high concentration of crimes, known as hotspots. An 
investigator may use intelligence and modus operandi data to identify that the 
same offender is likely to be responsible for a series of incidents;  
• geographic flow mapping: this is a simple graphic depiction of a specific 
region, used to show some activity or occurrence related to criminal activity. 
Information gleaned from a map can relate to territories covered by a crime 
group or to sources and routes of goods or services being transported by 
crime groups;  
• target profiling: this identifies locations that may have an unusually high 
likelihood of victimisation within an active pattern area. Within a large 
geographic area, offenders tend to target certain types of locations rather than 
others, especially for crimes influenced by the location of commercial or 
service-oriented activity, such as convenience stores or banks;  
• offender movement pattern analysis: ties at least two or more points to one or 
more criminal incidents. One example is the theft location and recovery site of 
a stolen motor vehicle. Connecting the two locations – theft and recovery – 
may help identify the roads used by an offender after stealing an automobile. 
Similarly, relating an offender‘s last known residence to an arrest location, 
such as an open air drug market, can identify roads used by dealers to 
transport drugs; and 
• forecasting: this is a process which predicts the future on the basis of past 
trends, current trends and/or future speculations. Within the field of analysis, 
both numeric and descriptive forecasting are done. Numeric forecasting is 
numerically used and generally rests on past and current numbers of 
occurrences. Descriptive forecasting takes both quantitative and descriptive 
trend data to predict the future. Forecasting is used both in crime analysis and 
strategic analysis.  
 
The abovementioned actionable crime information products may be used to reduce 
crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses. 
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4.5.3  Dissemination of analysis products 
 
Peterson (1994: 271), describes dissemination in the security information 
management process as the release of analysis products to a client, under certain 
conditions and protocols. It is usually based on the security classification of the 
information and the security clearance of the client. Jordaan (2003a: 59), refers to 
dissemination as vital, as it encompasses information that was collected, analysed 
and which must be packaged and delivered to the clients and stakeholders who can 
use it. The incident pattern analysis product from analysts can prompt an immediate 
response from the specialised anti-crime surveillance units. Taking a proactive 
approach is likely to reduce future incidents to be committed by the perpetrator. In a 
similar way, the officials may request analysts for listings of possible incidents where 
an arrestee may be involved. Analysts can also assist investigators with suspect and 
victim profiles (Reuland, 1997: 28-29). Dissemination can be carried out in several 
different ways, namely, by attending briefings and strategy sessions, presenting 
verbal reports, providing written reports, having face-to-face contact whenever the 
need arises and public information systems for both written and electronic media 
(Reuland, 1997: 35).  
 
4.5.4  Feedback on analysis products 
 
The last phase of the security information management is feedback. Analysts should 
not go blindly forward from day to day, without knowing which output products and 
formats (written reports, charts, graphs, overheads, computer-generated 
presentations and maps) work and which do not. Analysts spend a great deal of time 
preparing analysis products and must know how the end users plan to use the final 
product and how useful it was for them. Additionally, if the end users view the 
analysts’ output as non-responsive to a request, they may not make additional 
requests. Either scenario wastes effort and compromises efficiency. To obtain 
feedback, analysts should routinely include a survey form with the prepared analysis 
report (Reuland, 1997: 36-37).  
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4.5.5  Monitoring and evaluation of security risk control measures 
 
Monitoring and evaluation of the security risk control measures begins with the 
review of the PPS design and thorough understanding of the protection objectives 
the designed system must meet. This can be done simply by checking the required 
features of a PPS, such as intrusion detection, entry control, access delay, response 
communications and response force. Crime statistics may also be used as a 
standard to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and actionable 
crime information products (Garcia, 2008: 5).  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
A professional security service is fast gaining momentum in South Africa. Citizens 
are looking out for every new physical protection system backed up by the latest 
technology and/or piece of equipment that can safeguard property and give 
protection against criminal elements. Changes and developments in the security 
service environment demands new innovations and creativity to enhance traditional 
models. A literature study was conducted to enhance the traditional ways of 
managing security information. There was limited literature in South Africa on 
security information management. The researcher was compelled to focus on 
international literature for the theoretical framework. The Information Management 
and Crime Analysis Model used in law enforcement was found to be a success both 
internationally and nationally. The Model was studied and customised to the security 
service environment.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CASE STUDIES ON SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to focus on security information management practices 
used by security service providers in the Gauteng province of South Africa and in 
Perth, Western Australia. Case studies on security information management were 
conducted in Gauteng, South Africa and in Perth, Western Australia.  
 
The South African case studies revealed that security information on crime incidents 
are managed differently to incidents related to policy violations, threats and 
vulnerabilities. Crime incident information in South Africa is managed by SAPS. In 
major business entities such as banks, petroleum companies, retail, etc. crime 
incident information is also co-ordinated and managed by security information 
management companies. Threats are reported to the SAPS and handled internally 
by individual companies. Vulnerabilities and incidents related to policy violations are 
expected to be managed by individual security service providers.  
 
The case study conducted in Perth, Western Australia (WA) was co-ordinated with 
the assistance of the School of Computer and Security Science in the Faculty of 
Computing, Health and Science, Edith Cowan University (ECU) in Joondalup. During 
May 2011, the researcher spent a three week research period at ECU in Perth, 
Western Australia conducting the case study. In Western Australia, security 
information on threats and vulnerabilities are managed differently to incident 
information. Threats are reported to the police and handled internally by individual 
companies. Threat information is also shared with network forums in Western 
Australia. Crime incident information is managed by the Western Australian Police 
(WAP). Information on vulnerabilities and incidents relating to policy violations are 
managed by individual security service providers.  
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5.2  CASE STUDY STRATEGY OF ENQUIRY 
 
The case study strategy of enquiry can be best described as an intensive study of a 
single or collective type of cases with the aim of generalising across a larger set of 
cases of the same general type (Gerring, 2007: 65). The case study strategy 
provided for an intensive study of security service providers operating in Gauteng in 
South Africa and from Perth in Western Australia. The collective type of case study 
research helped the researcher to obtain a better understanding of a larger group of 
similar companies operating nationally and internationally. Evidence was collected 
by conducting semi-structured interviews using an interview guide (See Appendix1).  
 
5.3 SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
5.3.1 Case Study 1: Government departments, South African Police Service 
and the South African Private Security Industry  
 
5.3.1.1 Background 
 
Since the late seventies private security development in South Africa was supported 
by government. Government encouraged the development of the private security 
industry to fill the vacuum left by the police in the safeguarding of strategic 
installations. In 1980 the National Key Points Act, No. 102 of 1980, was passed. This 
granted greater powers to the private security guards who were tasked to guard and 
protect identified strategic installations. The Act granted full powers of arrest, search 
and seizure to security officers in pursuance of such task (Irish, 1999: 1). 
 
Over the years the private security industry in South Africa has undergone 
tremendous change. Not only has it seen a growth in the numbers of personnel but 
also a proliferation and expansion of different sectors in terms of specialisation. In 
addition, it has also seen a number of changes to its regulatory legislation and 
controlling framework. All these factors have impacted on the focus, profitability and 
future expansion of the industry. With reference to the regulation there has over the 
years been a long process of legislative amendments and regulatory changes aimed 
at better controlling and monitoring the private security industry in South Africa, 
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specifically in terms of registration, compliance and training standards. Starting with 
the South African Security Officer’s Act, No. 92 of 1987 and the introduction of the 
Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, a strong regulatory 
framework for controlling and managing the South African Private Security Industry 
was established. The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, 
essentially set up the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) 
(replacing the Security Officers’ Board), as well as obliging every security company 
inclusive of in-house security to register as a ‘security service provider’ and to have 
its personnel registered as well. The Act incorporated provisions for a new Code of 
Conduct and the Improper Conduct Regulations. Furthermore, it established an 
inspectorate with increased powers of inspection of all registered security service 
providers with powers of prosecution and reporting of charges of misconduct 
(Minnaar, 2007: 3-4).  
 
Private security has grown steadily, since then identifying market opportunities in 
government departments and expanding its influence in the realm of community and 
neighbourhood policing and community safety networks in South Africa (Minnaar, 
2010: 203). As of 22 October 2010, 7459 security companies were registered with 
PSIRA in the Republic of South Africa. These companies employed 387 273 security 
officers to work in the Republic of South Africa. As of 4 October 2011, PSIRA 
currently has 411109 registered security officers and 8828 security companies 
registered on the PSIRA database (Private Security Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), 
2012). 
 
Information is an extremely valuable tool for use by security officials, investigators 
and police officers for the reduction of crime, to improve detection rates and prevent 
losses. It is a key element in the sequence of events aimed at conceiving, 
implementing and evaluating measures to mitigate security risks (Ekblom, 1988: 1). 
It has proven to be an integral part of the skills package of specialists and experts, 
whose job it are to prevent and investigate crime and losses successfully. It helps 
them in reducing crime, making arrests, solving crimes and preventing losses. It is 
useful for security officials, police officers and investigators to know if a specific 
crime is on the increase, in which geographic part it is occurring, who is most likely to 
be committing it and where the offender(s) can be found (Lyman, 1988: 147). 
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Conducting analysis on security information makes it possible to devise security 
control measures appropriate to the local crime problem and its physical and social 
context. The implementation of these measures will require a great deal of 
commitment, coordination and perseverance. The form of evaluation of the 
preventative measures will depend on the broader context of a preventative initiative. 
Evaluation enables managers and practitioners to decide whether the initiative in 
question has had a sufficient impact on crime to be worth continuing, amending or 
extending (Ekblom, 1988: 4-7). The involvement of former intelligence and police 
personnel has had a marked impact on the security information management skills of 
private security companies in South Africa (Irish, 1999: 13). This has also helped 
build a good working relationship between the private security officials and the SAPS 
(Interview no. 3).  
 
5.3.1.2 Government departments  
 
Government departments in South Africa have in-house security structures 
established within departments. These security officials are also registered with 
PSIRA. They possess civilian powers in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. Some in-house security officers employed by specific government department 
are empowered by national legislation relevant to the specific government 
department to carry out their responsibilities. Depending on the business case of the 
government department, they work with security information on incidents, threats 
and vulnerabilities. Crime incident information is reported to the SAPS for 
investigation. Threat information is reported to SAPS. Government departments 
address vulnerabilities by applying security risk control measures to mitigate risks. 
Incidents related to policy violations are investigated by internal investigators from 
the human resources section. According to those interviewed for this study, the 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk 
control measures are not regulated in their departments. No policy framework was 
made available by any one of the service providers interviewed. The internet search 
engines could not provide any such policy frameworks (Interview nos. 1 & 2).  
 
Security information is mainly collected by conducting security assessments. 
Voluntary information is also received from third parties. ‘Hot-line’ information is 
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collected by providing toll-free telephone numbers to the public. Some of the 
methods used to collect security information include surveillance, research (external 
sources), internal audit (internal sources), forensics and interviews. In some 
instances undercover operations are implemented together with the SAPS. This 
activity is usually led by the SAPS. The collected information is entered manually in 
specific registers (occurrence book, case registers). Security officers in government 
departments mainly direct their efforts on information collection pertaining to 
vulnerabilities and incidents related to crime and policy violations. The collection of 
this type of security information helps them understand the threats facing the 
department. All criminal matters are referred to the police and incidents of policy 
violations are investigated by workplace investigators. Much of the information is not 
complete. In most instances information is received late and not on time. Information 
obtained through direct interviews is always valid and reliable (Interview nos.1 & 2).  
 
In most cases the collected information is analysed by management and a decision 
is made on security risk control measures. Very seldom do departments use analysts 
to evaluate, collate and analyse the information. In some instances ordinary clerks 
are used as analysts to determine trends and patterns pertaining to crime. They use 
computer software to collate and analyse the information. The computer software 
produces crime pattern analysis products. Vulnerabilities are given attention 
according to the threat they pose. The likelihood and consequences of the threat is 
considered by management at their meetings. Under normal circumstances no 
formal analysis is done on threats and vulnerabilities. Management makes decisions 
based on the security information placed before them. If the situation warrants it, 
security risk control measures are implemented based on affordability. There was no 
indication of probability, impact and cost benefit analysis being done in this regard. In 
many instances there was a dire shortage of personnel, computers and the correct 
software to collate and analyse the information. If additional information is required, 
risk managers, security officers or investigators are used to collect this information. 
Information is classified and handled in terms of the Minimum Information Security 
Standards (MISS) document7 (Interview nos. 1& 2).  
 
                                                          
7 Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) document was approved by the South African 
Cabinet in 1996, for implementation in all government departments in South Africa. 
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5.3.1.3 South African Police Service   
 
Legislative frameworks are provided to regulate the collection of crime intelligence in 
the country. The South African Police Service has a General as its National 
Commissioner, Lieutenant-Generals as Provincial Commissioners, Major-Generals 
are Cluster Commanders and Brigadiers and lower ranks are positioned at police 
station level. SAPS personnel are provided with guidelines and directives on the 
management of crime information and intelligence. In terms of security information 
management SAPS manages information on crime incidents, crime intelligence and 
threats. They do not manage information on private security vulnerabilities (Reddy, 
2010). 
 
All crime incident information reported by victims and complainants are captured on 
an automated Crime Administration System (CAS) by SAPS Crime Information 
Officers (CIOs) at police station level. The information is validated by supervisors 
and entered into automated systems by data capturers. This information flow starts 
from the police station level and moves upwards through the automated system to 
the provincial office and on up to the national office. The information is protected 
through classification in terms of the MISS policy document. The information may be 
accessed by anyone who has valid access to the information. If the person is not 
allowed to access the information, access will be denied by the CAS (De Kock, 
2011). 
 
The Business Intelligence System (BIS) is used by the Crime Information Analysis 
Centre (CIAC) to analyse the crime information at police station level. Crime 
Information Officers (CIOs) at police station level are involved in field work to gather 
crime information through interviews and visiting scenes of crime. The collection of 
this additional crime information is primarily used for addressing the what, why, 
where, who and how aspects of crime. The new information is used to add value to 
the existing information on the BIS so as to generate actionable crime information 
products for operationalisation at police station level. Some of the actionable crime 
information products generated by the Crime Information Analysis Centres (CIAC) 
include crime statistical analysis, crime pattern analysis, geographic crime analysis, 
linkage analysis, case docket analysis and profiling. The integration of all the 
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information from these actionable crime information products helps generate a Crime 
Threat Assessment (CTA) document at police station level. At police station level, 
some of the relevant crime information is shared at Community Policing Forums 
(CPFs) (De Kock, 2011 & Interview No. 3).  
 
This CTA of the police station is integrated at Cluster level with the CTAs of the 
cluster police stations. Hence, a Cluster CTA is generated. Linkage analysis is done 
on the information from the cluster stations. The linkage analysis product is provided 
to the Crime Intelligence Commanders at Cluster level. The information is enriched 
to produce crime intelligence. The crime intelligence is used to effectively, efficiently, 
proactively and reactively conduct intelligence led policing in the Cluster (De Kock, 
2011).  
 
At Provincial level the Cluster information is integrated into a CTA document for 
Intelligence led Operations. This intelligence is enriched by security service providers 
both from private security and government. The Provincial Office has a structured 
‘War Room’ which is used to obtain information from these and other and 
stakeholders in the fight against crime. Crime Intelligence is not shared with other 
stakeholders, unless authorised by the Provincial Commissioner (De Kock, 2011).  
 
The information provided by the Provincial CTA is considered at National Level to 
address organised crime using unconventional methods such as undercover 
operations and specific surveillance methods (De Kock, 2011).  
 
At all levels different methods are used to collect information. Some of the methods 
include physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, forensics, interviews, research, 
audits and undercover. Crime Combating Forum (CCF) meetings are held daily at 
Station, Provincial and National levels with all stakeholders including private security 
and other government departments, so that the application of information and 
intelligence can be monitored and evaluated through crime statistics, arrests, 
recoveries of exhibits, etc. (De Kock, 2011; Reddy, 2010). 
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All threat information received from other stakeholders such as private security and 
government departments are integrated into the CTA at the different levels (De Kock, 
2011).  
  
5.3.1.4 South African private security service providers  
 
Security service providers in Gauteng handle security information on a daily basis. 
They collect security information on threats, vulnerabilities and incidents. The 
security information on incidents comprises mainly of crime incidents and to a lesser 
extent information on policy violations. All of the security service providers involved 
in the case study collects security information. In most instances information is 
collected during security surveys and by investigators involved in workplace 
investigations. Some of the methods used to collect security information include 
surveillance, research (external sources), internal audit (internal sources), forensics, 
interviews and undercover. Undercover sources are used in consultation with the 
SAPS. The case study showed that more security information is collected from 
internal sources compared to external sources. Most of the internal source 
information consists mainly of reactive information on crime incidents and 
irregularities which have already taken place at the facility. This was followed by 
internal information collected on vulnerabilities using surveillance techniques and 
security assessments. Much of the external information consists of threats received 
through hotline reports (toll free) and informer networks. External information on 
threats mainly originates from other security service providers organisations, forums 
and security networks (Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 & 17).  
 
The majority of the security service providers do not have specific security persons 
assigned for the collection of security information. Only a few larger companies have 
collection units, risk managers or investigators assigned for the collection of security 
information. This is mainly because of the cost involved in establishing such a 
capacity. In most cases the security information is recorded in occurrence books and 
archived. Security assessments are done during specific intervals. Many security 
service providers outsource security assessment functions to Risk Management 
Companies They are carried out to a lesser extent by in-house security managers 
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due to a lack of knowledge and skills in this regard (Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17). 
 
All day-to-day incident based information is directed to a supervisor and manually 
recorded in an occurrence book or other similar types of register books. In some 
instances they are entered into automated systems for acknowledgement by top 
management. This is seldom done. Criminal incidents are reported to the SAPS, who 
register a case docket for investigation. Criminal incidents relevant to specific 
business entities are also reported to specific information management companies. 
SAPS is also informed of all security information on threats, so that responsible 
intelligence structures in terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 39 of 
1994 may be activated. The security service provider also initiates strategies in 
consultation with the police. Security information pertaining to incidents on policy 
violations are handled by workplace investigators or the human resource section of 
the company (Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16 &17).  
 
The day-to-day security information received by management is discussed at 
management meetings and decisions made to manage the risk. They either inform 
the police, human resources section or investigators of the incident or threat. 
Information on vulnerabilities is handled according to the threat it poses. In many 
instances supervisors analyse the information for operationalisation. Only large 
security service providers have in-house general analysts or specialist analysts. In 
the majority of cases if additional information is required, security managers, risk 
managers or investigators are tasked to obtain additional information (Conradie, 
2010; Interview nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 &17).  
 
When security assessment reports are received from Risk Management Companies, 
management makes a decision on the implementation of security risk control 
measures. These decisions are based on the financial position of the companies and 
the assets being protected. In residential and business complexes, many clients are 
reluctant to pay an increased premium to implement specific security risk control 
measures as recommended by the security assessment reports. Consequently, 
much of the needed security risk control measures are not implemented or are 
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shelved for the new financial year for consideration (Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17). 
 
Many of the security service providers apply security information to identify crime 
trends and patterns and investigative leads. The application of the security 
information is evaluated by comparing criminal incidents to previous periods 
(Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17).  
 
In recent years specific security information management companies have proven to 
be successful within specific sectors. Case studies were conducted with three of 
these security information management companies (SABRIC, CGRI, PSI) to identify 
their practices (Conradie, 2010; Interview nos. 36, 37 & 38).  
 
5.4 SUMMARY 
 
The above case study presented a background to security information management 
in South Africa. Although security information is a valuable tool for use by security 
officials, no legislative direction is provided to the private security industry on how to 
manage security information. Government departments collect security information 
on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. Managers in the government departments 
make decisions for the implementation of security risk control measures based on 
the incident information. Many of these departments and companies do not have an 
analysis capability to analyse incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. The SAPS 
manages crime information on threats and incidents of crime but not vulnerabilities. 
They have a collection capacity for crime intelligence and a formal analysis capability 
of crime analysts. Private security companies handle security information on 
incidents, threats and vulnerabilities as they are received. Decisions are made by 
management on the implementation of security risk control measures based on the 
collected information. Many of the private security service providers do not have an 
information collection capacity nor do they have a formal analysis capability. The 
views presented in this case study by the different stakeholders might be similar to a 
certain extent, because they all addressed the same research questions of the study.  
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5.5 SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICAN 
ORGANISATIONS AND COMPANIES 
 
5.5.1 Case Study 2: South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) 
 
5.5.1.1 Organisational structure 
 
South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) is a section 21 security risk 
information management company which was established in 2002. It manages and 
collates crime incident information collected by its clients, analyses the crime 
incident information and recommends strategies and/or provides actionable crime 
information products aimed at mitigating organised bank related crimes. SABRIC 
adopted a centralised approach to information management, crime analysis and the 
application of recommended strategies and/or actionable crime information products. 
It is managed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is supported by a Business 
Support Office, Commercial Crime Office and Violent Crime Office. Clients (mainly 
banks/financial services organisations) of this company mandated the CEO to do 
information management, crime analysis and recommend strategies and/or provide 
actionable crime information products to its clients, partners and stakeholders. The 
clients contribute financially, partners mutually benefit and the stakeholders have a 
stake in the company (Interview no. 36).  
 
Purposive interviews were conducted with senior managers from the Violent Crime 
Office. The infrastructure of the Violent Crime Office consists of a Consequence 
management office and Information office. Both these offices operate in an 
integrated fashion to address the strategic objectives of the company. The strategic 
objectives of the company include:  
• developing a credible and actionable crime information repository; 
• providing leadership that delivers quality services/products and effective 
strategies to tackle bank related organised crime; 
• coordinating a range of activities to reduce bank related crime; 
• optimising inter-bank cooperation; 
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• optimising beneficial public private partnerships by interfacing with a range of 
external organisations, most notably, government departments, law 
enforcement agencies, regulators and industry associations, both 
domestically and internationally; 
• creating awareness amongst bank customers and the general public of bank 
related crime and ways to prevent it; and  
• contributing to the general safety and security of the banking environment 
(SABRIC, 2011).  
 
SABRIC, specialises in information management and crime analysis, recommends 
strategies and/or provides actionable crime information products to its clients, 
partners and stakeholders. SABRIC also acts as a source of information to its 
clients, partners and stakeholders. Daily crime incident information is provided to 
SABRIC by its clients, partners and stakeholders using their own collection methods 
and collection means (source techniques). It has Standing Operating Procedures 
(SOP) for information management, crime analysis and the utilisation of crime 
information strategies/information products (Interview no. 36).  
 
5.5.1.2 Crime information management 
 
SABRIC’s information management strategy is to develop a credible crime 
information repository with integrity to recommend strategies and/or provide 
actionable crime information products to clients/partners and stakeholders. The 
consequence management office also serves as an information source. Strategies 
stem from the information in the repository. It is therefore important that the 
information in the repository is credible to work on. The purpose is thus to develop a 
credible crime information repository. Collected incident information is not parked on 
the system and forgotten. Evaluation/verification of the quality of the information is 
very important, as it is the key to the repository. All information on crime incidents 
received from sources, is evaluated/verified by the consequence management office 
through follow up, before the information becomes actionable through analysis. 
Written information products delivered from this repository for example, update 
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reports on Automated Teller Machine (ATM) related crime is what is termed as an 
actionable crime information product (Interview no. 36).  
 
Standing operating procedures agreed upon by clients, partners and stakeholders 
are used to ensure credibility and integrity to the crime information provided by 
clients, partners and stakeholders. Internal sources of information also include the 
CEO, business support office and the commercial crime office. A company relies 
primarily on its clients (banks, cash in transit companies, etc.) and partners (South 
African Police Service (SAPS), Metro Police, Business Against Crime (BAC), 
stakeholders (Consumer Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI), Petroleum Security Initiative 
(PSI) and Telkom, etc.) and the mass media who serve as external sources. It does, 
however use open source techniques to enrich its crime information. The 
Commercial crime office may source information from the violent crime office and 
vice versa. Consequence management and the information office operate 
interdependently. If there is an incident, it is given via by the information office to the 
consequence management office to obtain more detail or to enrich the available 
information (Interview no. 36).  
 
There are two types of risks, one is the organised bank-related crime risk, which 
SABRIC deals with and the other types of security risks are dealt with by the banks 
themselves. SABRIC cannot manage these risks because of the following factors:  
• every individual bank should be looking at what affects them most;  
• banks security models differ; 
• they have different service providers from a security point of view; and 
• their priorities differ from one bank to another (Interview no. 36).  
 
Banks should, however, also have their own analysis capabilities to attend to day-to-
day security risks affecting them operationally. Presently, some of them are 
outsourced to private security contractors who deal predominantly with day-to-day 
incidents. SABRIC provides a picture of what is happening in the banking industry in 
general (Interview no. 36).  
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According to the interviewees, they face challenges rather than problems. Some of 
the challenges include impediments to the constant flow of information from the 
source to the consequence management office which is sometimes also not 
provided according to the criteria set down in the standing operating procedures, e.g. 
timeliness of the information. The vicious cycle of new staff and restructuring within 
the partner structure poses a challenge, because they need to be trained to be 
knowledgeable to meet their challenges. Where technology is concerned, not all their 
partners and stakeholders have access to computers and not everyone has 
computer knowledge. Partners do not have cell phones to send an (Short Message 
System) SMS, but can only receive an SMS, some do not have emails instead they 
use faxes. Some partners operate in outlying areas and cannot be reached due to 
poor communication infrastructure. Some of the clients cannot receive 
comprehensive reports because of restrictions on their systems. Many 
clients/partners/stakeholders do not have appropriate software programmes and 
compatibility complicates matters (Interview no. 36).  
  
Provinces are visited and particular client representatives including partners are 
made aware of the company model. Most of the information management challenges 
are addressed internally and externally through workshops and awareness 
programmes (Interview no. 36).  
 
5.5.1.3 Crime information analysis 
 
SABRIC has its own analysis infrastructure with in-house analysts. It also outsources 
specialised analysis functions based on specific needs. The company’s analysis 
strategy is to use all available information from its repository to formulate 
strategies/actionable crime information products to mitigate crime, using different 
computer software programs and human skills. Analysis is done by using computer 
and manual skills. The company recruits highly competent analysts to perform the 
analysis function. The company starts with initial analysis by collating the data. 
Information from clients, partners and stakeholders are used in the analysis process. 
Verification, detail and integrity of the information are very important elements for 
analysis. Verification of information is done by testing the information with different 
sources. If information is not in detail, the missing detail is obtained from the 
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sources. Sources ensure that the information is timely. Information is also enriched 
by the sources according to Standing Operational Procedures (SOP). The SOP 
serves as a memorandum of understanding, which outlines the procedures to be 
followed by clients, partners, stakeholders and the company. It determines the needs 
of the clients, partners or stakeholders. These Standing Operational Procedures are 
contractual by nature. Analysts employed by the company perform a dual function. 
One such function is to do crime information analysis and the other is to be business 
minded in the mining of information (Interview no. 36).  
 
The security risk information pertaining to organised bank related crimes is collated, 
verified, enriched, interpreted and produced as strategies/actionable crime products 
by consequence management for use by clients, partners and stakeholders. Both the 
consequence management and information office are sources for one another. They 
work together. Consequence management serves as a collection unit for information 
management. If a missing link is identified in the collated information or any 
additional information is requested it is passed onto consequence management to do 
a follow up. The company cannot work with outdated information, it is therefore 
important that sources should provide information on time. It keeps abreast with 
developments and monitors new methods criminals use in committing crimes. This 
may also require entering into new partnerships to combat specific types of crimes, 
e.g. identity thefts, scams, phishing, etc. The consequence managers do linkage 
analysis for example using modus operandi and photos received from the bank, etc. 
They support and assist the investigators and the police to link suspects and crimes 
with similar modus operandi between cases and suspects (Interview no. 36).  
 
The analysts work with modus operandi data, geographic concentrated patterns and 
statistical information of crime risk factors, data from victims (clients) and 
explanations of crime. Analysts identify crime patterns, research theoretical 
explanations and formulate strategies/products for use by the intended users. They 
also keep abreast with developments in the political, economic, social, technological 
and international environments to add value to the strategies/actionable products. 
There is an integrated process all the way. Information is integrated for tactical and 
strategic purposes. Analysts liaise and verify the repository information with the bank 
officials or SAPS. If something has to be amended on the database not anybody can 
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do it. A process needs to be followed. Clients, partners and stakeholders do not have 
access to the database. They have their own databases, which feed into their 
organisational/company database. They do not have open access to the information. 
No exchange of information takes place from one database to another due to the 
agreed upon integrity and credibility of the company database (Interview no. 36). 
 
Challenges in analysis are verification (verify information with different sources); 
detail (not all information is reported in full detail); integrity (checking on data 
integrity); and criteria (standards to be followed to collect information). The Standard 
Operating Procedures are sometimes not followed by the providers of the daily crime 
incident information to SABRIC (Interview no. 36). 
 
5.5.1.4 Implementation of strategies and actionable crime information products 
 
The company has a policy relating to the implementation of crime information. It 
produces a host of actionable crime information products namely; assessments, 
briefings, linkage analysis, statistical analysis, association analysis, crime analysis 
and written reports. Strategies and products are disseminated through briefings, 
meetings, handouts, reports, e-mails, compact discs, etc. Informational needs of 
clients, partners and stakeholders are identified in the SOP guideline. Continuous 
assessment is done on the client’s needs in the different environments. Managers 
hold meetings with clients, partners and stakeholders to determine needs of the 
intended users. Clients also request additional information regarding a product (ad 
hoc request) and this assists with informal feedback. Impact studies are done to 
determine if all the information received is used accordingly and whether predictions 
have been realised. Formal meetings, one on one interview, quarterly client surveys, 
an annual partner surveys are used to do follow-ups on disseminated 
strategies/actionable information products (Interview no. 36). 
 
Not just any person can add information to the database or access the database. 
Staff members are limited to add or access specific types of information. Two levels 
of classification are used namely; confidential and restricted. Staff members do not 
have problems to access the database; they need to have security clearance. 
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Classified access to the database gives credibility to the data in the database 
(Interview no. 36). 
 
The South African Police Service has acknowledged that SABRIC has a big role to 
play in supporting its operations. Some of the challenges in the application of 
services, strategies and products are the leakage of information and not getting 
timely feedback from the intended users. These challenges are addressed internally 
and externally through workshops and awareness programmes (Interview no. 36).  
 
5.5.2 Case Study 3: Consumer Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI) 
 
5.5.2.1 Organisational structure 
 
In this case study interviews were conducted with senior managers of the Consumer 
Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI), a business unit of the Consumer Goods Council of 
South Africa (CGCSA). The CGRI specialises in information management, crime 
analysis and the formulation of strategies and/or actionable crime information 
products for application by the retail industry in South Africa. The CGRI obtains its 
funding from its members. Its purpose is to work together with members, partners 
and stakeholders, to mitigate crime in the retail industry. Retail companies enter into 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the CGRI to ensure that daily 
incidents of crimes are reported to the company in support of its initiative aimed at 
reducing crime in the retail industry. It serves about 4 600 retail/wholesale outlets in 
the country. Each retail/wholesale outlet also appoints a dedicated “Champion” to 
drive the initiative in his or her company. The Information Management Company 
obtains its information from its members and acts as a source of information to its 
members, partners and stakeholders. Standard Operating Procedures exist for 
information management, crime analysis and the application of strategies and 
actionable crime information products. This security risk information management 
company is not involved in the implementation of strategies nor does it have any 
control over criminal activities. Its focus is to provide strategies and/or actionable 
crime information products to reduce crime and financial losses at its retail/wholesale 
outlets (Interview no. 37).  
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Each retail/wholesale outlet also has its own database to store varying levels of 
information that affect them. However, their information is generally insurance 
focussed and does not facilitate crime analysis, in order to produce preventative 
measures or enhance police investigations. The CGRI is not prescriptive in that it 
only makes recommendations. The first concern of the retail stores is the safety of 
customers and its personnel. The second concern is the reduction of losses. The 
CGRI does not do security risk analysis or security surveys at these outlets 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
The CGRI has adopted a centralised approach to information management, crime 
analysis and the utilisation of strategies and or actionable crime information 
products. The Head: CGRI and Manager for Member Services and Projects manage 
the Security Risk Information within the CGRI (Interview no. 37). 
 
Business Against Crime has played a mentoring role to CGRI. BAC’s role in the 
business sector and its communication line with the leadership in the Criminal 
Justice System-Police,Justice and the Private Security Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) 
has enabled CGRI to fast track its relationship with these stakeholders, to the extent 
that BAC facilitates meetings between CGRI and these stakeholders. The CGRI 
participates regularly in South African Police Service meetings. It builds relationships 
with the police stations and clusters (Interview no. 37). 
 
5.5.2.2 Crime information management 
 
Members provide daily crime incident reports to CGRI for crime analysis and 
formulation of strategies and/or actionable crime information products. Information 
collection starts at the store. The CGRI relies on the store to provide the information 
on the crime incident. First information of crime is a telephone call from the 
participating stores. The Store follows up on the telephonic incident with a relevant 
incident report for the specific crime and sends it electronically to the data 
administrator of CGRI. The data administrator on the Incident Management System 
(IMS) electronically captures it. A reference number is allocated to the incident. 
Statistical information, geographic information and modus operandi is also provided 
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to the data administrator. No false incidents can be reported as the incidents are 
coordinated with the police by means of the police case numbers (Interview no. 37). 
 
Many stores are not prepared to invest in and install Closed Circuit Television 
(CCTV) surveillance camera systems. They are of the perception that installing 
CCTV cameras will not prevent an armed robbery from happening. It will only assist 
the store in identifying the perpetrators. Stores are keener on having criminal acts 
prevented. If prevention is linked to the apprehension of criminals then stores are 
prepared to invest. On the other hand certain stores invest a lot of money on the 
installation of CCTV cameras. They believe that the identification of perpetrators will 
lead to arrests of perpetrators, which will in turn reduce crimes, which in some cases 
has proven to be true. Some stores have decided not to invest in CCTV cameras, 
because their losses do not justify spending that much of money on CCTV cameras. 
Risk managers from the participating stores check out CCTV camera tapes and pass 
their findings to CGRI who conduct content analysis on the CCTV image (Interview 
no. 37). 
 
Personnel Identity cards are also issued to retail store personnel to help monitor 
people involved in criminal activity in stores. Personnel identity cards are taken away 
from such personnel when disciplinary action is taken against them. Previously the 
offending personnel were able to commit an offence in one retail/wholesale outlet 
and go to work for another outlet without being detected. Personnel cardholders 
come from merchandising companies, promotion companies and labour brokers, etc. 
Members vet their own staff. CGRI only provides identification cards to all vetted 
personnel. CGRI coordinates information, develops best practices and gives advice 
to stores when requested to assist. The company only handles crime information and 
formulates strategies and or actionable crime information products to combat crime 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
Information management, crime analysis and the application of strategies and/or 
actionable crime information products is managed through CGRI‘s operating 
procedures. Members provide voluntary information. No toll free public information 
line is available. Information is not always obtained from external sources. The 
Company discusses its crime incident reports, strategies and/or actionable crime 
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information products with private security companies, SABRIC, PSI, SAICB other 
stakeholders and the Police. CGRI is reactive incident driven. It does not work with 
covert information. They also work with proactive information which is passed to the 
police to follow up. SAPS liaise with other government departments for any 
additional information required by CGRI. CGRI does not work for the SAPS 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
CGRI continuously engages with shopping managers and security personnel at the 
retail/wholesale outlets regarding potential security risks. A BAC project called ‘Crim 
Project’ (Cash Management Project) is currently implemented to prevent pavement 
robberies of cash from the bank, to the centre. This project is managed by SABRIC. 
Special projects are also managed in a team approach, with participants from the 
different stores and the police. Primary concern for the stores is the safety and 
security of their customers and staff, secondary is the losses they incur. The 
Company contributes towards its projects, which is focussed on its crime threats 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
5.5.2.3 Crime information analysis 
 
Crime incident reports are received electronically through the Hi-base automated 
information system or through email from members. The information is then 
transferred onto an analyst notebook. The analyst notebook is used by an analyst to 
evaluate/verify the information and to collate the information. Information is then sent 
weekly to the risk manager of the relevant outlets for evaluation/verification of facts. 
Data integrity is monitored and verified by senior crime analysts. Analyst’s 
programmes were specifically written for the junior and senior analysts. Incomplete 
data is a big problem. The data administrator has to follow up on the incomplete 
information. Trained data analysts are in-house (home grown). No specialist analysts 
are used. Analysts work is only outsourced if a problem occurs with specific types of 
reports; which need a much more sophisticated analysis. The analyst justifies all 
information, by verifying the information with the client and the police. The specific 
software programme used by CGRI handles all crime information related to 
shoplifting, short deliveries of stock, hi-jacking, cash in transit heists, credit card and 
cheque fraud, burglaries and armed robberies (seven identified crimes). It is not 
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confined to syndicate crimes only. The information is verified with the champion of 
the company. Problems are experienced with the completeness of the incident 
reports and in obtaining case numbers and details of investigating officers from the 
police (Interview no. 37). 
 
Although it is not a big problem, retail outlets sometimes do provide incorrect 
statistical information. One of the biggest problems is the verification and completion 
of the data. When the crime incident comes in, the relevant data capturer, will look at 
it try to verify the information or try to get the case number and enrich the information 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
Information comes in and goes out under classification. The system is not an open 
system and therefore cannot be accessed by anyone. CGRI’s strategy is to collate 
the data relating to crime incidents, conduct analysis of the information in order to 
provide accurate and meaningful strategies and/or actionable crime information 
products to their members so that they can implement the crime-combating 
strategies in their stores. It also looks at the various aspects of the crime and 
decides on what should be done. It identifies problem areas, trends, new modus 
operandi, etc.; and develops new strategies to counter the problems. Analysts also 
produce profiles of wanted suspects, red alerts and provide police with photos 
profiles and any other analytical products when required. CGRI also adds value to 
the information through criminological research for the purpose of prevention. 
Criminologists experience problems to get access to victims. Analysts also seek 
clarification, interpretation, draw inferences and provide advice to members. Analysis 
is done according to Standing Operating Procedures. No problems are experienced 
with analysis (Interview no. 37). 
  
5.5.2.4 Implementation of strategies and actionable crime information products 
 
When an incident of serious crime occurs at a specific retail/wholesale outlet, CGRI 
sends an SMS messages to the cell phones of other members in the area. This will 
alert the other members as to the modus operandi of the particular crime, so that 
they can harden their targets, in order to prevent it occurring at their outlets.  
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Hotspots (vulnerable areas) are also identified in partnership with the members, 
partners and stakeholders. The identified users prepare a hotspot report 
(vulnerability analysis report) for use. The hotspot report identifies vulnerable areas 
for attention by SAPS. The South African Police Service (SAPS) deploys personnel 
according to the hotspot report. Whenever this intervention happens, sharp decrease 
in crime is noticed at the identified hotspots (Interview no. 37). 
 
CGRI attends weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual meetings where strategies 
and/or actionable crime information products are shared with members, partners and 
stakeholders. Hints are given for the prevention of criminal incidents. CGRI is not 
involved in the operationalisation of the strategies and/or actionable crime 
information products. It does not decide on strategies but only recommends the 
implementation of the strategies. The Company contributes to special projects as a 
team member at a store (Interview no. 37). 
 
Security information obtained through security assessments by respective stores are 
sometimes used to assist in formulating strategies to improve security measures at 
the store in order to prevent criminal activities. SMS’s are used to disseminate 
information as alerts. Strategies and products are classified by using ‘confidential’ 
and ‘restricted’ (Interview no. 37). 
 
The manager responsible for strategies visits the store and meets with the risk 
managers on a monthly basis. At that meeting statistics, trends and the strategies 
are reviewed. Opportunities and threats are discussed. Best practices are discussed 
on how to protect the safes, strong rooms, cash office and how to improve alarm 
systems. In the case of burglaries, to overcome the problem of criminals taking away 
the outdoor alarm communication systems. This issue was discussed and 
investigated by CGRI. Strategies and/or actionable crime information products are 
identified and recommended to mitigate the relevant security risk in this regard 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
Risk managers from the participating stores sit on the monthly Management 
Committee (MANCOM) meetings called by CGRI. Information regarding crimes 
affecting the retail/wholesale industry as a whole is shared with them. Police 
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organised crime units are given information on syndicated criminal incidents for 
example housebreakings and armed robberies. All ATM crimes are handled by 
SABRIC despite the ATM being situated inside the stores. SABRIC also monitors 
ATM crimes in terms of modus operandi, etc. SABRIC maintains ATM statistics. 
CGRI discusses retail crimes with participating store groups and the police (Interview 
no. 37). 
 
Different meetings take place with the police and the retail industry. The store works 
on their own initiative with the information, since the stores are responsible for their 
own security. They have their own meetings with the local police (Interview no. 37). 
Meetings are attended with the police nationally, provincially and locally. 
Vulnerabilities are also rated so that police deployment can be enhanced in those 
areas. Crime prevention awareness is done at shopping centres to overcome 
incidents of criminality (Interview no. 37). 
 
Security personnel will only have access to information as deemed necessary by the 
store management. SAPS only share statistics which are case related. They do not 
share information on suspects or proactive information (Interview no. 37).  
 
Some of the big security companies (Group 4 Security Company, Protea Coin 
Security Company and Fidelity Security Company) are privy to security information 
from CGRI as crime is considered as a non-competitive issue by them. Security 
guards at the stores do not have access to information from CGRI. Information 
provided by security guards is managed by the store management. If necessary it is 
referred to CGRI. The company communicates directly with police of the specific 
cluster commander or station commissioner organised crime units or the special task 
force of the police when it encounters crime incidents in progress (Interview no. 37). 
 
Seventy percent of the participating stores implement strategies and/or actionable 
crime information products to combat specific incidents. An impact study showed a 
46% decrease in crime statistics during 2009. During 2005, the Retail Industry used 
to undergo an average loss of about R100 000 per incident through armed robberies. 
Since then, it has decreased to about R30 000 per incident. Losses per incident 
came down because of cash management strategies. CGRI makes 
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recommendations to stores on cash management strategies for example; to have as 
little cash as possible at their outlets, to use as many Cash-in-Transit pick-ups as 
possible, encourage the use of ‘dropsafe’ drops and to have small cash floats in tills 
(Interview no. 37). 
 
Feedback is given to the members on all information of incidents received. All 
information, strategies and/or actionable crime information products are classified to 
overcome leakage of information (Interview no. 37). 
  
5.5.3 Case Study 4: Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
5.5.3.1 Organisational structure 
 
In this case study interviews were conducted with senior managers from the 
Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI). PSI has been in existence since 2004. PSI is 
responsible for information management and crime analysis for the South African 
petroleum industry for all participating oil companies. It manages and collates crime 
incident information collected by its clients, analyses the crime incident information 
and recommends strategies and/or provides actionable crime information products 
aimed at mitigating serious crime related to the petroleum industry. This initiative is 
driven in partnership with five (of the six) participating oil companies. The purpose for 
PSIs existence is the high level of crimes perpetrated in the petroleum industry and 
the absence of information management and crime analysis strategies, as well as 
actionable crime information products. Their strategy is to identify the crime drivers, 
develop strategies to mitigate the crimes and to implement preventative measures. 
Its vision is to reduce the crimes perpetrated against petroleum retailers to an 
acceptable level. Reference is made to serious and violent crimes including 
robberies at service stations, hijackings, fuel thefts, truck hijackings, bombings of 
ATMs, etc. Most of the information focuses on petroleum industry related retail 
crimes including Cash-in-Transit (CIT) incidents and ATM crimes perpetrated at 
petrol station forecourts. Each oil manufacturing plant or service station operates 
under individual oil companies. They operate within the policy of the specific oil 
company for example Engen, Sasol, etc. The specific oil company specifies policy on 
how the crime information is to be provided to the Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI). 
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The infrastructure for PSI includes a general manager, consequence manager, data 
capturer and an analyst. Formal training is not provided to their personnel, since 
many of the incumbents are former police officers who had been exposed to crime 
information collection and analysis. However, they do provide on the job training on 
specific issues such as information technology and software training for analytical 
skills (Interview no. 38). 
 
There are standing operating procedures on the expected service delivery 
requirements. There is no interference with the work of the South African Police 
Service. Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI) is there to support the South African 
Police Service in their endeavours to combat and limit crime-site-specific to premises 
of petroleum retailers (petrol stations) (Interview no. 38). 
 
5.5.3.2 Crime information management 
 
The Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI) has a 24-hour security incident reporting line. 
As incidents happen, they are reported through this line. A data capturer who takes 
down the information of the incident completes an incident report. The incident report 
includes all relevant details, according to a prescribed reporting format. All the 
information is captured onto an automated system. There is also a toll-free number 
for the reporting of crimes in progress, e.g. an armed robbery in progress. If a 
specific site uses the toll free number, it can be seen on the system as to who is 
reporting and from which site the report is emanating. The police are immediately 
informed of the crime in progress. This number is not for public use.  
 
Sometimes the reporting of incidents by petrol service stations is very sketchy. Some 
retailers do not report the incident due to competition among retailers. The feeling is 
that if they do report they will be penalised by their oil company for not adhering to 
policy or administrative procedures. If crime incidents are hidden and not reported to 
the PSI, particulars of the crime incident is eventually obtained from SAPS, media, 
SABRIC, CGRI or other members of the Public Private Partnership (PPP). The PSI 
is in the process of putting in place a help line to encourage retailers to report crime 
incidents without being exposed. This helpline is to enhance reporting of hidden 
crime incidents. There is no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with all 
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stakeholders to share information, due to some entities being disorganised and not 
equally effective (Interview no. 38). 
The PSI uses a Computerised Occurrence Book (COB) with coordinates to all its 
service sites. It can be used to send simultaneous SMSs to different sites in a 
particular radius or in general as soon as it receives information on crime incidents. If 
all retailers report crime incidents, it will improve the crime situation (Interview no. 
38). 
  
Business Against Crime (BAC) arranges meetings with the leadership of the police 
and holds bi-monthly meetings with all stakeholders. A representative from BAC also 
functions from the crime support centre at the 10111 police emergency centre. This 
person is there to liaise directly with all participating industries including the PSI, 
other stakeholders and the police regarding crime incidents occurring at oil company 
sites and other places of interest to the other stakeholders. This person represents 
the BAC (crime support centre). The Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI) liaises with 
the police both nationally and provincially, SABRIC, CIT companies and oil 
companies on a continuous basis. The police work in partnership with the PSI 
sharing information of commonality (Interview no. 38). Continuous meetings with 
SAPS cluster commanders and/or station commissioners impacts positively on 
police action. Police enhance operations at hotspot areas identified by the meetings. 
The enhanced police action reduces crime incidents in that particular hotspot. 
Annual statistics maintained by PSI showed that whenever there were meetings with 
the policing clusters, crime levels dropped at the identified clusters (Interview no. 
38).  
 
New managers come and go from the various petrol service stations, some new 
managers are not aware of security procedures on the reporting of crime incidents. 
Managers have far too many responsibilities than to focus on security. Their prime 
focus is to run a business and not to manage crime. They are not adequately trained 
on security related issues. Retailers do not train personnel on how to react in the 
event of armed robberies or how to prevent armed robberies. PSI is currently 
developing a curriculum to assist in the training of site personnel (Interview no. 38).  
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One big disadvantage is that information could be leaked to perpetrators during the 
sharing of information (Interview no. 38).  
 
5.5.3.3 Crime information analysis 
 
The automated incident report is sent to the analyst for processing. Using the 
appropriate software the analyst ensures that the information is enriched by using 
information provided by other sources, such as the police, other oil companies, 
Consumer Goods Risk Initiative (CGRI), South African Banking Risk Information 
Centre (SABRIC), the Post Office and South African Insurance Crime Bureau 
(SAICB), etc. The automated system also does linkage analyses by providing links to 
other similar information on the system. The information on the system is further 
enriched by collecting further information to fill the gaps. Once the information is 
enriched, the analyst then converts it into a daily incident report. The information on 
the daily incident reports also reflects information of incidents provided by SABRIC 
on banking and Cash-in-Transit incidents, which affect threats confronting the oil 
companies. The collected information is further enhanced with information from 
criminological research, the media and other open sources, to add value to 
information on crime incidents. It is a comprehensive document, some days it is up 
to twenty pages (Interview no. 38).  
 
The Consequence Manager is tasked to conduct further investigations at every site 
in Gauteng where a crime incident had occurred. He will identify the cause/s that led 
to the occurrence of the incident, determine what has been done and what has not 
been done. He will also collect additional information, which has not been collected 
previously, e.g. Description of other occupants in the suspect vehicle, colour of 
vehicles, CCTV images will be viewed for possible suspects. Information on previous 
incidents is also collected at the specific site. Information on the modus operandi is 
also obtained. If a specific security weakness for example, poor locking devices and 
door fittings, watchman found sleeping, involvement of security officials, etc. resulted 
in the criminal incident taking place, this is also addressed by the consequence 
manager with the retailer and security company employed at the petrol service 
station (Interview no. 38).  
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The analyst will add all the new information onto the incident report. Weekly, the 
analyst will use all the collected information and provide management with a hotspot 
report. It will also provide a hotspot forecast by PSI, on where future incidents may 
occur and identify clusters that are being hit frequently. Hotspot reports are sent to 
the same recipients as the incident reports. A third report called the Joint Operational 
Committee (JOCOM) report is compiled in conjunction with SAPS and other 
stakeholders. It is a report that deals with crime trends, activities and frequency of 
crime incidents in the policing clusters where these incidents are most common. This 
report also serves as a Crime Threat Assessment (CTA) (Interview no. 38).  
 
The crime information analysis process includes collation of the raw information, 
interpretation, verification and adding value by further investigating the information. 
Petroleum Security Initiative (PSI) does not have a policy for analysis. All analysis is 
done using intelligence software, similar to that used by SABRIC, banks, mines, 
SAIB, casinos and tourism, etc. (Interview no. 38).  
 
Information is classified at two levels, namely: ‘confidential’ and ‘restricted to specific 
companies’. The analyst is supportive and gives advice whenever needed (Interview 
no. 38).  
 
5.5.3.4 Implementation of strategies and actionable crime information products 
 
A daily incident report is sent out electronically. The SMS is used to disseminate this 
information to the sites (petrol service stations), to all the clients including the South 
African Police Service for application. There are about twenty identified users of the 
daily incident report. It also provided to SABRIC, CGRI, Post Office, South African 
Petroleum Retailers Association (SAPRA) and the different service providers from 
the different oil companies. South African Police Service Gauteng (Provincial 
Commissioner: Crime Management Centre) also receives the daily incident report, 
which is disseminated to other policing structures in the Province. It is also possible 
that SABRIC, PSI and the CIT contracted companies will all report on the same 
incident to the provincial policing structure for proactive and reactive steps. For 
example ATM attacks or CIT attacks happened. All incidents in the daily incident 
reports have already been reported to the SAPS and will be part of their daily crime 
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report. Weekly Hotspot reports are sent to the same recipients, as the daily incident 
reports. A third report is the JOCOM report. The JOCOM report is not as widely 
distributed as the other two reports, due to their inclusion of confidential information 
applicable to specific companies. As a result of competition amongst oil companies, 
values of losses are not put in the report to all the recipients (Interview no. 38). 
 
An Industry specific report is also provided to specific oil companies whenever an 
incident occurs at their sites. This report is also sent to other oil companies and the 
SAPS. The consequence manager’s report is also sent to the specific oil company 
and the site (petrol service station) where the incident occurred. It is also sent to 
SAPS (provincial crime management centre) (Interview no. 38). 
 
A monthly analysis report of all incidents is also given to the oil companies only. This 
report is not for general consumption. PSI also participates in big projects run by 
BAC and the SAPS. The company also registers projects if there is a major problem 
at specific sites (petrol service stations). There are advantages for service stations 
who implement strategies and/or actionable crime information products provided by 
PSI. This results in reduction of crime incidents. In some instances if the retail side 
does not want to implement certain strategies and/or actionable crime information 
products they just ignore the tasking by not acting on it. Those that ignore 
implementation of strategies and/or actionable crime information products, usually 
experience a high number of incidents (Interview no. 38). 
 
Whenever there are meetings with cluster commanders/station commissioners and 
operational interventions follow, incidents at oil company sites show a decrease. On 
one occasion, there were investigators at Honeydew SAPS looking for the same 
suspects as SAPS Florida. They did not realise that the perpetrators were being 
investigated by SAPS Florida. There was no linkage analysis. Intervention by 
security officers of a private security company led to the perpetrators being arrested 
and linked to cases from Honeydew and Florida (Interview no. 38). 
 
Police provide feedback on progress being made with investigations being 
conducted at the different sites. Oil companies also provide feedback on the 
implementation of strategies. The biggest response comes from individual petrol 
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service stations that liaise directly with PSI. There is no structured way of getting 
feedback. Formal feedback is given by written reports, emails and informal 
discussions with specific persons. All successes are also reported and coordinated 
by the analyst (Interview no. 38). 
 
5.6  SUMMARY 
 
The three security information management companies are private initiatives. They 
do not collect security information, but coordinate incident information received from 
their clients. They collate the crime incident information received from their clients, 
analyse the crime incident information and recommend strategies and/or provides 
actionable crime information products aimed at mitigating serious crimes confronting 
their clients. They do not analyse security information on vulnerabilities, but do 
support their clients with threat assessments depending on the gravity of the threat. 
All three companies are intent on reducing crime, increasing detection rates and 
preventing losses. The views presented in this case study by the different companies 
might be similar, because they all addressed the same research questions of the 
study.  
 
5.7  SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA  
 
5.7.1  Case Study 5: Security information management in Western Australia, 
Western Australian Government Departments, Western Australian Police 
and the Western Australian Private Security Service Providers 
 
5.7.1.1 Background 
 
The use of private security in crime prevention and law enforcement in Australia has 
grown to a point where security personnel outnumber police by more than two-to-
one. During 2006, there were 52 768 personnel employed full time in the Australian 
security industry, compared with 44 898 police members. A decade earlier the police 
had out-numbered security (Prenzler, Earle & Sarre, 2009: 1). 
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Any person who conducts a business or is employed in a security related field within 
Australia is required to be licensed. Each of the six states and two territories (New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania 
and Northern Territory) of Australia have separate legislations that cover all security 
activities. Licensing management in each state/territory is varied and is carried out 
by Police, Attorney General’s Department, Justice Department or the Department of 
Consumer Affairs. Security officers are not permitted to carry firearms, handcuffs or 
batons unless they have a legitimate requirement to do so and then only when 
working and have the appropriate sub-class accreditation to their licence (Australian 
Security Industry Association Ltd, 2011). 
  
Presently data indicates that over 5000 security and investigative businesses are 
registered in Australia and over 110 000 licences have been issued mainly to 
individuals (Prenzler et al., 2009: 1).  
 
In Australia, threats and risks are considered as different concepts. Threat is a 
hazard or a source of risk (criminals, terrorists, etc.), usually measured in terms of 
intent and capability. A threat also takes into consideration direct impact of natural 
disasters, e.g. power outages, infrastructure and indirect impacts such as fire, 
looting, civil unrest, etc. Risks are considered as the likelihood of an attack with the 
most credible impact(s) or consequence on assets. Security Risk Management 
therefore involves understanding the threat as part of the objective of determining 
and implementing counter measures to manage risks (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 36).  
 
5.7.1.2 Security information management in Western Australia 
 
Private security activities within Western Australia are governed by the Security and 
Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 and the Security and Security and Related 
Activities (Control) Regulations 1997. Whilst the term security guard is used by many 
companies, government bodies and individuals use the term security officer, 
“Bouncers” are called Crowd Controllers and Store Detectives are called Loss 
Prevention or Asset Protection Officers. The Western Australian Police Licensing 
Services (Security) regulates and manages the security Industry. The aim is to 
provide the community of Western Australia a professional security industry where 
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competency (training), integrity and accountability is maintained at a high standard 
(Australian Security Industry Association Ltd, 2011). 
 
In Western Australia businesses supplying security products or services must hold 
the following licences:  
• Security Agents Licence which authorises the supply of security officers, 
security consultants or security equipment services.  
• Crowd Control Agent Licence which authorises the supply of crowd control 
services. 
• Inquiry Agents Licence which authorises the supply of investigation services.  
 
Individuals who perform security services need to hold the following non-agent 
licences:  
• Security Officers Licence: to watch, guard and protect property.  
• Security Consultant Licence: to investigate and advise on matters relating to 
the watching, guarding and protection of property; including security services 
and equipment sales.  
• Security Installer Licence: to install security equipment (does not include 
installers of security equipment in vehicles, vessels or aircraft) 
• Crowd Control Licence: to monitor or control the behaviour of persons, screen 
persons for entry or remove people from premises. Required for licensed 
premises, places of entertainment and public or private events or functions 
(Australian Security Industry Association Ltd, 2011). 
 
Investigators licence means to legally investigate the conduct of individuals or a 
corporation or the character of individuals, perform surveillance work or investigate 
missing persons (Australian Security Industry Association Ltd, 2011).  
 
Security information is usually obtained from threat, vulnerability and criticality 
assessments as well as historical information, management systems and 
programme activities. This security information is analysed using a risk register. The 
risk register informs on asset criticality against identified risks and provides a 
framework from which to allocate the needed physical security resources and 
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funding. The likelihood and consequence of the risk is determined by assessing and 
defining the risk using descriptive terms (qualitative), using calculated data 
(quantitative) or the combination of the both (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 178-179).  
Security information on incidents is handled according to an Incident Management 
and Reporting Guideline. The operationalisation of the security information depends 
on reports and trends identified through analysis of incidents. The analysis of 
incidents consistent with other institutional standards is essential in order to 
maximise the value of the information (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 66).  
 
5.7.1.3 Government departments  
 
The Government departments provide policy; guidelines and collection plans for the 
collection of security information. The owners of the buildings where the government 
departments are housed have contracted security service providers. Their functions 
are mainly directed at access control and taking care of the physical protection 
systems. The Government departments have their own Security Heads. They 
manage security related activities and conduct workplace investigations on 
misconduct and other policy related incidents in respect of the government 
department. These officials are all licensed to perform the specific security related 
activities. It is the responsibility of all employees and clients to report any information 
on threats, incidents and vulnerabilities to the security official at the sites. The 
security officials enter the information into the computer system using a specific 
template. Software programmes are used to collate the information. Much of this 
information is handled by the security officials at the respective sites.  
 
Security information on crime incidents are referred to the WAP. All misconduct and 
policy related violations are referred to the Regional offices. Different methods are 
used to collect security information. Open means is most commonly used to collect 
security information. Networking is also used to gather information. Security 
managers identify misconducts and vulnerabilities. Risk management profiles 
determine the types of threats the department is exposed to. The Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Business Liaisons Unit (ASIOBLU), collects security 
information on threats, analyses it and provides threat assessment reports to 
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government departments in Western Australia. Information is also collected from 
third parties (Interview nos. 18, 19 & 20). 
 
Government departments share information among themselves. All information is 
recorded manually and then transferred to computer systems. Feedback is given 
according to the information received. A collection unit is tasked to collect any 
additional information, analyse the information and make recommendation. 
Actionable information products and threat assessment reports are received for 
application as security risk control measures. Feedback is then also given on the 
outcomes of the application of security information (Interview nos. 18, 19 & 20). 
 
5.7.1.4 Western Australian Police   
 
The Western Australian Police (WAP) has a Commissioner as head, Assistant 
Commissioners as deputies, Superintendents in charge of the uniform and detective 
police divisions, inspectors appointed as district officers, senior sergeants and 
sergeants are in charge of police stations and constables as operational workers. 
The Australian Crime Commission Corporate Plan 2004 is used as a guiding 
instrument for the WAP to manage security information on crime (Interview nos. 21 & 
22). 
  
The WAP use the concept ‘intelligence’ rather than ‘information’. This was started in 
the 1990s when intelligence led policing first appeared in Australia. It was driven by a 
number of police commissioners. The local adoption included a new accountability 
structures at a local level, a greater integration of intelligence and investigation and 
improve targeting of daily police efforts through intelligence dissemination. For the 
purpose of the WAP the researcher will use the concept intelligence rather than 
security information (Interview nos. 21 & 22). 
  
 The WAP use overt and covert means of collecting intelligence. Public hotline 
systems are also used to get intelligence from the public. Intelligence is also 
provided by third parties. The WAP use different methods to collect intelligence. 
Some of the methods include physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, 
interviews, research, auditing, undercover and forensics. Intelligence is obtained 
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from both internal and external sources. All intelligence is entered into the computer 
and viewed at the local level. The intelligence from the different police stations is 
viewed by the intelligence group at district level. The different policing units have 
access to the intelligence according to the classification criteria. Anybody may 
access any intelligence if they have a valid reason to access it. If the reason is not 
valid, access is denied. All intelligence is also viewed by the State Intelligence 
Division. They share this intelligence at the Federal Intelligence level, so that all the 
police states and territories can have access to them (Interview nos. 21 & 22). 
  
Private security companies directly share intelligence with the WAP at the different 
intelligence levels. National key point companies share intelligence with the State 
Intelligence Division at the Critical Infrastructure Security Forum (CISF). These 
meetings take place four times a month. This sharing is based on scenarios. All 
intelligence received goes through value rating and security rating, so that the 
intelligence is sanitised and declassified for sharing (Interview nos. 21 & 22). 
  
The WAP has a specific Incident Management System to manage all reported 
incidents. All incidents of crimes are reported by private security companies to the 
WAP for investigation. They sometimes assist the WAP with preliminary 
investigations, but hand over all criminal investigations to the WAP (Interview nos. 21 
& 22). 
 
The intelligence is analysed by qualified intelligence analysts at the local, district 
intelligence offices and at the State Intelligence Division and operationalised 
according to the priority of the Commissioner. The intelligence is used to generate 
actionable intelligence related products such as profiles, linkage charts, crime 
pattern analysis and threat assessments for operationalisation. If any further 
intelligence is needed to enrich the present intelligence, several cells are activated to 
collect this additional intelligence. A collection plan is designed for this purpose by 
the analysts. Operationalisation is done by the superintendents. They do the 
monitoring and evaluation of the application of the actionable intelligence products. 
Feedback is only given on its success, where necessary (Interview nos. 21 & 22). 
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5.7.1.5  Western Australian Private Security Service Providers  
 
Security Risk Management (SRM) is a sub-set and an essential part of a broader risk 
management system. It is simply another management discipline fitting 
predominantly within the sphere of risk management. In Western Australia more 
emphasis is placed on investing in Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) of 
personnel rather than on security risk control measures. This is attributable to the 
low levels of violent crimes being experienced in Western Australia (WA). The 
collection, analysis and application of security information are therefore not regulated 
in the private security environment (Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33 & 34).  
 
Security service providers in Western Australia have individual ways of collecting 
security information on threats, vulnerabilities and incidents. They also use different 
collection methods depending on the type of security information they need. Some of 
the more common methods include physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, 
interviews, research, audits and forensics. Security companies sometimes hold 
workshops with interest groups to collect security information. Depending on the 
nature of the operations, collection plans are specifically structured and used for this 
purpose. Individual interviews are held, security assessments and critical inspections 
are conducted and information is collected from third parties. Security service 
providers do not use collection units to collect security information (Interview nos. 23, 
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34).  
 
In the casino industry, the collection of security information is everyone’s 
responsibility. An information awareness culture is created by the distribution of 
pamphlets, holding awareness workshops and using a common code of conduct for 
all employees at the casino. Television screen (LCD) messages are also used to 
encourage the general public to provide information to specific control points. When 
Campus security guards receive security information they enter them into their 
notebooks, obtain statements, prepare a written report and enter the information into 
a computer system. They handle the information as a policy violation, criminal act or 
in terms of a contract management plan. Everyone on campus is encouraged to 
collect security information, as security is everyone’s responsibility for example 
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students will inform security if they observe a breach of security or criminal act. 
Information is managed as a policy violation, criminal act or in terms of a contract 
management plan (Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34).  
 
Security information is initially referred to the supervisors and then entered into an 
electronic database. Sometimes security information is received verbally and 
managed by the immediate supervisors. The threat information is generally referred 
to the WAP and addressed by the security service provider in consultation with the 
WAP. Incident Reporting Information Systems (IRIS) is used by campus security to 
manage security information on incidents. This is usually governed by the policy of 
the security service provider. The incident information on criminal conduct is 
generally given preliminary attention and referred to the WAP for investigation. The 
WAP has the legislative mandate to investigate crime in Western Australia. All 
incidents on policy violations are sometimes referred to the human resources section 
of the company for attention or investigated by workplace investigators. All 
vulnerabilities are handled in terms of a risk management process as determined by 
the company. It also provides a threat assessment for operationalisation. Security 
service providers do not follow a standardised procedure in handling vulnerabilities 
(Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34).  
 
The security information is handled in a protected manner. The information can only 
be accessed if the individual has been permitted to access the required information. 
Otherwise access to the information is denied. All security information pertaining to 
threats and crime in general is discussed with different stakeholders at different 
forums. There are specific forums which serve the needs of specific security service 
providers. Some of these forums include: The Critical Infrastructure Security Forum 
(CISF), Australian Security Industry Association Liaison (ASIAL), Council of 
Australian Governments (CAG), Industry Security Committee and Trusted 
Information Sharing Networks (ISCTISN). Security information is shared at these 
forums on a need to know basis (Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 
& 34).  
 
Many security service providers do not have appointed analysts. Computer software 
is used in the collation, analysis and generation of actionable information crime 
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products. One such common software used in Western Australia is the IRIS software 
which is used to collate, evaluate and analyse information for application. Security 
information is analysed only if it can be used. Otherwise the information is left in the 
computer to be used as historical information. Investigators or security supervisors 
are tasked to collect additional information where necessary. They prefer clean 
information than corrupted information. The casino industry analyses its CCTV and 
other information as soon as it is received and the notify police immediately of any 
criminal conduct. It also takes immediate action if the incident is in progress. Data 
integrity is a problem. Much of the information is not entered onto the system 
immediately. Sometimes information is not correctly entered into the computer 
system. Actionable information products and alerts are generated for use by security 
officials. Feedback on the application of the actionable information products is 
usually done verbally or in writing (Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33 & 34).  
 
Many security service providers are of the view that they do need to analyse their 
information as no losses occur at their companies. All crime information is analysed 
by the WAP and operationalised (Interview nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33 & 34).  
 
5.8  SUMMARY 
 
Security officials employed in a security related field in Australia are required to be 
licensed. The businesses as well as individual security officers need to be licenced. 
Threats and risks are considered as different concepts in Australia, Threat is 
considered as a source of a risk, usually measured in terms of intent and capability, 
while risks are considered as the likelihood and consequence of an attack. Security 
information is usually obtained from threat, vulnerability and criticality assessments 
as well as from historical information, management systems and programme 
activities. This security information is analysed using a risk register. The risk register 
informs on asset criticality against identified risks and provides a framework from 
which to allocate the needed physical security resources and funding. Government 
departments in Western Australia have a collection unit that is tasked to collect 
specific information, analyse the information and make recommendation. Actionable 
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information products and threat assessment reports are received for implementation 
as security risk control measures. The Western Australian Police use the concept 
‘intelligence’ rather than ‘information’. Private security companies directly share 
intelligence with the WAP at the different policing levels. Qualified analysist are used 
to analyse intelligence in the WAP. Security service providers in Western Australia 
have individual ways of collecting security information on threats, vulnerabilities and 
incidents. Specific collection plans are developed for the collection of security 
information. 
 
5.9  COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA 
 
As much as the researcher is not keen on making comparisons between a 
developed and a developing country, there are, however matters of relevance in the 
management of security information which may be important to compare. Table 5.1 
draws comparisons on the management of security information between security 
practitioners in Gauteng in South Africa and Western Australia. Table 5.1 was drawn 
up by the researcher. 
 
Table 5.1: Comparisons on the management of security information between 
Gauteng in South Africa and Western Australia. 
SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG) AUSTRALIA (WESTERN) 
Security officers are registered by 
PSIRA 
Security officers are registered and 
licenced by the Western Australian Police 
Threats and Risks are considered as 
similar concepts 
Threat and risks are considered as 
different concepts 
Security Risk Management involves 
understanding the risk as part of the 
objective of determining and 
implementing counter measures to 
manage risks 
Security Risk Management involves 
understanding the threat as part of the 
objective of determining and 
implementing counter measures to 
manage risks 
The term security guard, store 
detectives and security risk managers 
are commonly used in the Security 
The term security guard is used by many 
companies, government bodies and 
individuals use the term security officer, 
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industry “Bouncers” are called Crowd Controllers 
and Store Detectives are called Loss 
Prevention or Asset Protection Officers 
Risk assessment or Risk analysis 
(Probability, Frequency and Impact 
analysis) 
Criticality assessments (Probability, 
Frequency and Impact analysis) 
Security information is analysed by 
managers using a security officers 
incident report 
Security information is analysed using a 
risk register 
Security information on incidents is 
handled by the supervisor according to 
discretion 
Security information on incidents is 
handled according to an Incident 
Management and Reporting Guideline 
Government departments do not 
provide policy; guidelines and 
collection plans for the collection of 
security information 
Government departments provide policy; 
guidelines and collection plans for the 
collection of security information 
Government departments do not share 
information among themselves nor do 
they use forums 
Government departments share 
information among themselves and at 
forums 
Collection units are not tasked to 
collect security information, analyse the 
information and make recommendation 
A collection unit is tasked to collect 
security information, analyse the 
information and make recommendation 
Concept crime information and 
intelligence is used by the SAPS 
Concept intelligence rather than 
information is used by the WAP 
Private security companies do not 
directly share information or 
intelligence with the SAPS at the 
different policing levels 
Private security companies directly share 
intelligence with the WAP at the different 
policing levels 
SRM is a model used by the Security 
Industry to manage risks 
SRM is simply another management 
discipline fitting predominantly within the 
sphere of risk management 
In South Africa more emphasis is 
placed on investing in security risk 
control measures 
In Western Australia more emphasis is 
placed on investing in Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) of personnel 
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rather than on security risk control 
measures 
Security officials are not tasked to 
collect security information on threats, 
vulnerabilities and incidents  
Security officials are tasked to collect 
security information on threats, 
vulnerabilities and incidents.  
Private security information 
management companies coordinate 
and analyse security information on 
incidents of crime (SABRIC, PSI, 
CGRI) 
Private security information management 
companies do not co-ordinate and 
analyse security information on incidents 
of crime 
 
5.10  PRESENT DAY STANDARDS EMANATING FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
The SAPS and the WAP have a structured way of managing crime incident 
information and intelligence. They use collection units and investigators to collect 
information and intelligence. Collection plans are specifically structured for each 
project, so that only the required information and intelligence is collected. The 
information flows from the bottom upwards to the highest decision maker in the 
organisation. Only persons who have the level of security clearance have the 
authority to access the information (De Kock, 2011 & Interview nos. 21 & 22). 
 
All crime incident information/intelligence that enters the system is analysed by 
structured analysis units. The crime incident information/intelligence is shared with 
interested networks such as private security companies, intelligence structures and 
other information networks. The WAP sanitises the information and declassifies the 
level before information/intelligence is shared. Only the relevant portions of the 
information/intelligence are shared. Decisions are made by management to 
operationally and strategically apply the information. In addition to actionable crime 
information products, they also generate a CTA with all the information/intelligence 
they receive. All Threat information received by the police is also included in the CTA 
(Interviews nos. 21 & 22). 
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In Western Australia, security managers in government departments have a 
structured, regulated way in which they manage the flow of security information on 
incidents of misconduct. Internal directives are issued to ensure that security 
information on crime incidents, threats and vulnerabilities are managed at the 
different sites. The collected security information is then channelled to their Regional 
Office. The Western Australian government department use the complaints 
management unit to collect information on incidents of policy violations. All incidents 
related to misconduct are investigated by the ethical standards unit at their Regional 
Office. Their Director General discusses the information on policy violation with the 
Director Generals of other Government Departments at the Federal level (Interview 
nos. 18, 19 & 20).  
 
Awareness is created by security service providers in Western Australia to 
encourage the collection of security information on incidents, threats and 
vulnerabilities. Security service providers at the casino in Western Australia use 
different awareness strategies such as code of conduct cards for staff, pamphlets 
and LCD screens for the general public to report any security information relevant to 
incidents, threats or vulnerabilities to a security officer at a control point. In this way 
the information is immediately acted upon by a response team (Interview nos. 33 & 
34).  
 
In South Africa on the other hand the crime incident information management 
companies have a well-structured, regulated way to manage crime incident 
information. The process is controlled by Standing Operating Procedures which were 
agreed upon by the clients and the service provider. The analysis and 
recommendation of strategies to clients and stakeholders is coordinated, monitored 
and evaluated. The sharing of crime incident information by crime information 
management companies in South Africa helps enrich the existing repository and 
avoids duplication of strategies to address the same problem, for example ATM 
bombings at a petrol station retail outlet. This incident will be attended by SABRIC, 
PSI and CGRI, all of whom have an interest in the crime incident. Networking assists 
in coming up with one formidable strategy for recommendation to the client and the 
police (Interview nos. 36, 37 & 38).  
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Although the crime incident information management companies discover 
vulnerabilities during the course of their investigation, they only provide 
recommendations to the site managers on how to address the vulnerabilities. They 
do not manage security information on vulnerabilities for their clients. They consider 
this to be the responsibility of the contracted security company or in-house security 
service provider (Interview no. 35).  
 
 
5.11 CONCLUSION 
 
This collective type of case study research was not done to draw comparisons 
between South Africa and Australia. It would be meaningless to draw comparisons 
between societies with vastly different cultures and levels of crime, especially violent 
crime. This case study design was used to primarily identify present day standards 
both in South Africa and Australia in order to enhance the management of security 
information. The researcher’s intention was to include only those attributes relevant 
to the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. In-depth interviews for the case studies were 
conducted with senior managers from the police, government departments (with in-
house security service infrastructure) and private security service providers both in 
South Africa and Western Australia. One of the advantages of the in-depth 
interviews was that it helped to record more fully the responses of the participants 
supported by their outward manifestations. The use of the case study design proved 
to be a natural advantage in this study, as it helped identify strengths and 
weaknesses relative to a larger class of similar units. The procedures followed in 
conducting the case study interviews were consistent. The same interview guide was 
used for all the case studies. The researcher also tried to get interviewees from 
similar environments in both Perth, Western Australia and South Africa. Due to 
differences in both the countries it was not possible to achieve total success in this 
regard. The case study interviews were successful in the identification of present day 
standards. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DATA ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The non-experimental design was used for the quantitative data collection (Fouché, 
et al., 2011: 155-156). The data was collected by conducting a self-administered 
questionnaire survey. Different sectors of the security industry from Gauteng 
participated in the study. A total of 114 respondents participated in the survey out of 
an intended target of 150, giving a response rate of 76%. The data was analysed by 
an independent statistician. The data analysis procedures had to be identified within 
this design. Data was analysed using the descriptive and inferential numeric analysis 
process (Creswell, 2009: 218). Basically, data analysis entailed the breaking down of 
the data into constituent parts to obtain answers to the research questions in 
Paragraph 1.4 and to test the grounded theory. The data will be presented using 
tables and frequencies. Ranking will be used to prioritise aspects. When two or more 
observations are equal, the average rank is used. For example, if two observations 
are tied for the second-highest rank, they would get a rank of 2.5 (the average of 2 
and 3) and also if there are three ranks tied at 4 they would get a rank of 5 (the 
average of 4, 5 and 6). 
 
The analysis and interpretation of the data was necessary in order to answer the 
research questions. It was therefore necessary to describe and analyse the data and 
then interpret the results of the analysis.  
 
This chapter examines and discusses the data analysis and interpretation of the data 
from the structured interviews carried out with security officials employed by the 
security industry in Gauteng. 
 
6.2  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Two types of data were collected using the questionnaire survey method. They 
included categorical data and numerical data. The categorical data denoted 
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variables while the numerical data gave measurements or counts. The univariate 
analysis process was used, because of the fact that single variables were being 
analysed mainly with a view to describing that variable (Kruger et al., 2007: 217-
245).  
 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher decided to collate the responses from 
the questionnaire survey (See Appendix 14) into tables. The frequency distribution 
was used to summarise and display the data into tables (Kruger et al., 2007: 217-
245). This involved developing qualitative themes and categories. The themes and 
categories were given numeric codes, then counting the number of times they occur 
in the text data. This quantification of qualitative data enabled the researcher to 
compare quantitative results with the qualitative data. The data was conceptualised 
into three main themes relevant to the categories. The frequency table which resorts 
under the specific theme is interpreted and explained. It is randomly supported by 
literature study to confirm the accuracy of the findings (Creswell, 2009:218).  
 
6.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY GROUP 
 
The sampling of this study group was discussed in Paragraph 2.2.4. The security 
officials gave their consent to participate in this study. The demographic 
characteristics of the study group are merely being presented to describe the study 
group.  
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6.3.1  Demographic characteristics 
 
6.3.1.1  Security service sector with which you are involved at present  
 (See Appendix 14 question 8) 
 
Table 6.1: Security service sector (N = 110) 
Security service sector Frequency Cases % Rank 
Protection services (military air force, 
intelligence service, correctional services 
other government department 
27 24.5% 1 
In-house security (university, complex, etc.) 24 21.8% 2 
Retail sectors (shops, casinos, shopping 
centres and hotels) 
21 19.1% 3 
Public service entities (Telkom, post office 
hospitals, other parastatals) 
15 13.6% 4.5 
Mining sector 15 13.6% 4.5 
Private security contract companies 11 10.0% 6 
Financial and insurance institutions 9 8.2% 7 
City and metropolitan councils 2 1.8% 8.5 
Industrial sector 2 1.8% 8.5 
Transport service (road, marine, aviation) 1 0.9% 10 
 
Twelve companies from different security service sectors participated in the study.  
 
6.3.1.2  Gender (See Appendix 14 question 1) 
 
Table 6.2: Gender (N = 109) 
Gender Frequency Cases % Rank 
Male 87 76.3% 1 
Female 22  19.3% 2 
 
A total of 109 of the respondents managed to indicate their gender status, that is, in 
this particular question 109 responses were valid. Nearly 80% of the security 
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personnel officers were males; the remaining security personnel, almost 20% were 
females. The ratio of males to females may be attributed to the fact that the field of 
security service is mainly dominated by males. At present females are trying to move 
into this field.  
 
6.3.1.3  Ethnicity (See Appendix 14 question 3) 
 
Table 6.3: Ethnicity (N = 111) 
Ethnicity Frequency Cases % Rank 
Indian 4 3.5% 4 
Black 72 63.2% 1 
Coloured 7 6.1% 3 
White 28 24.6% 2 
 
In terms of ethnicity a total of 111 responses were valid. About 65% of the 
respondents to the survey were Blacks followed by almost 25% Whites. The two 
categories Indian and Coloured only comprised 10 % of the respondents.  
 
6.3.1.4  Age (See Appendix 14 question 2) 
 
Table 6.4: Age (N = 112) 
Age Frequency Cases % Rank 
36 – 40 years 32 28.6% 1 
31 – 36 years 29 25.9% 2 
41 – 45 years 24 21.4% 3 
26 – 30 years 9 8.0% 4.5 
46 – 50 years 9 8.0% 4.5 
51 years and above 5 4.5% 6 
21 – 25 years 4 3.6% 7 
For the question on age a total of 112 responses were valid. The respondents were 
all above 20 years of age. The largest percentage of respondents (48%) was in the 
range 30-46 years old with at least 90% of them aged over 30 years of age. The 
181 
service security personnel are mature and thus will be able to give reliable 
information.  
 
6.3.1.5  Educational qualifications (See Appendix 14 question 4) 
 
Table 6.5: Educational qualifications (N = 112) 
Educational qualification Frequency Cases % Rank 
Standard 10/Grade 12 38 33.9% 1 
Diploma (3 years) 32 28.6% 2 
Certificate 17 15.2% 3 
Postgraduate degree 12 10.7% 4 
Degree 10 8.9% 5 
Diploma (1 year) 9 8.0% 6 
Standard 9/Grade 11 4 3.6% 7 
Standard 8/Grade 10 and below 3 2.7% 8.5 
Advanced diploma 3 2.7% 8.5 
Diploma (2 years) 1 0.9% 10 
 
A total of 112 responses were valid for educational qualification. Some respondents 
managed to give more than one qualification as this was a multiple response 
question. Almost 33.9% of the responses were standard 10 or Grade 12 whilst only 
19.6% possessed a degree or postgraduate degree. 
 
6.3.1.6  Security service working experience (See Appendix 14 question 5) 
 
Table 6.6: Working experience (N = 109)  
Working Experience Frequency Cases % Rank 
10 years and above 50 45.9% 1 
5 – <10 years 30 27.5% 2 
3 – <4 years 9 8.3% 3.5 
4-<5 years 9 8.3% 3.5 
Below 1 year 5 4.6% 5 
1 – <2 years 4 3.7% 6 
2-<3 years 2 1.8% 7 
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Nearly 46% (45.9%) of the total pool of respondents had a working experience of 
more than 10 years. The majority of the respondents (73.4%) had more than 5 years 
working experience and this group was in a good position to comment about security 
information.  
 
6.3.1.7 Security service position occupied at present (See Appendix 14 
question 6) 
 
Table 6.7: Security service position (N = 110) 
Current position Frequency Cases % Rank 
Manager 46 41.8% 1 
Security officer 16 14.5% 2 
Supervisor 14 12.7% 3 
Administration official 11 10.0% 4 
Investigator 8 7.3% 5 
Patrol officer 4 3.6% 6 
Security guard 3 2.7% 7.5 
Educator 3 2.7% 7.5 
Law enforcement official 2 1.8% 9 
Control room operator 1 0.9% 11 
Information analyst 1 0.9% 11 
Legal advisor 1 0.9% 11 
 
In terms of security service position there were 110 valid responses. The largest 
percentage of respondents (41.8%) were managers, nearly fifteen (14.5%) percent 
were security officials. Fourteen of the respondents (12.7%) were supervisors and 
eleven of the respondents (10%) were administration officials.  
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6.3.1.8 Security service work with which you are involved at present (See 
Appendix 14 question 7) 
 
Table 6.8: Security service work (N = 112) 
Security service work Frequency Cases % Rank 
Managing, controlling or supervising the 
rendering of any security-related service 
49 43.8% 1 
Protecting or safeguarding a person or property 47 42.0% 2 
Giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of 
person or property, on any type of security 
service, or on the use of security equipment 
34 30.4% 3 
Performing the functions of an investigator 30 26.8% 4 
Providing a reactive or responsive service in 
connection with the safeguarding of a person or 
property 
20 17.9% 5 
Control room operator 19 17.0% 6 
Providing a service aimed at ensuring order and 
safety on the premises used for sporting, 
recreational, entertainment or similar purposes 
18 16.1% 7 
Providing security training or instruction to a 
security service provider 
16 14.3% 8 
Making a person or the service of a person 
available, whether directly or indirectly for the 
rendering of any specialised security service 
13 11.6% 9 
Monitoring signals of transmissions from 
electronic security equipment 
7 6.3% 10 
Installing, service or repairing security equipment 6 5.4% 11 
Manufacturing, importing, distributing, or 
advertising monitoring devices contemplate in 
section1 of the interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 
2 1.8% 12.5 
Performing the function of a locksmith 2 1.8% 12.5 
Collection, analysis and utilisation of security 
information 
1 0.9% 14.5 
Professional advisor to the security 
company/organisation 
1 0.9% 14.5 
 
The respondents were asked to indicate the type of security service work they are 
involved in. This was a multiple response question where a respondent gave more 
than one response. This means some of the security service personnel are involved 
in more than one area. Only 1% of the security officials were involved in the 
184 
collection and analysis of security information and the application of security risk 
control measures. One can conclude that most security service officials were 
involved in managing, safeguarding, giving of advice on the protection or 
safeguarding of person or property and investigating. 
 
6.3.1.9 Security service training which you have undergone  
 (See Appendix 14 question 9) 
 
Table 6.9: Security service training (N = 112) 
Security service training Frequency Cases % Rank 
Risk management (risk analysis, security 
survey, risk assessment) 
57 50.9% 1 
Fire-arm handling 54 48.2% 2 
Security supervisor (Grade A) 53 47.3% 3 
Security first-line supervision (Grade B) 40 35.7% 4 
Occupational health and safety training 39 34.8% 5.5 
Access control officer (Grade D) 39 34.8% 5.5 
Asset and reaction officer (Grade C) 38 33.9% 7 
Patrol security office (Grade E) 37 33.0% 8 
Security threat assessment 34 30.4% 9 
Fire risk assessment training 28 25.0% 10 
Emergency preparedness training 25 22.3% 11 
Intelligence training 22 19.6% 12 
Specialised investigation training 21 18.8% 13 
Collection of security information 20 17.9% 14 
Specialised security training 19 17.0% 15 
Analysis of security information 17 15.2% 16 
Implementation of security risk control 
measures 
16 14.3% 17 
South Africa police service training 2 1.8% 18.5 
National prosecuting authority 2 1.8% 18.5 
Advance military law practitioner 1 0.9% 20 
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In terms of security service training, there were 112 valid responses. This was a 
multiple response question. It was found that most of the security service personnel 
had attended more than one training course, thus, this was a multiple response 
question. The most frequent courses attended were risk management (risk analysis, 
security survey, risk assessment), firearm handling and security supervisor (grade 
A). Eighteen percent attended courses in the collection of security information, 15% 
attended courses in the analysis of security information and 14% attended courses in 
the implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
Training in the collection, analysis and implementation of security information is not 
included in the compulsory Grade A, B, C, D and E training curriculum for security 
officers (Minnaar 2007: 52-65). Security service providers do not prioritise the 
training for the collection, analysis and application of security information.  
 
6.4  CONCEPTUALISATION AND CATEGORISATION OF DATA: A THEMATIC 
EXPOSITION 
 
6.4.1 Theme 1: Collection of security information 
 
6.4.1.1  Who in your organisation/company is tasked by the analysts to obtain 
additional information to enrich the collected information?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 55) 
 
Table 6.10:  Personnel responsible for collecting security information  
(N = 110) 
Personnel Frequency Cases % Rank 
Security managers 58 52.7% 1 
Investigators 45 40.9% 2 
Supervisors 32 29.1% 3.5 
Risk Managers 32 29.1% 3.5 
Self 30 27.3% 5 
Information/Intelligence unit 21 19.1% 6 
Crime risk officers 13 11.8% 7 
Collection units 11 10.0% 8 
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Table 6.10 indicates that security managers are prioritised as number 1, 
investigators as number 2 and supervisors/risk mangers as number 3 for collecting 
security information. Security service providers had not mentioned the use of 
security guards for the collection of security information. Security service providers 
had not prioritised collection units or intelligence/information units over senior 
security officials for the collection of security information. This implies that many 
security service providers do not have these units. 
 
6.4.1.2  Have you previously collected security information?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 21) 
 
Table 6.11:  Security information collection (N = 107) 
Security information collection Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 81 71.1% 1 
No 26 22.8% 2 
 
When asked whether respondents had previously collected security information, 
there were 107 valid responses. Seventy-one percent acknowledged that they had 
previously collected security information. Only 23% had not collected security 
information. 
 
6.4.1.3  Do you need permission from your supervisor/manager to collect 
security information on behalf of your organisation/company? 
(See Appendix 14 question 18) 
 
Table 6.12:  Permission to collect security information (N = 113) 
Permission Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 63 55.3% 1 
No 50 43.9% 2 
 
Fifty-five percent of the 113 valid responses indicated that they need permission 
from the supervisor/manager to collect security information on behalf of their 
organisation or company.  
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6.4.1.4 Does your organisation/company have the necessary resources to 
collect security information? (See Appendix 14 question 32) 
 
Table 6.13:  Resources (N = 110) 
Resources Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 98 86.0% 1 
No 12 10.5% 2 
 
When asked whether respondents had the necessary resources to collect security 
information, there were 110 valid responses. Eighty-six percent of the 110 security 
service personnel who responded to the question indicated that their company has 
the necessary resources to collect security information. Only 10.5% indicated they 
do not have the necessary resources. 
 
6.4.1.5  Please indicate if you have previously received security information in 
any of the following situations? (See Appendix 14 question 25) 
 
 
Table 6.14: Receipt of security information (N = 108) 
Situations Frequency Cases% Rank 
Information about a crime/incident from a 
victim/complainant 
72 66.7% 1 
Information while investigating a 
crime/incident 
66 61.1% 2 
Voluntary information from a third party 65 60.2% 3 
Information from informants 59 54.6% 4 
Information through interaction with 
personnel 
58 53.7% 5 
Information through interaction with clients 57 52.8% 6 
Information through interaction with the 
general public 
54 50.0% 7 
Information while at a crime/incident scene 
from observers 
51 47.2% 8 
Information while investigating a suspicious 
activity report 
45 41.7% 9 
Forums (explosives, illegal mining forum, 
illegal special metal forum) 
22 20.4% 10 
Analysis results from an analyst 1 0.9% 11.5 
Security information from the mass media 1 0.9% 11.5 
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A total of 108 valid responses, mentioned that they received security information 
under different situations. This was a multiple response question. The three most 
common sources from which security information was collected include information 
about a crime/incident from a victim/complainant, security information while 
investigating a crime incident and voluntary security information received from a third 
party. About 66.7% of security information about a crime/incident was received from 
a victim/complainant. About 61.1% of security information was received while 
investigating a crime/incident. About 60.2% of security information was voluntary 
information received from a third party. According to Table 6.14 no specific effort was 
made by the security officials to collect security information on specific matters within 
a specific context to address a specific threat.  
 
According to Talbot and Jakes, (2008:142) the reliability of the information source 
and the credibility of the information should be assessed on criteria such as the 
previous quality of the information supplied by the source, the situation, the location 
and the likely access of the source at the time the information was collected. The 
accuracy of the information is assessed as an actual measurement in relation to 
each item of information received. 
 
6.4.1.6 Please indicate the type of security information you personally 
collected during the past month (See Appendix 14 question 28) 
 
Table 6.15:  Type of security information collected (N = 99) 
Type of information Frequency Cases % Rank 
Company policy breaches/violations, etc 58 58.6% 1 
Physical security breaches 55 55.6% 2 
Crime threats 53 53.5% 3 
Electronic security breaches 35 35.4% 4 
 
A total of 99 valid responses mentioned the type of security information they 
personally collected as indicated in Table 6.15. Table 6.15 shows that most security 
information collected related to company policy breaches/violations and physical 
security breaches. It is clear that crime threats were not prioritised by the 
respondents as compared to policy violations. There is no indication of the collection 
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of security information on vulnerabilities and incident. It would seem that the security 
service providers do not support the SAPS in the prevention of crime and 
investigation of criminal cases. There is no indication of collecting such information in 
Table 6.15. This implies that security service providers do not encourage the sharing 
of information with the SAPS.  
 
6.4.1.7 Have you previously collected security information by making use of a 
‘collection plan’? (See Appendix 14 question 23) 
 
Table 6.16:  Collection plans (N = 108) 
Collection plans Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 33 28.9% 2 
No 75 65.8% 1 
 
The “collection plan” seemed not to be a popular method of collecting security 
information. Only 28.9% of the 108 valid responses indicated that they had used it 
before. Thus, a large majority of the respondents, about 66 % had not used it before.  
 
6.4.1.8  If you answered “Yes” to question 23, what kind of collection plan did 
you use? (See Appendix 14 question 24) 
 
Table 6.17:  Kinds of collection plans (N = 27) 
Collection Plan Frequency Cases % Rank 
SWOT analysis 17 63.0% 1 
Investigation plan 12 44.4% 2 
Intelligence collection plan 9 33.3% 3 
Occurrence book (OB) 2 7.4% 4.5 
Statement 2 7.4% 4.5 
Random collection of information 1 3.7% 6.5 
Meetings with staff members from different 
sections 
1 3.7% 6.5 
 
On the different kinds of collection plans used, there were only 27 valid responses. 
Those who used collection plans mentioned the kinds of collection plans in Table 
6.17. This was a multiple response question. The most common collection plans 
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were referred to as strength, weakness and opportunity (SWOT) analysis 
documents, investigation plans and intelligence collection plans. SWOT analysis was 
indicated by 63%, investigation plans by 44.4% and intelligence collection plans by 
33.3%.Table 6.17 shows that the security service in Gauteng does not use a 
prescribed collection plan nor does it design one for individual situations. Further, it 
is implied that out of 114 respondents only 27 respondents participated in this 
question. This indicates that the majority of the security officials do not use collection 
plans nor do they know of such an instrument. This supports the finding in Table 
6.16 that 65.8% of the respondents do not use collection plans  
 
SWOT analysis documents may be used to put in place a threat assessment, which 
can result in the development of collection plan to collect security information.  
SWOT analysis documents cannot by itself be used as a collection plan. An 
investigation plan will help guide an investigation until its conclusion, but cannot 
serve as a collection plan. With exception to the intelligence collection plan, all other 
responses provided in Table 6.17 cannot serve as collection plans. 
 
6.4.1.9  Do you understand the steps to be followed when collecting security 
information? (See Appendix 14 question 19) 
 
Table 6.18:  Understanding of the steps used in the collection of security 
information (N = 103) 
Understanding of the steps used in the 
collection of security information 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 76 66.7% 1 
No 27 23.7% 2 
 
Nearly 67% of the 103 respondents indicated that they understood the steps to be 
followed when collecting security information.  
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6.4.1.10 In the space provided, outline all the steps to be followed when 
collecting security information (See Appendix 14 question 20) 
 
Table 6.19:  Steps to follow in the collection of security information (N = 110)  
Steps to follow in the collection of security 
information 
Frequency Cases% Rank 
Gather all the information 62 76.5% 1 
Analysis of the collected information 34 42.0% 2 
Identify the risk at hand 31 38.3% 3 
Get a mandate from the company/top 
management 
21 25.9% 4 
Make notes/reports/complete specific forms 14 17.3% 5 
Ensure high-level confidentiality 11 13.6% 6 
Utilisation of analysis results 10 12.3% 7 
Capture data and store in database for future 
reference 
7 8.6% 8 
Complete a detailed analysis report and forward it 
to immediate senior 
6 7.4% 9 
Establish a steering committee to implement 
policies and to exercise control  
3 3.7% 10 
 
According to Table 6.19 there were 110 responses for the steps to be followed in the 
collection of security information. This was a multiple response question where 
respondents indicated more than one step. The respondents identified the steps they 
are most likely to follow. Based on the different responses given by the participants 
on the steps to be followed, it can be concluded that there is no standard operating 
procedure to guide security personnel. When it comes to security it is important for 
security personnel to understand the steps to be followed in the collection of security 
information. 
 
The steps which were given by most of the respondents were to gather all the 
information, analyse the collected security information and then identify the risk. 
These steps are commonly used in security risk management (risk analysis). The 
steps used for the collection of security management differ from those used for risk 
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management. According to Garcia (2006: 2), Security Risk Management is a set of 
actions an enterprise takes to address identified security risks and includes 
avoidance, reduction, spreading, transfer, elimination and acceptance options.  
 
In security information management, the three documents which are crucial are: 
Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA) (Gottlieb et al., 1994: 161), Threat Assessment (TA) 
document (Garcia, 2008: 26) and a Vulnerability Assessment (VA) document 
(Garcia, 2006: 1). These documents define threats and vulnerabilities which need to 
be addressed. According to Garcia (2008: 26), a Threat Assessment document 
defines the threat and directs the collection of security information on the potential 
threat. A Vulnerability Assessment document defines the weak points for a defined 
threat at a facility. These weak points direct the collection of security information 
(Garcia, 2006: 1). A CPA document acquaints officers with the types of crimes being 
committed. It lists the days, times and locations of their occurrence; and provides 
officers of any known suspects, suspect vehicles, modus operandi and or property 
loss information.  
 
Essentially, the first step in the collection of security information will involve the 
Threat Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and the Crime Pattern Analysis 
documents approved by management. A specific mandate or security policy is 
required from an organisation’s top management before collection of security 
information takes place (Rogers, 2008: 152). The context for the collection of 
security information is then defined (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 177). These three 
documents are used to develop a collection plan for the collection of security 
information. This step involves the identification of objectives for the collection of 
security information. The second step will be to establish the context, the area in 
which you want to direct your resources and energy to collect security information. 
You may want to focus on the external context, internal context and security risk 
management context, on the process/program structure, evaluation criteria, security 
agendas of stakeholders or on the security business case, specific assets, etc. The 
third step involves the gathering of security information on threats and vulnerabilities 
leading to security risk control measures. Incident based information is generated on 
its own. No collection plan is used for incident based information. Incident based 
information is used to enrich the Threat Assessment document. Security risk 
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identification normally flows from the context and is informed by the threat, 
vulnerability and criticality assessments as well as incident related information, 
management systems and program activities (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 177). 
 
6.4.1.11  Please indicate if you have previously used any of the following 
method/s to gather security information  
 (See Appendix 14 question 26) 
 
Table 6.20:  Methods used to collect security information (N = 108) 
Methods used to collect security information Frequency Cases% Rank 
Physical surveillance (observation tailing, etc.) 71 65.7% 1 
Electronic surveillance (camera, biometrics, hi-
tech, etc 
70 64.8% 2 
Interviews (briefing debriefing, etc.) 64 59.3% 3 
Internal audit (internal sources for example risk 
analysis security survey, etc. 
49 45.4% 4 
Research (external sources for example South 
Africa police Home affairs, etc.) 
40 37.0% 5 
Interrogations 37 34.3% 6 
Undercover 33 30.6% 7 
Forensics 15 13.9% 8 
Hacking into computer databases for information 5 4.6% 9 
Mass media 2 1.9% 10 
 
In terms of the methods used in collecting security information there were 108 valid 
responses. The popularity of the methods used are indicated in Table 6.20. The 
most common methods are physical surveillance (65.7%) and electronic surveillance 
(64.8%), interviews (59.3%) and internal audit (security assessments) (45.4%). Very 
little use is made of open sources such as the mass media (1.9%) to collect security 
information. External sources (Research) and forensics are also neglected. 
According to Rogers (2008: 152), security risk managers gather security information 
through interviews, observation and the examination of internal and external source 
documents. They also use security survey checklists to gather security information 
on vulnerabilities.  
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Ferraro and Spain (2006: 13), state that there are six methods commonly used to 
collect information. These methods include physical surveillance, electronic 
surveillance, internal auditing, research, forensics, undercover, interviews and 
interrogations. These methods may be combined in some fashion or mixed and 
matched for use. 
 
6.4.1.12 Please indicate the item that best describes how you handled the 
collected security information (See Appendix 14 question 29) 
 
Table 6.21: Handling of security information (N = 105) 
Handling of security information Frequency Cases % Rank 
Informed immediate manager/supervisor 65 61.9% 1 
Recorded information in the control room OB 40 38.1% 2 
Recorded information in an incident register 34 32.4% 3 
Recording information in personnel pocket 
book 
31 29.5% 4 
Informed the investigating unit 30 28.6% 5 
Utilised information to perform task 29 27.6% 6 
Informed the unit that handles all collected 
information 
23 21.9% 7.5 
Entered the information into an electronic 
database (computer) 
23 21.9% 7.5 
Forwarded the information to law 
enforcement 
21 20.0% 9 
Informed the supervisor on the duty parade 14 13.3% 10.5 
Forwarded the information to human 
resources management for disciplinary 
investigation 
14 13.3% 10.5 
Informed the analysis unit 13 12.4% 12 
Did nothing with the information 1 1.0% 13 
 
In terms of items that best describe how the collected security information is 
handled, a total of 105 responded to the question. About 75% of the respondents 
handed the collected information to their immediate manager/supervisor or the 
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supervisor on parade as indicated in Table 6.21. More than 70% either recorded the 
information in the control room occurrence book or in the information register. 
Twenty-two percent entered the information into a computer system. Twenty-two 
percent handed the information to the collection unit, whist 12.4 % handed the 
information over to the analysis unit. About 13% handed the collected information 
over to human resource management for disciplinary investigation. Only 1 % did 
nothing with the information. It is clear that there is no standard operating procedure 
on how the collected security information need to be handled. A standard operating 
procedure in this regard is important for the protection of security information and to 
prevent leakage of information (SABRIC, 2011).  
 
6.4.1.13  Are there security measures in place in your organisation/company 
for the protection of information (data)?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 30) 
 
Table 6.22: Protection of security information (N = 110) 
Protection of security information Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 104 91.2% 1 
No 6 5.3% 2 
 
A clear majority, almost 91.2% out of the 110 valid responses mentioned that there 
are security measures in place for the protection of information in their company. 
Only 5.3% indicated that there were no security measures for the protection of 
security information in their company.  
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6.4.1.14 If you answered “Yes” to question 30 please indicate which of the 
following information (data) protection measures are being used by 
your organisation/company (See Appendix 14 question 31) 
 
Table 6.23:  Security information protection methods (N = 105) 
Security information protection methods Frequency Cases % Rank 
Organisation/company policy on the 
classification of information for example 
confidential, secret, restricted 
73 69.5% 1 
Information Protection Act 46 43.8% 2 
Minimum information Security Standard 
(MISS) approved by Cabinet 
37 35.2% 3 
Security clearance to access classified 
information 
36 34.3% 4 
Access is allowed on a need-to-know basis 31 29.5% 5 
Access to information database is not 
allowed to employees below management 
30 28.6% 6 
Access to information act 24 22.9% 7 
 
One hundred and five respondents identified information protection methods as 
indicated in Table 6. 23.The three common measures mentioned by the respondents 
include; organisation/company policy on the classification of information for example 
confidential, secret, restricted; Information Protection Act and the Minimum 
Information Security Standard (MISS) approved by Cabinet. No regulatory standard 
has been implemented by PSIRA for the protection of security information by all 
security service providers (Private Security Industry in South Africa, 2012). Each 
security service provider applies his/her own method of protecting security 
information. 
 
The ISO 7498/2 is considered one of the best reference frameworks for introducing 
information security. The five stages that ISO identifies are identification and 
authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation (Kritzinger, 
2006: 10). 
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6.4.1.15 Does your organisation/company store the collected security 
information in a database? (See Appendix 14 question 33) 
 
Table 6.24:  Storage of security information (N = 109) 
Storage of security 
information 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 96 84.2% 1 
No 13 11.4% 2 
 
In terms of whether the company stores collected security information in a database, 
there were 109 valid responses and 84.2% indicated that their company stores 
security information. Only 11.4% indicated that their companies do not store security 
information. 
 
6.4.1.16 If you answered “Yes” to question 33, in which database is the 
collected security information stored? (See Appendix 14 question 34) 
 
Table 6.25:  Security information storage database (N = 98) 
Storage Database Frequency Cases % Rank 
Both electronically and manually  66 67.3% 1 
Electronic database (computer 
system) 
48 49.0% 2 
Manual database (handwritten in a 
regular, document, etc.) 
23 23.5% 3 
 
Of the respondents who said that their company stores the security information in a 
database, 98 of them mentioned the data system in Table 6.25. About 67, 3% 
indicated that their company’s store security information in both electronic and 
manual storage systems. Forty-nine percent indicated that their companies store 
security information in electronic databases (computer). It is of concern that there are 
still 23.5% of security service providers who are still using the manual system.  
 
According to Block et al. (1995: 15), there are often too many pieces of information 
to store manually. It becomes impossible for the human mind to assimilate them, sort 
them and use them for strategic and tactical decision-making. This has precipitated a 
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technological revolution, such as electronic databases for the storage of information 
doing computer mapping and generating actionable crime information products. It 
has also been found that the electronic system supplements the expertise of 
experienced officers and it avoids that the knowledge and techniques accumulated 
over the years do not retire with a veteran official. It must be available for others to 
build on.  
 
6.4.1.17  If the collected security information is stored in a database (computer 
or manual), who is responsible for entering the data onto the 
database? (See Appendix 14 question 35) 
 
Table 6.26:  Personnel responsible for storing security information (N = 105) 
Personnel Frequency Cases % Rank 
Security managers 57 54.3% 1 
Self 31 29.5% 2.5 
Investigation officer 31 29.5% 2.5 
Supervisors 21 20.0% 4 
Data administrator 19 18.1% 5 
Data typist 16 15.2% 6.5 
Data analyst 16 15.2% 6.5 
Admin. Official 10 9.5% 8 
Clerk 5 4.8% 9 
 
A total of 105 respondents mentioned the personnel involved in storing the 
information as indicated in Table 6.26. Table 6.26 shows that security managers 
(54.3%) are mostly involved in storing the information. Only a small proportion 
(4.8%) use clerks for storing information. Security personnel should be empowered 
to store their own security information onto the system. It is clear from the responses 
that only 29.5% of the respondents store their own information onto the data system.  
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6.4.1.18 Have you previously experienced any problems in the collection of 
security information? (See Appendix 14 question 39) 
 
Table 6.27:  Problems experienced in the collection of security information  
(N = 110) 
Problems  Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 44 38.6% 2 
No 66 57.9% 1 
 
Close to 39% of the 110 respondents mentioned that sometimes they experience 
problems when collecting security information whilst 57.9% did not experience any 
problems.  
 
6.4.1.19  If you answered “Yes” to question 39, please indicate the nature and 
extent of the problems (shortcomings) experienced in the collection 
of security information (See Appendix 14 question 40) 
 
Table 6.28:  Nature and extent of problems (N = 41) 
Nature and extent of problems Frequency Cases % Rank 
People scared to give out 
information due to fear of 
victimisation 
23 56.1% 1 
Incomplete/inaccurate/unreliable 
information 
9 22.0% 2 
Security personnel not trusted 8 19.5% 3 
Insufficient knowledge on the 
collection of security information 
4 9.8% 4.5 
Lack of resources 4 9.8% 4.5 
No sharing of information takes 
place 
2 4.9% 6 
Lack of role players to share 
information 
1 2.4% 7 
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Those respondents who identified problems in Table 6.27 mentioned the nature and 
extent of the problems as indicated in Table 6.28. Fear and victimisation (56.1%) 
was seen to be the biggest inhibiting factor in the collection of security information. 
This indicates that personnel are reluctant to assist in workplace investigations 
involving their fellow employees because of fear of victimisation. Although 
companies encourage whistle-blowing, by providing for procedures in terms of which 
employees may disclose information anonymously regarding unlawful or irregular 
conduct by their employers or fellow employees, employees still fear victimisation 
and intimidation. Twenty-two percent indicated incomplete/inaccurate/unreliable 
information as a problem. About 20% indicated that security personnel are not 
trusted. About 9.8% indicated lack of resources, about 9.8% insufficient knowledge 
on collection and 4.9% reluctance in sharing information. This indicates that 
management is not doing enough to enhance an information awareness culture. 
 
6.4.1.20  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems 
(shortcomings) you encountered as indicated in question 40? 
(See Appendix 14 question 41) 
 
Table 6.29: Solutions to overcome problems of collection of security 
information (N = 38)  
Solutions Frequency % of 
cases 
Rank 
Security personnel to be developed on the 
collection of security information 
13 34.2% 1 
Should be policies for the protection of 
witnesses against victimization 
12 31.6% 2 
Security information to be protected through 
classification 
10 26.3% 3 
Trust the security personnel 7 18.4% 4 
To have sufficient resources for the collection 
of security information 
4 10.5% 5 
Encourage sharing of information 1 2.6% 6 
 
201 
About 34.2% of the respondents indicated that security personnel need to be 
developed in the collection of security information while 31.6% indicated there should 
be policies for the protection of witnesses against victimisation. About 18.4% 
indicated that security personnel should be trusted and 10.5% indicated that there 
should be sufficient resources for the collection of security information. It is clear that 
there is a dire need for training in the collection of security information.  
 
Interpretation: In general security information is not collected according to the 
threats and vulnerabilities confronting an organisation. Most of the information is 
randomly collected by security managers, investigators and supervisors. This type of 
collection is done mainly by using technical and human methods. No standardised 
framework is in place to guide security personnel on the collection of security 
information. There is no mention made of an organisational security strategy, 
security plan, Threat Assessment document, Vulnerability Assessment document or 
a collection plan on the steps followed to collect security information in Table 6.19. It 
is indicative that security information is arbitrarily collected with no objectives and 
outcomes to guide the process.  
 
The handling of the collected security information should be streamlined to be less 
cumbersome, so that information may be immediately operationalised. More 
emphasis is placed on collecting security information on incidents than on threats 
and vulnerabilities. This is confirmed by the fact that 67% of the information is 
collected from victims and complainants involved in incidents. Security personnel are 
more accustomed to the model used for Security Risk Management. There is this 
confusion of mixing the processes used for security risk management with that of 
security information management. 
 
Only 50% of the respondents use automated systems to store information. This is an 
indication that about 50% use other means than computers for the storage of 
security information. The protection of information should be based on trust rather 
than creating mistrust between management and grassroots security personnel. This 
is based on the assumption that grassroots security personnel come into daily 
contact with personnel and clients and serve as the eyes and ears of management. 
Sharing of information between management and grassroots personnel will go a long 
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way in intensifying the collection of security information. Fear and victimisation is 
seen as the biggest intimidating factor in the collection of security information. 
Personnel are reluctant to provide security. Many workplace investigations are not 
successfully concluded because of personnel being reluctant to make statements 
implicating colleagues. In view of existing problems in the collection of security 
information; it can be assumed that management in the security business is not 
creating a culture of information awareness. Issues such as training, policies, trust, 
classification of information, sharing of information and resources were identified as 
solutions to improve the collection of security information. 
 
6.4.2 Theme 2: Analysis of security information 
 
6.4.2.1  Have you previously analysed security information?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 53) 
 
Table 6.30: Analysis of security information (N = 111) 
Previously analysed security information  Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 88 77.2% 1 
No 23 20.2% 2 
 
Almost 77% of the 111 valid responses indicated that they had analysed security 
information before. Only 20.2% of the respondents indicated that they did not 
analyse security information before. The 77% of the respondents who indicated to 
have previously analysed security information are making reference to decisions 
made on the security information rather than analysis per se.They did not follow any 
analysis steps or processes in making decisions on the collected security 
information. Most of these decisions’ were made on incident based information. 
Many of the security service providers do not have analysis capabilities in their 
companies. Security officers are not trained; neither do they possess the necessary 
qualifications as analysts to carry out any analysis function on security information. 
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6.4.2.2 If you answered “Yes” to question 53, please indicate which of the 
following stages of the analysis process you have previously been 
involved with (See Appendix 14 question 54) 
 
Table 6.31:  Stages of involvement in the analysis process (N = 87) 
Stages of involvement in the analysis process Frequency Cases % Rank 
Identifying counter-measures that will prevent or 
mitigate security risks 
62 71.3% 1 
Identifying security risks to the assets 60 69.0% 2 
Identifying assets (people material, legalities) 
deserving protection 
59 67.8% 3 
Estimating the probability that security risks will 
materialize 
44 50.6% 4 
Estimating the impact of security risks 
occurrences 
41 47.1% 5.5 
Assessment of manageability of security risks 41 47.1% 5.5 
Estimating the frequency of event occurrences 39 44.8% 7 
 
Only 87 respondents of the 88 who previously analysed security information as 
indicated in Table 6.30 mentioned the stages they were involved in as mentioned in 
Table 6.31. About 71% of the total respondents were involved in the identification of 
countermeasures that prevented or mitigated security risks occurrences. Sixty-nine 
percent were involved in the identification of security risks to the assets. About 68% 
were involved in the identification of assets (people material, legalities) deserving 
protection. About 50% were involved in estimating the probability of security risks 
occurrences, 47.1% on estimating the impact of security risk occurrences and 44.8% 
estimating the frequency of event occurrences. About 47% of the respondents were 
involved in the assessment of the management of security risks. This confirms that 
the respondents used the security information to make decisions for security risk 
management rather than following a security information analysis process in security 
information management.  
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The different stages of the analysis process indicated in Table 6.31 refer mainly to 
the Security Risk Management Process and not the Security Information Analysis 
Process in security information management. Both the processes have different 
approaches (refer to Figure 7.2 and Paragraph 1.2.6.). Security risk management 
allows the risk to be handled in a logical manner, using long held management 
principles. Security risk management includes four basic steps namely; identification 
of risks or specific vulnerabilities, analysis and study of risks, optimising risk 
management alternatives and the implementation of security programs (Fischer et 
al,. 2008: 148).  
 
According to Talbot and Jakeman (2008:177), all security information including 
threats and vulnerabilities need to be evaluated/verified as the first step. This step 
will determine the likelihood and consequences of the information materialising. 
Collation is seen as the second step and analysis is seen as the third step. Once the 
security information is evaluated/verified, it is collated and analysed. The collation 
and analysis steps help identify security risk control measures. Incident based 
information is handled differently since the threat has already materialised. All the 
analysed information contributes to the threat assessment document, vulnerability 
assessment document and a crime pattern analysis document of all the incidents 
that have occurred.  
 
6.4.2.3  Indicate the ‘analysis result’ provided to you  
 (See Appendix 14 question 67) 
 
Table 6.32:  Types of analysis results provided by analysts (N = 108) 
Analysis Results Frequency Cases % Rank 
Security assessments 56 51.9% 1 
Crime analysis reports 49 45.4% 2 
Security awareness products 48 44.4% 3 
Alerts 42 38.9% 4 
Profiles 40 37.0% 5 
Security risk mitigating strategies  36 33.3% 6 
Statistical analysis reports 31 28.7% 7 
Target analysis reports 20 18.5% 8 
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In terms of the types of analysis results provided by the analysts, there were 108 
valid responses. This was a multiple response question where respondents gave 
more than one response. Table 6.32 indicates that 51.9% of the respondents 
received security assessments. Over 90% of the respondents receive reports (crime, 
statistical and target related). About 33.3% receive strategies, while over 100% of 
actionable information products are generated. Table 6.32 shows that security 
service providers generate more actionable information products, reports and 
security assessments than strategies to reduce crime, increase detection rates and 
prevent losses.  
 
According to Horne (2009: 78), the use of analysis results cannot be underestimated. 
Therefore, there is a need to employ competent and professional analysts to provide 
high quality analysis products. Some of the analysis results such as actionable crime 
information products commonly used in law enforcement include, linkage analysis, 
flowcharting, financial analysis, association analysis, spatial analysis, geographic 
crime pattern analysis, crime mapping, the Geographic Information System (GIS), 
profiling, timeline analysis and document analysis. 
 
6.4.2.4  Have you previously experienced any problems in the analysis of 
security information? (See Appendix 14 question 56) 
 
Table 6.33: Problems experienced in the analysis of security information  
(N = 109) 
Problems 
experienced in 
analysis 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 35 30.7% 2 
No 74 64.9% 1 
 
About 31% of the respondents have previously experienced problems in the analysis 
of security information, while 64.9% did not experience any problems in the analysis 
of security information. 
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6.4.2.5  If you answered “Yes” to question 56, please indicate the nature and 
extent of the problems (shortcomings) you encountered when 
analysing security information (See Appendix 14 question 57) 
 
Table 6.34:  Nature and extent of problems encountered in analysis (N = 30) 
Nature and extent of Problem 
encountered in analysis 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Insufficient, unreliable and inaccurate 
information received for analysis 
22 73.4% 1 
Need for qualified analysts 10 33.3% 2 
Information should be classified according 
categories in relation to crime 
2 6.7% 3 
Sometimes managers take long time to 
implement the results of the analysis 
1 3.3% 5 
Problems with IT equipment used for 
analysis 
1 3.3% 5 
Information overload 1 3.3% 5 
 
Only 30 of the 109 responses indicated in Table 6.33 identified some of the problems 
experienced by them. This is indicated in Table 6.34. The problems relevant to data 
integrity (73.4%) shortage of qualified analysts (33.3%) and information overload 
(3.3%) shows that there is a need for intervention by management and standing 
operating procedures for the analysis of security information. 
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6.4.2.6  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems 
(shortcomings) you encountered as indicated in question 57?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 58) 
 
Table 6.35:  Solutions to overcome problems of analysis in security 
information management (N = 29)  
Solutions to overcome problems of 
analysis 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Training of security officers on the analysis of 
information 
12 41.4% 1 
Managers must have a good relationship with 
subordinates 
6 20.7% 2 
To provide more resources for analysis 4 13.8% 3 
The sources and information must be tested 
before information is placed on record 
3 10.3% 5 
Collect as much information as possible to 
support the analyst 
3 10.3% 5 
Methods used for identification/classification 
should be improved 
3 10.3% 5 
Analysts to stay in touch with world class 
technology 
2 6.9% 8 
Policies and procedures must be 
implemented for the analysis of information 
2 6.9% 8 
Investigator must have knowledge of the 
specific action/conduct 
2 6.9% 8 
Experienced personnel should be used to do 
analysis 
1 3.4% 11 
Act according to the information received 1 3.4% 11 
Outsourcing of the analysis function 1 3.4% 11 
 
A total of 29 valid responses provided solutions to overcome the problems. This was 
a multiple response question were people gave more than one response. About 
41.4% of the responses relate to the training of security officers in the analysis of 
security information. Other solutions include improvement of relationship between 
management and subordinates (20.7%), need for resources to do analysis 13.8%, 
208 
need for policies and procedures (6.9%), need for experienced analysts (3.4%). 
Table 6.35 shows that there is a need for intervention by management.  
 
Interpretation: The quality of security information received for analysis will 
determine the results of the analysis which may take the form of a recommendation 
for strategy, security protection systems or actionable information products to 
address a specific threat. About 73.4% of the security information received by 
security officers for decision making is insufficient, unreliable and inaccurate 
information. In many instances this information is used for decision making by 
security management without any form of enrichment. These decision makers are 
mainly security officers or security supervisors with no analysis training or 
qualifications. Security information only goes through an analysis process if the 
security service provider has an analysis capability. Due to the cost of such an 
infrastructure, very few security companies have an analysis capability. Hence, very 
little security information goes through the analysis process. The indication that 
about 77% of the security personnel have previously analysed information is an 
indication that this percentage of security information was used by management for 
decision making, which has been interpreted by respondents as being analysed by 
the security company. This is further supported by the result that 71.3% of the 
security personnel have been involved in the identification of counter measures to 
mitigate security risks. This means that in the majority of cases security information 
was used for decision making on security risk management without actually following 
the steps in the analysis process for security information management. Security 
companies and the organisations being protected will need to establish analysis 
capabilities managed by trained and qualified security information analysts. It is 
important that qualified analysts should be employed to conduct security information 
analysis. According to Ratcliffe (2009: 94), the analyst should be an expert on 
security related matters. He/she must be able to apply environmental criminology, 
understand incidents of crime/violation of security related policies, vulnerabilities and 
threats. Security analysts must be able to perform in-depth analysis, identify 
solutions, communicate effectively and be able to evaluate the outcomes and solve 
problems. 
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The organisational strategic direction, the security plan, Threat assessment, 
Vulnerability Assessment and the needs of the clients ought to be considered for the 
purpose of analysis. It is clear from the types of results of analysis provided by 
analysts that this is not the case. It appears as though security service providers 
generate more actionable information products, reports and security assessments 
than strategies to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses. This 
function of analysis needs more innovation and cognitive thinking. There is also an 
information overload problem which indicates that any information is collected at 
random and given for analysis. It would seem that the trend is to analyse all 
information that is received to prepare counter measures even though there is no 
threat present. This to the knowledge of the researcher is a waste of money, human 
resources and technology on the analysis of security information which is a not a key 
information need of management. The key information need should be part of the 
security plan or specifically requested by management (Muller, 2002c: 5-6). The fact 
that there is a need for qualified analysts, computer equipment and analytical 
software it is sufficient to assume that security service providers find it difficult to 
reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses. Issues such as training, 
evaluation of information, policies, technology, resources, relationships, classification 
and outsourcing were identified as solutions to improve the analysis of security 
information.  
 
6.4.3 Theme 3: Implementation of security risk control measures  
 
6.4.3.1  Indicate in what manner (way) the “analysis result” was disseminated 
to you (See Appendix 14 question 68) 
 
Table 6.36: Dissemination of analysis results (N = 110) 
Manner of disseminating analysis 
results 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Reports 77 70.0% 1 
Briefing 65 59.1% 2 
Meetings 62 56.4% 3 
Handouts 19 17.3% 4 
E-mail 4 3.6% 5 
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Of 110 respondents who responded, 70% indicated that the dissemination was done 
by reports. The main modes of dissemination are reports, briefings and meetings as 
indicated in Table 6.36. According to Reuland (1997: 35), dissemination may be 
carried out in several different ways, namely, by attending briefings and strategy 
sessions, presenting verbal reports, providing written reports, having face-to-face 
contact with detectives whenever the need arises and public information systems – 
both written and electronic media. 
 
6.4.3.2  Have you previously encountered any problems in the dissemination of 
the “analysis result” to you? (See Appendix 14 question 69) 
 
Table 6.37: Problems experienced in the analysis of security information 
(N = 112) 
Problems 
experienced  
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 28 24.6% 2 
No 84 73.7% 1 
 
About 24.6% out of 112 valid responses have experienced problems in the 
dissemination of security information, while 73.7% did not experience any problems 
in the dissemination of security information. 
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6.4.3.3 If you answered “Yes” to question 69, please indicate the nature and 
extent of the problems (shortcomings) experienced in the 
dissemination of the “analysis result” to you  
 (See Appendix 14 question 70) 
 
  
Table 6.38:  Nature and extent of problems experienced in the dissemination 
of analysis results (N = 25) 
Nature and extent of problems 
experienced 
Frequency Cases% Rank 
Management undermines and 
generalises the analysis results before 
it is disseminated 
20 80.0% 1 
No ongoing communication between 
analyst and user of analysis results 
4 16.0% 2 
Dissemination of analysis results not 
being done by analysts 
2 8.0% 3.5 
Analysis results takes too long 2 8.0% 3.5 
No computer access given to receive 
analysis results 
1 4.0% 6 
Analysis results not protected by 
classification 
1 4.0% 6 
No policy for the dissemination of 
analysis results 
1 4.0% 6 
 
According to Table 6.38, the biggest setback is that management undermines the 
analysis results prior to dissemination. Many security service providers do not have 
policy for the dissemination of analysis results to end users. 
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6.4.3.4  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems 
(shortcomings) indicated in question 70?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 71) 
 
Table 6.39: Suggested solutions for dissemination problems (N = 22)  
Solution for dissemination problems Frequency Cases % Rank 
Regular communication should take place 
between analyst and user 
9 40.9% 1 
User should be allowed to request additional 
analysis on the result 
5 22.7% 2.5 
Dissemination should also take place formally 
by means of report 
5 22.7% 2.5 
Management should not undermine analysis 
results 
3 13.6% 4 
Train personnel in the dissemination of 
analysis results 
2 9.1% 5.5 
Management to trust security personnel and 
not generalise analysis results 
2 9.1% 5.5 
Analysis results should be classified 1 4.5% 8 
Computer access should be given to all 
security personnel 
1 4.5% 8 
Management should not interfere with 
analysis function 
1 4.5% 8 
 
In terms of solutions, 22 responses provided solutions in Table 6.39. According to 
Table 6.39 over 40 % of the responses indicate better communication between the 
analyst and the end users. About 18% of the responses are of the view that 
management should not undermine analysis results or interfere with analysis 
function. On considering the solutions to overcome the problems in the 
dissemination of analysis results one can conclude that the respondents would like 
full cooperation from management.  
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6.4.3.5 Have you in the past provided feedback to the analysts on the 
implementation of the “analysis result” information provided 
(disseminated) to you? (See Appendix 14 question 72) 
 
Table 6.40:  Feedback on the implementation of the analysis results (N = 108) 
Feedback  Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 64 56.1% 1 
No 44 38.6% 2 
 
Fifty-six percent of the 108 responses indicated that they provide feedback to 
management on the implementation of the security risk control measures, whilst 
38.6% do not provide feedback.  
 
6.4.3.6  If you answered “Yes” to question 72, please indicate the type of 
feedback you provided to the analysts (See Appendix 14 question 73) 
 
Table 6.41:  Type of feedback provided to analysts (N = 78) 
Type of feedback 
provided to analysts 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
 
Formal feedback 26 26.2% 2 
Informal feedback 19 29.7% 3 
Both (Formal and 
Informal) 
33 51.6% 1 
 
The types of the feedback were mentioned by 78 respondents as indicated in Table 
6.41. Both formal and informal types are used in giving feedback to analysts.  
 
6.4.3.7  Have you previously experienced any problems (shortcomings) in the 
implementation of the “analysis result” that was provided to you?  
    (See Appendix 14 question 74) 
 
Table 6.42:  Problems experienced in the implementation of security risk 
control measures (N = 108) 
Problems  Frequency Cases % Rank 
Yes 20 17.5% 2 
No 88 77.2% 1 
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Only 17.5% of the 108 respondents indicated that they experienced problems in the 
implementation of security risk control measures. About 77.2% did not experience 
problems in the implementation of security risk control measures. 
 
6.4.3.8  If you answered “Yes” to question 74, please indicate the nature and 
extent of the problems (shortcomings) experienced in the 
implementation of the “analysis result” (See Appendix 14 question 75) 
 
Table 6.43:  Nature and extent of the problems experienced in the 
implementation of security risk control measures (N = 17) 
Nature and extent of problems 
experienced 
Frequency Cases % Rank 
Analysis result not relevant to the 
security risk prevalent at the time 
6 35.3% 1 
Not experienced to utilise analysis 
results 
4 23.5% 2 
Data integrity of the Analysis results 3 17.6% 3.5 
Clients are unwilling to pay for 
additional resources to implement 
analysis results 
3 17.6% 3.5 
Lack of resources to utilise analysis 
results 
2 11.8% 5.5 
No communication between the 
analyst and the user 
2 11.8% 5.5 
 
Respondents who answered this question indicated their problems in Table 6.43. 
About 35.3% of the respondents indicated that the analysis results are not relevant 
to the security risk prevalent at the time. About 11.8% indicates that there is a 
shortage of resources to implement security risk control measures. About 11.8% 
indicate that there is no communication between the analyst and the end user. The 
responses in Table 6.43 show that analysis is not being conducted according to the 
needs of the client. 
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6.4.3.9 What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems 
(shortcomings) indicated in question 75?  
 (See Appendix 14 question 76) 
 
Table 6.44:  Solutions to overcome problems in the implementation of security 
risk control measures (N = 16)  
Solutions to overcome problems Frequency Cases % Rank 
Training security personnel to utilise analysis 
results 
5 31.3% 1 
Data integrity of analysis results should not be 
compromised 
4 25.0% 2 
Regular communication should exist between 
analyst and user 
3 18.8% 3 
Formulate policies to guide the utilisation of 
analysis results 
2 12.5% 4.5 
Make available resources for utilisation 2 12.5% 4.5 
Analysis results should not be generalised 1 6.3% 8 
Implementation of analysis results should be 
cost effective 
1 6.3% 8 
Managers should not undermine the analysis 
results 
1 6.3% 8 
Experienced security personnel to be used in 
the utilisation of analysis results 
1 6.3% 8 
Project management approach to be followed 
in the utilisation of the analysis results 
1 6.3% 8 
 
A total of 16 respondents gave the solutions they think will solve the problems. This 
was a multiple response question were people gave more than one response. 
Looking at the solutions one can conclude that the respondents would like see 
security personnel trained to implement analysis results and the formulation of 
policies to guide the application of security risk control measures. 
 
Interpretation: No policy framework exists for the implementation of security risk 
control measures. All analysts’ findings and recommendations are generalised by 
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management to down play the seriousness of the threat or vulnerability. Different 
methods are used for dissemination and feedback. This may seriously compromise 
the protection of the information and result in leakage of information. The 
implementation of security risk control measures is not needs driven. It does not take 
into consideration the reduction of crime, increasing the detection rates and 
preventing losses. The fact that communication is not encouraged between the 
analysts and the end user indicates that the implementation of the security risk 
control measure is not monitored and evaluated. Issues such as training, policies, 
communication, data integrity, resources, experience and a project management 
approach were identified as solutions to improve the implementation of security risk 
control measures.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION  
 
The themes, categories, concepts and processes were numerically analysed 
according to frequency, percentage and ranking. They were interpreted in terms of 
the research questions. The status quo of security information management was 
determined and problems were identified in the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of security risk control measures. The findings of 
this data and analysis of the questionnaires will be discussed in Paragraph 8.1 and 
compared with the theory as identified in Chapter 3. The interpretations which are 
based on the responses provided by the respondents make the interpretation reliable 
and valid.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MODEL: THE CONCEPT 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Security information collection first emerged in the mid-1950s. From then onwards 
the extent, complexity and detail of security information collection, analysis, 
interpretation and utilisation changed dramatically and developed in many different 
ways (Fischer et al., 2008: 39). Chapters 4 and 5 discussed these changes and 
developments that have taken place both nationally and internationally. This study 
originated due to these changes and developments taking place in the field of 
security information management. All stakeholders in an organisation need to be 
informed of these changes and developments, in order to ensure that they are aware 
of the importance and impact of security information in their overall work 
environment.  
 
Security information management will derive the most significant benefits from 
security management related issues that is integrated into an organisations existing 
functional processes. Security information management should be seen as part of 
the existing functional processes of an organisation.  
 
This chapter will discuss the security management related issues that is significant to 
security information management and the security information management model 
based on the grounded theory, as referred to in Chapter 3. The model will also 
encapsulate the analysis and interpretations made in Chapter 6. The proposed 
model will form one of the building blocks towards the further professionalisation of 
the security services industry. 
 
7.2 SECURITY MANAGEMENT RELATED ISSUES 
 
Specific security management related issues needs to be understood within its own 
context. An understanding of the security management related issues will avoid 
confusion and misunderstanding of the security organisations existing functional 
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processes. A discussion of the different management related issues will help 
understand the operational competency areas of a security environment. 
 
7.2.1  Risk Management 
 
Risk management was not formally used until the early 1950s. It is accepted that the 
modern concept of risk management originated in the United States. Technical 
developments in the United States confronted the insurance industry with a 
multiplicity of insurable risks so that insurance was purchased on an ‘all risk’ instead 
of a ‘specified peril’ basis. The consequence of fluctuating premiums directed the 
attention of top management to the cost of insurance. This gave rise to the 
development of risk management actions aimed at containing the cost of insurance. 
Risk managers were also made responsible for finding innovative ways and 
procedures to reduce losses which resulted in the integration of risk control and risk-
financing activities. Risk management developed in South Africa in the 1970s 
(Valsamakis et al., 1996: 3 & 6). Since its inception Risk Management has been very 
popular in South Africa. It was the only risk assessment activity which was widely 
used to contain the costs of insurance. However, during the 1970s, 1980s and early 
1990s very little emphasis was placed on the importance of security information 
management to reduce crime, increase detection and prevent losses.  
 
7.2.2  Security information management 
 
According to Kritzinger (2006: 74), security information management is a growing 
issue in all spheres be it industry or government and affects management positions 
at different authority levels, from the end user to the board level. All employees of an 
organisation should understand the importance of security information management 
and how they, as employees, are responsible for their actions in the workplace. It is 
important that security information is managed according to strategy, policy and 
standing operating procedures. Many security service providers in South Africa have 
information security policies to ensure ongoing information security. Information 
security policies are there to ensure the identification, authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of information (Kritzinger, 2006: 6 & 74).  
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7.2.3  Security information management culture 
 
A security information management culture is about ensuring that all employees in 
an organisation are made aware of their role in and responsibility for the collection 
and analysis of security information. In an ever-changing environment, organisations 
must try to create and sustain a healthy security information management culture. A 
security information management culture focuses on encouraging the proper 
planning and management of all security information issues in the organisation, 
especially since organisations are dependent on the data, raw information, 
information systems and networks. Security information management must become 
part of the day-to-day operations of employees. Instilling a strong security culture in 
a company/organisation can help to ward off threats, incidents and irregularities. If 
they want their organisations to survive, they have to change their culture and keep 
up with current security information management developments. Cultivating a 
security information management culture among stakeholders will ensure the safety 
of all assets of the organisation (Kritzinger, 2006: 78). Security awareness 
programmes will be essential to ensure that security objectives are met. Such a 
programme may be developed by an organisation that employs in-house security or 
one that that employs security officers. 
 
7.2.4  Corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance is responsibility enforced by law in countries such as South 
Africa and England (King, 1994: 5). Corporate governance must be taken seriously 
due to the fact that the accountability for corporate governance ultimately rests with a 
company/organisation’s board and executive management levels. If the corporate 
governance system fails in an organisation, it will be bound to lose its competitive 
edge and will not be able to ensure its survival. In South Africa all companies 
seeking public listings need to show corporate governance of the management of 
risks in their companies (Shaw: 2002: 1).  
 
There is no section in the King Report 1, 2 and 3 that covers the management of 
security information or information security per se (Kritzinger, 2006: 49).The board 
and executive management levels in organisations are still accountable for security 
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information management in their organisations. Security information governance 
involves the leadership, organisational structure, processes and technologies used 
for the collection and analysis of security information and the application of security 
risk control measures. The managers at the level of board and executive 
management can be taken to court if the integrity, availability or confidentiality of 
information is compromised in any way. It is also essential that corporate 
governance include information security as a vital part of governing an organisation 
and that the board and executive management levels should also encourage 
effective and responsible use of information among all stakeholders in the 
organisation (Kritzinger, 2006: 74-75). 
 
7.2.5  Security information management policy/plans/strategies 
 
Before any organisation can start to manage their security information, they should 
have security information management policies, plans and strategies in place as a 
guideline to what must be managed and how this must be managed. Top 
management is responsible for the formulation of these policies, plans and 
strategies. These security information policies/plans/strategies should relate to the 
collection and analysis of security information and the application of security risk 
control measures. Middle management has to ensure that information is collected 
analysed and implemented according to standard operating procedures as outlined 
in policy/plans and strategies (Smit & Cronje, 2002: 12). 
 
7.3  SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MODEL 
 
The security information management model prepared by the researcher is 
schematically presented in three phases in Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. 
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Figure 7.1:  Collection of security information (Phase 1)  
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Figure 7.2: Analysis of security information (Phase 2) 
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Figure 7.3: Implementation of security risk control measures (Phase 3) 
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favour of such a model to enhance security information management in Gauteng, 
South Africa. The model is explained as follows: 
 
Security information management is spread out in three phases, namely the 
collection of security information phase; analysis of security information phase; and 
the implementation of security risk control measures phase. The collection and the 
analysis of the security information is handled by the Security Information 
Management Centre (SIMC) and referred to top management as an analysis report 
(result/outcome). The analysis report is handled by top management and referred to 
the operational manager or the human resources manager for the application of 
security risk control measures.  
 
7.4.1 Phase 1: Collection of security information  
 
7.4.1.1 Planning and/or direction  
 
A Strategic Plan is developed by the Board of Directors and Executive Level 
Management. The Strategic Plan inter alia identifies the security threats affecting the 
organisation and its assets, as well as the organisational security strategy to address 
the threats. The threats are identified through the process of a SWOT analysis 
conducted by the Board of Directors and Executive Level Management. A security 
survey is initiated by the organisation to identify vulnerabilities relevant to the 
identified threats. An incident register is used to identify incidents related to the 
threats. The incident register will consist of reported incidents experienced by the 
organisation (Jacobs, Sheperd, & Johnson, 1998: 122-123). Planning is about 
collecting the right information that is needed to support top management’s decision. 
It is about understanding the most important parts of the organisation, whether they 
are clients, government, technology, suppliers or competitors. The senior manager 
responsible for all security related matters in the organisation should develop a 
security plan to address the security threats using the organisational security 
strategy as a directive. The organisational security strategy should indicate projected 
costs and time frames to address specific threats affecting the organisation and its 
assets. These threats will be prioritised in the organisational security strategy 
according to importance, taking into account the cost of losses if the specific threat 
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has to occur. The security plan which should consist of the threats affecting the 
organisation, information on vulnerabilities and incident related information relevant 
to the threat should be used to address the prioritised threats in terms of the 
allocated budget. In essence, the security plan will consist of a Threat Assessment 
document, A Vulnerability Assessment document and an Incident Pattern Analysis 
document. These assessment documents should be prepared by a qualified security 
analyst and used as part of the security plan. The assessment documents should 
serve as tools to manage security risks, conduct performance management as well 
as impact studies on the physical protection systems. A target centred approach 
should be used to prioritise the threats for the collection of security information, 
analysis and implementation of security risk control measures (Clark, 2010: 13).  
 
7.4.1.2 Target-centred approach  
 
Target identification should be performed by the organisation. Targets may include 
critical assets or information, people, or critical areas and processes (Garcia 2008: 4) 
All stakeholders in an organisation, which includes senior management, collectors, 
analysts and operational management who are going to be involved in the 
implementation of the security risk control measures should be part of the target-
centred approach. Here the goal is to construct a shared picture of the target, from 
which all stakeholders can determine what is expected of them to address the threat. 
They should be able determine the resources they would need to do their jobs and 
what they can contribute from their own resources or knowledge so as to create a 
more accurate target picture (Clark, 2010: 13). 
 
Once a shared target had been identified, it is time to prepare a collection plan to 
focus on the threats and vulnerabilities affecting the shared target. The senior 
security officer should develop and manage this collection plan in accordance with 
project management principles. The collection plan should be developed in 
consultation with the security analyst. The security analyst should be able to provide 
guidance on the kinds of information to be collected and the key information needs to 
prepare specific analysis products in terms of the organisational security strategy.  
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7.4.1.3 Kinds of security information 
 
Security information on threats, incidents and vulnerabilities should be lawfully 
collected in a structured manner within the ambit of an organisational policy 
framework. Standard operating procedures in line with the organisational policy 
framework should be developed to guide the collection of the different kinds of 
security information. The kinds of security information and the key information needs 
should be identified by the security analyst (Smit, 1989: 5; Simonsen, 1998: 202; 
Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 66). All personnel from the organisation which is being 
protected, all security personnel, all stakeholders and clients of the organisation 
should be mandated to collect security information. Stakeholders and clients should 
be encouraged to provide security information which they intend to voluntarily share 
with the organisation. Such security information may be regarding their own 
experiences, observation or on the activities of adversaries from the inside or outside 
of the organisation. Stakeholders and clients may be assisted by the mass media as 
to the types of security information required by the organisation. This may appear in 
pamphlets, posters, newspapers or on television screens as alerts, notices etc.  
 
A collection unit should be established within the Security Information Management 
Centre to collect security information and to service the analysts in the collection of 
missing information. The Security Information Management Centre should manage 
all the collected information and provide rapid response to security information that 
requires immediate action. All the collected security information should be managed 
by the SIMC who should have the information evaluated/verified and entered into a 
computerised database. All security information is collated by the analyst or a data 
capturer using an automated system with the relevant computer software. This 
includes indexing, sorting, and storage of raw information. A data base should be 
created for storage. Only when similar information is collected and considered 
together can the analyst provide meaning to the information (refer to paragraph 4.4) 
(Gottlieb et al., 1994: 27).  
 
The SIMC manager may task the collection unit to obtain missing information to 
ensure data integrity of the collected security information. All threat information 
should be collated onto the Threat Assessment field, while vulnerabilities should be 
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collated into the Vulnerability Assessment field. The computerised system may be 
designed to also provide for an Incident Register to record all information on 
incidents. A computerised database will allow for the use of software to collate and 
analyse data into actionable information products. (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008: 33).  
 
7.4.1.4 Collection process  
 
The collection of security information is authorised by management either through 
job descriptions, service level agreements or a code of conduct. It is the act of 
gathering information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities that may exploit the 
assets of an organisation and result in losses (Fischer et al., 2008: 149). Security 
information collection may also be outsourced to private security risk assessment 
companies (Fischer et al., 2008: 38). The best sources of information are people and 
technology. All collected security information ought to be validated, as 
misinformation can result in bad decision making. Hopefully, all employees in an 
organisation will be alerted to their responsibility of constantly reporting security 
information. The persons that should be approached first, from a tasking point of 
view, should be security personnel and those who work in the strategic areas and 
those that are well networked and attuned to the security information of the 
organisation (Muller, 2002c: 6).  
 
There should be a code of conduct signed by all personnel in the service of the 
organisation which is being protected and by all security personnel. In the collection 
of security information the collector must respect the law and the fundamental 
principles of privacy (Nemeth, 2010: 87). Organisations and companies need their 
own set of ethical standards that should include issues such as preserving and 
protecting the organisation/company’s credibility, value and public profile and what 
people may or may not do. Management should be clear about the fact that no 
unethical and certainly no illegal collection of information will be tolerated. When 
outsourcing certain aspects of security information collection, management should 
make sure that the contracted company knows the ethical guidelines in place in the 
contracting company or organisation. Transgressions by such contracted personnel 
will not exempt a company from liability, accountability and possible sanctions 
(Muller, 2002c: 20). 
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The protection of security information is the prerogative of each organisation and 
should not be undermined in any way. The security protection measures applied by 
government departments are coordinated by a policy framework called the MISS. 
Private organisations on the other hand may structure their own standing operating 
procedures in line with their policy framework for the protection of security 
information. Security managers refer to the term ‘sensitive’ when referring to 
information that has value and is protected. Organisations assign classifications to 
their ‘sensitive’ information. The names assigned to the classification levels may vary 
from organisation to organisation and include secret, restricted, confidential, private 
and personal. Sometimes top secret and highly confidential is used, depending on 
the type of information being classified (Fay, 2002: 289). 
 
Personnel should be trained on how to collect security information and know what 
information they should collect (Muller & Whitehead, 2002: 5). Internal and external 
sources may be used to collect security information (Reuland, 1997: 9-10). Ferraro 
and Spain (2006: 97) identify methods such as physical surveillance, electronic 
surveillance, interviews, undercover operations, forensics, research and internal 
audit that can be used in collecting threat, vulnerability and incident information. The 
techniques that may be used to collect security information may typically include the 
overt information collection technique-which can be generally defined as personal 
interaction with people, and the covert information collection method, which is 
commonly defined as intelligence gathering (Lyman, 1988: 147; Matthews, 1986: 
189).  
 
7.4.1.5 Sharing of security information  
 
The growth of information-sharing partnerships and networks and the recent 
development of ‘Fusion Centres’ in the United States promises a real-time 
information sharing and access for the future. Some security agencies uphold a 
‘need-to-know’ culture of information protection rather than promoting a ‘need to 
share’ culture of integration (Ratcliff, 2009: 4-5). Without a proper security 
information management culture and attitudes that favours information sharing it is 
difficult to collect information in an organisation. Sharing of information goes hand in 
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hand with the concept of having access to information databases under the control of 
other stakeholders and organisations. This includes working together with the SAPS 
and other law enforcement agencies both nationally and internationally (Muller and 
Whitehead, 2002: 6). There should be a plan for the sharing of information. Funding 
should be available for training, infrastructure, the development of standards, and the 
building of trust between law enforcement and the security service providers. The 
United States government identified not only the technological barriers to information 
sharing, but, more importantly also the organisational and cultural barriers (Ratcliff, 
2009: 32). 
 
Informal information sharing networks are used when formal systems prove to be too 
tedious. This is not encouraged due to the leakage of information (Ratcliff, 2009: 
124). There are no punishments or sanctions for not sharing information (Ratcliff, 
2009: 5). According to Clark (2010: 2), sharing requires openness. But any 
organisation that requires secrecy to perform its duties will struggle with and often 
reject openness.  
 
7.4.2 Phase 2: Analysis of security information  
 
7.4.2.1 Organisational Security Strategy 
 
The security analysis function includes evaluation and interpretation of security 
information. It should be directed by the organisational security strategy and the key 
security information needs that result from changes and action in the organisational 
environment. An event or development in the organisation could give rise to key 
information needs. The routine monitoring and evaluation of an effective analysis 
capability regularly uncovers information that has the potential of impacting positively 
or negatively on strategy (Muller, 2002b: 6). The collected information should be 
properly organised to ensure that the right information is collected and gaps are 
determined. Organising the information means putting together relevant facts, 
developing appropriate titles and headings and then indexing the document for 
retrieval purposes. Factors such as chronology and geography can be used and 
information can also be ordered according to appropriate themes. This is important 
for later retrieval and checking (Muller, 2002b: 9). 
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An analysis function should be centralised because security information works on the 
principle of bringing together all relevant bits and pieces of data and information and 
adding meaning to it (Muller, 2002b: 2).The analysis capability should be situated at 
the SIMC. The development of an effective analysis capability; really, is the true 
justification for establishing SIMC. If correctly focussed information is not analysed 
and interpreted to ascertain the true impact of an event on the organisation’s 
strategy, there would be little purpose in conducting security information 
management. According to Ratcliff (2009: 153-154), understanding the organisation 
which is being protected can go a long way in easily accepting and influencing 
analysis results. Three central points that analysts should recognise: 
• decision-makers internal environment exerts considerable pressure; 
• decision-makers demand strategies and actionable information products over 
descriptive reports; and that 
• growth from knowledge to strategy or actionable information products is 
dependent on the nature of the decision-maker.  
 
The standardised framework for the analysis of security information should provide 
for standing operating procedures. This should be approached in a multidisciplinary 
fashion. It should provide clarity on the following: 
• what each person’s input should be? 
• deadlines; 
• type of information required; 
• most probable sources of information; 
• time frame; 
• cost estimate; 
• planning for pitfalls e.g. unavailability of information; and 
• framework for final report themes, titles, format (Muller, 2002b: 7). 
 
Security information analysis is not a substitute for the analysis activities in areas 
such as sales, customer relations, the legal department, human resources, finance, 
market research, purchasing, or research and development. It would ideally add 
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value by the sharing and integrating of the information, and incorporating external 
information (Muller, 2002b: 2). 
 
7.4.2.2 Key information needs 
 
The collected security information should be accessed from the computer by the 
analyst to confirm the key information needs to provide an analysis result in line with 
the organisational security strategy. Analysis of security information entails 
evaluation and interpretation of the exact nature of the problem and the 
characteristics of the incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. Important factors to 
consider include where the incidents are occurring, at what times, who is involved, 
how and why the problem is occurring, and what solutions have been tried in the 
past. By determining the underlying causes of the problem through the collection of 
detailed information, more effective tactical strategies can be developed to address 
the threats (Block et al., 1995:3). 
 
7.4.2.3 Task to collect missing information 
 
Once the analyst has determined the key information needs and what information is 
missing or unavailable and where to find it, new tasking should be given to the 
collection unit or the responsible person for additional information. This new 
information will be used to enrich the information on hand, so that an accurate, 
complete analysis result may be produced (Muller, 2002b: 8).  
 
7.4.2.4 Evaluation and interpretation of the collected security information 
 
The evaluation phase is the true analysis phase and has three aspects i.e. assessing 
the information, integrating and interpreting the information. The reliability of the 
information source is assessed on specific criteria such as the previous quality of 
information supplied by the source, the situation, the location, and likely access of 
the source at the time to the information collected. The accuracy of the information 
provided is assessed as an actual relative measurement in relation to each item of 
information received (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008:142). Although the reliability of the 
source needs to be assessed, the credibility of the information is also important and 
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should not be neglected. The more primary information is used, the higher the 
importance of testing because of the subjective nature of human sources and the 
danger of mistaking misinformation and disinformation for fact. The information as 
well as where it was sourced, should also be tested for credibility and usability (refer 
to paragraph 4.4) (Muller, 2002 b: 8-10). 
 
According to Gottlieb et al. (1994: 161), the interpretation of information is the true 
analysis function. It requires highly skilled and experienced security information 
analysts. These skills should include a variety of crime analysis tools, threat analysis 
tools, vulnerability analysis tools and criticality assessment tools. Incident pattern 
analysis will consist of incident patterns of both crime incidents and policy violation 
incidents. Since no literature could be found on incident pattern analysis of policy 
violations in the security environment, the researcher decided on using the crime 
pattern analysis process employed by policing agencies. Crime pattern analysis 
contains information relative to continuing occurrence of particular criminal activities. 
They acquaint officers with the types of crimes being committed; list the days, times 
and locations of their occurrence; and provide officers with any known suspects, 
suspect vehicle, modus operandi, and or property loss information.  
 
Threats become more serious when vulnerabilities exist that can be exploited. There 
will always be potential threats in any protected environment. The threat should be 
assessed to ascertain the intent, capabilities and motive as this would impact on the 
security risk control measures that would be devised and implemented. Therefore, 
being able to counter an actor’s threat means knowing the actors capabilities. For 
example; 
- how effective is their intelligence capability?  
- what measures would they employ?  
- do they adhere to strict guidelines in terms of gathering information?  
- do they have a history of using non-conventional methods, e.g. bugging? and  
- how determined are they or how desperate are they?  
 
In identifying possible threat actors one must not forget vendors, suppliers, 
customers, distributors, consultants and other indirect employees or associates. Do 
you really know them and their interests? What is it that they really know about the 
233 
protected company’s operations, plans, strategies, capabilities and weaknesses? 
How do they handle information of importance against the protected company (refer 
to Paragraph 4.4.3) (Muller, 2002a: 9). 
 
All organisations/companies have areas of vulnerability and the bigger the 
vulnerability the more severe the threat. It is therefore important to assess the 
vulnerabilities. Potential vulnerabilities often include the following: 
- a lack of defensive awareness amongst employees;  
- unmaintained physical security protection systems; 
- deliberate harmful actions by a disgruntled employee; or  
- communication via telephones, facsimiles and even e-mail and the internet.  
 
Information and other service vendors, consultants and service providers can also 
pose a threat. Weak links are usually people and the way they communicate with 
others. People’s talkative habit may sometimes make them spill the beans. This step 
requires knowing the rivals’ capabilities and expected actions. How would it go about 
“attacking” your vulnerabilities? Requirements for such an assessment are typically a 
record of dubious, often inexplicable incidents, e.g. stolen computers, break-ins, 
hacking incidents. Recognising vulnerabilities also means that companies are aware 
of potential loopholes and can in time take alternative measures to protect interests. 
It is about taking preventive measures to limit a potential threat (refer to Paragraph 
4.4.4) (Muller, 2002a: 9-10). 
 
In Criticality Assessment the essential question is: How likely is it that a particular 
threat event will take place or the probability of a threat event occurring. Has the 
product been a target before? What is the current situation regarding the threat. Was 
it previously attacked, if so how frequently? The security manager must take into 
consideration the costs of replacement, repair, lost productivity, forfeiture of business 
opportunity, cleanup, litigation, damage to reputation and undermining of customer 
goodwill. Even when the impact is upon human life, the yardstick is in Rand value 
(Fischer et al., 2008: 157).  
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7.4.2.5 Analysis result 
 
Analysing the information needed by clients can also pose problems, especially in 
terms of needs, the level of training of the analyst and the technical support in terms 
of the operating systems, hardware and software. The skills required may be 
considerably different for which they were initially employed (Block et al., 1995: 161).  
 
‘Relationship management’ is not a term that many analysts are probably familiar 
with, but perhaps they should be. Managing the relationship between the analysts 
and the end user of the results – the client – is essential if the knowledge possessed 
by the analyst is to be converted into actionable results. The need to manage this 
analyst –client relationship is the most vital skill that analysts should possess. 
“Relationship management” will help to overcome mistrust and misunderstanding 
between analyst, management and the end user (Ratcliffe, 2009: 98). 
 
Clarke and Eck (2003: 1) are of the view that personnel appointed as analysts 
should be able to provide the kind of strategies, actionable information products and 
recommendations on physical protection systems needed to support the end user.  
 
There are a range of analytical techniques that can be used by analysts. Some of the 
analytical techniques include the following:  
1. Crime pattern analysis: provides trends and hotspot analysis. 
2. Network analysis: provides an understanding of the direction, frequency and 
strength of links between criminal collaborators in a criminal network. 
3. Market profiles: assessment of the market for a specific commodity e.g. 
physical protection system. 
4. Demographic/social trend analysis: an assessment of the impact of socio-
economic and demographic changes on criminality. 
5. Criminal business profiles: determine and understand the business models 
and techniques used by organised crime groups. 
6. Target profile analysis: provides an understanding of the lifestyles, networks, 
criminal activities, and potential interdiction points in the life of a targeted 
offender. 
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7. Operational intelligence assessment: evaluation of information collection to 
inform decision-making about an existing operation. 
8. Risk analysis: assesses the scale of risks or threats posed by offenders or 
organisations to individual potential victims, police and the public. 
9. Results analysis: a process used to evaluate the effectiveness of law 
enforcement activities (Ratcliffe, 2009: 135). 
 
7.4.2.6 Analysis report (result) 
 
Once the evaluation and interpretation have been completed and having determined 
how the analysis results should best be presented to management, the analysis 
results now need to be packaged. The analysis result should only consist of the 
answer to the original question and should not include comprehensive reports in 
which the answer is indiscernible. An effective analysis report should contain the 
following:  
• a clear, concise and objective message that is responsive to the original key 
information need; 
• be timely and in appropriate format; 
• contain varying predictions indicating most probable outcome; 
• propose various proactive or counter-strategies; 
• indicate information gaps and the effect thereof; 
• comment on the credibility of information and reliability of sources; 
• use persuasive presentation skills (Muller, 2002b: 14-15).  
 
7.4.3  Phase 3: Implementation of security risk control measures  
 
Upon receipt of the analysis report top management may decide on the application 
thereof. They may use the analysis result to design appropriate security risk control 
measures that would deter, detect, delay and respond to an intruder or institute a 
disciplinary enquiry, civil/criminal prosecution. Management may want to make 
personnel aware of specific activities. They may use it as deterrence or to authorise 
further collection of security information using physical surveillance or other forms of 
non conventional methods. Ultimately, they may want to address the organisational 
security strategy by the implementation of security risk control measures in the form 
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of physical protection systems (PPS), strategies and actionable crime information 
products (Garcia, 2008: 6).  
 
7.4.3.1 Objectives  
 
No company can protect everything all the time. This would be unrealistic, 
impossible and unnecessary. We need to recognise that most organisations already 
have security measures in place e.g. access control, firewalls etc. There is no need 
to double these efforts. Although there is limited linkage between an organisation’s 
Strategic plan and security functions, security risk control measures are often made 
the responsibility of security personnel. Once the vulnerable assets have been 
identified those crucial elements in the assets should then be identified in order to 
design appropriate security risk control measures (Muller, 2002a: 5).  
 
To formulate these objectives, the designer must understand the organisational 
operations and conditions, define the threat and identify the target. The ultimate 
objective of a security plan should be to reduce crime, increase detection and 
prevent losses. Typical objectives will be to prevent sabotage of critical equipment, 
theft of assets or information from within the facility, and protection of people. The 
envisaged security risk control measures must be able to accomplish its objectives 
by either deterrence or a combination of detection, delay, and response (Garcia, 
2006: 8-23).  
 
According to Garcia (2008: 3), a proper description of the facility will provide an 
understanding of the PPS requirements for the facility as well as an appreciation for 
the operational and safety constraints. A thorough description of the facility and the 
processes within the facility is an absolute necessity. This information can be 
obtained from different sources, including the facility design blueprints, process 
descriptions, safety analysis reports and environmental impact statements. An 
orientation of the organisation and interviews with personnel is crucial.  
 
Adversaries can be separated into three classes: outsiders, insiders and outsiders 
who are working in collusion with insiders. For each class of adversary, the full range 
of tactics (deceit, force, stealth, or any combination of these) should be considered. 
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Deceit is the overriding of a security system by using fraudulent authorisation and 
identification; force is the overt, forcible attempt to overcome a security system; and 
stealth is any attempt to defeat the detection system and enter the facility covertly 
(Garcia, 2008: 4). Security information management is about ensuring the 
identification, authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation of information (Kritzinger, 2006: 74).  
 
7.4.3.2  Design  
 
Using the objectives for security risk control measures obtained in the organisation 
characterisation, threat definition and target identification, the specialist can design 
security risk control measures. The security risk control measure design must be 
able to detect and detain (arrest) the adversary, prevent the criminal conduct or 
irregularity of the adversary from occurring and create awareness to prevent losses 
(Garcia, 2008: 4).  
 
According to Garcia (2008: 5), in designing a specific physical protection system to 
avert the threat identified in the analysis’s report, management must ensure that the 
new physical protection system will detect the adversary, delay the adversary, and 
alert the response force to interrupt the adversary. 
 
Security risk control measures may be designed to include strategies encompassing 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Designing (CPTED), business watch, car 
guard watch, neighbourhood watch, awareness, sharing of information, electronic 
networking with other service providers and organisations. Many of these have 
served as best practices in the law enforcement environment. The challenge is for 
security managers to make themselves aware of current and innovative design 
strategies. This knowledge should be coupled with the latest information on issues of 
changes in cultural values, crime, technology, market conditions, and political 
conditions (Opolot, 1999: 229).  
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7.4.3.3 Dissemination  
 
Dissemination can be carried out in several different ways, namely, by attending 
briefings and strategy sessions, presenting verbal reports, providing written reports, 
having face-to-face contact whenever the need arises and public information 
systems – written and electronic media (Reuland, 1997: 35). To ensure that a paper 
trail exists, dissemination should take place in a regulated written format. 
 
7.4.3.4 Implementation  
 
The recommended security risk control measure is received from management by 
the end user for implementation. The security risk control measure may take the 
form of strategies, physical protection systems or actionable information products. 
There should be open communication between the management, the analyst and the 
end user. This is important, especially where the end user needs to discuss a new 
trend or some additional design elements with the analyst or management regarding 
the specific threat (Garcia, 2008: 64-65).  
 
7.4.3.5 Feedback  
 
The last aspect after the implementation of the security risk control measure is 
feedback and reaction. Management and the analyst need to know what works and 
what does not work. Feedback may be given verbally or in written format. A survey 
form may be used to obtain feedback and reaction of the analysis result (Reuland, 
1997: 36-37).  
 
7.4.3.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Once the security risk control measures have been implemented they must be 
periodically evaluated to determine the effectiveness or lack thereof (Rogers, 2008: 
163). There are two main types of evaluations. They are outcomes and process 
evaluations. An outcome evaluation is to determine if the security risk control 
measure had the desired effect, such as, ‘was crime reduced?’ or ‘was an intruder 
disrupted?’ (Ratcliffe, 2008: 189). Monitoring and evaluation should be carried out by 
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line management. It has to begin with a review and thorough understanding the of 
the protection objectives the designed security risk control measure must meet. The 
PPS should be quantitatively and qualitatively monitored and evaluated for 
vulnerabilities on a continuous basis (Garcia, 2008: 5). 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Security information management is a fundamental part of security management. 
This concept needs proper planning, organising, leadership, co-ordination and 
control to be successful. The concept ensures that policy follows strategy. Standing 
operating procedures have proven to be working well in security information 
management companies such as SABRIC, CGRI and the PSI. It is suggested that 
standard operating procedures should follow policy, so that the security information 
management model may be implemented by all security service providers. This 
security information management model should be seen as a concept separate from 
security risk management which was introduced to prevent losses so that insurance 
premiums may be reduced. The Security Information Management Model should be 
seen as a concept to reduce crime, increase detection and reduce losses. The 
model was developed using reliable information obtained in the literature study, case 
studies and interviews. If security information management is researched by another 
researcher he/she will also be able to produce a similar model. Due to sensitivity of 
some of the information being managed in the security environment, there was some 
reluctance to discuss some of the techniques used in practice to gather security 
information for example in undercover operations. This had to be cleared with 
security managers, before this information could be shared with the researcher. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The security industry operates within a diverse and multi-disciplinary knowledge 
base, with security risk management being a fundamental knowledge domain within 
security. Over the past decade, the concept of security risk management as a formal 
discipline has emerged throughout the private and government sectors of security. 
Security risk management is now a well-established discipline, with its own body of 
knowledge. The standards and compliance requirements for security risk 
management only considers security risk management and not security information 
management. In security risk management, security risk assessment is carried out to 
identify areas that need security intervention. The security risk management 
framework currently used by the security industry provides for the collection of 
information on vulnerabilities and incidents, whenever the need arises. This does not 
include the day to day collection of security information on threats, vulnerabilities and 
incidents for the purpose of reducing crime, increasing detection rates and 
preventing losses. In the absence of a security information management framework 
for the security industry, this research was focussed on developing an effective 
model for the management of security information. The security information 
management model will among other things, provide for incident pattern analysis, 
threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and criticality assessment.  
 
This study used the mixed methods research approach to obtain scientific 
knowledge and insight for the development of a model for the management of 
security information in the security industry. This chapter concludes with findings and 
recommendations made in this study. It also highlights limitations in the model and 
future research work that could further enhance this study. 
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8.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
The security industry comprises of private and government security service 
providers. They are divided into different sectors according to the security service 
function they perform. Each sector has a specific goal and emphasis in respect of 
security related functions.  
 
The substantive grounded theory which was developed in this research describes 
how security information is managed in the Security Industry. The substantive 
grounded theory also forecasts that if security information is not correctly managed, 
there will be continuous recurrence of losses. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 5), are of 
the opinion that the grounded theory should explain, describe and to a certain extent 
be able to predict. The substantive grounded theory in this research was developed 
by obtaining qualitative data through focussed semi-structured interviews and focus 
group interviews. The primary data was obtained directly from the participants. The 
collected data was manually coded and categorised by the researcher. A continuous 
theoretical discussion, supported by the codification of categories and themes with 
emphasis on the theory as a process was used. It was not difficult for the researcher 
to develop a ‘story line’ which started with the collection of security information, the 
analysis and ended with the implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
Selective coding resulted in the following conclusion: the core category that emerged 
after coding was the security officials’ ‘management of security information’. The 
category was developed in the same way as all the other categories and a 
substantive grounded theory emerged (De Vos, 2007: 345). The theory is that 
security officers operate without a standardised framework to manage security 
information. 
 
A self-administered questionnaire survey was conducted with security officials from 
different sectors of the security industry in Gauteng. The data was quantitatively 
analysed by a statistician and interpreted by the researcher. The grounded theory 
was verified using the analysed data from the questionnaires (Strauss and Corbin 
(1990: 23). It was found that there was a need for a security information 
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management model for the management of security information in the security 
industry. 
 
The aim of this study was to explore the management of security information in the 
security industry in Gauteng. The outcome resulted in the development of a Security 
Information Management Model for the security industry. The research rationale, 
research problem, research questions, research goal, research objectives and the 
case study were evaluated with the view to making findings and recommendations.  
 
8.3  RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
8.3.1 Findings related to the research rationale  
 
The research rationale in Chapter 1 suggests that security information is not being 
managed in the same way as security risk management and the management of 
crime information and intelligence.  
 
Awareness on the importance of security information: It has been found that in 
the Western Australian (WA) casino industry, the collection of security information is 
everyone’s responsibility. An information awareness culture is created by the 
distribution of pamphlets, holding awareness workshops and using a common code 
of conduct for all employees at the Casino. LCD television screens are also used to 
encourage the general public to provide information to specific control points 
(Interview no 23).  
 
Collection of security information: It has been found that in law enforcement both 
in South Africa and Western Australia, intelligence and crime information is collected 
using crime information/intelligence collection units. They have their own collection 
capacity within the crime information/intelligence units. Intelligence is collected when 
a specific need arises as directed by management. On the other hand, crime 
information is collected according to a specific crime problem as directed by crime 
analysts. A collection plan is used to collect crime-specific elements that distinguish 
both one criminal incident from another and one group of offences, related in one or 
more ways, from a larger group of similar offences. The collection units collect crime 
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information/intelligence using different sources, methods and techniques. Security 
risk management requires the use of a security survey instrument to identify risks 
confronting assets in a facility. The security industry collects security information on 
incidents of crime and policy violations as they occur. Very seldom do security 
service providers use different sources, methods and techniques to collect security 
information. 
 
Sharing of security information: It has been found that the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa provides for Community Police Forums (CPFs) and the 
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) to share crime information 
and intelligence. According to the National Strategic Intelligence Act, No. 39 of 1994, 
private security service providers shall provide crime information/intelligence in 
support of the SAPS’ policing function in terms of section 205 (3) of the Constitution.  
Poor working relationships and mistrust among security personnel and between law 
enforcement and security service providers hinders the sharing of security 
information. 
 
Workplace investigations: It has been found that in two High Court cases (of the 
Witwatersrand and Natal divisions) the Judges expressed their acceptance that 
workplace investigations can occur (see State vs Botha and others (1) 1995 (2) 
SACR 598 (W); and State vs Dube 2000 (1) SACR 53 (N)). The court referred to the 
fact that various institutions conduct their own investigations and then hand the 
evidence over to the police for further action and possible criminal prosecution. This 
development has created new opportunities for all investigators whether in private, 
business (corporate) or government service. All indications are that the scope will 
increase. The Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, No. 56 of 2001 provides for 
the functions of an investigator in the security service. Workplace investigations 
include the collection of information in search for evidence of a crime or irregularity. 
Information collected during workplace investigations may give rise to security 
information which may enlighten management on the extent of incidents, 
vulnerabilities and threats against the organisation/company being protected.  
 
Analysis of security information: It has been found that the change from manual 
analysis to automated analysis is important. It supplements the expertise of an 
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experienced official. It is also because the knowledge and techniques accumulated 
over the years do not retire with a veteran official. They are there for others to build 
on. Automated analysis helps to obtain an accurate picture of a problem. It enables 
practitioners to know the exact nature of the problem and the characteristics of the 
incidents. It helps to determine the underlying causes of the problem and to develop 
effective strategies, measures and actionable crime information products. According 
to Gottlieb et al. (1994: 27), there are four types of analysis most often used by law 
enforcement analysts. They include crime analysis, intelligence analysis, operations 
analysis and investigative analysis. Crime information analysis plays a significant 
role in producing intelligence through the systematic collection, evaluation, analysis, 
integration, and dissemination of information on criminals, especially related to their 
associations and their identification with criminal activity of an organised nature. The 
use of accurate analysis results to reduce crime, increase detection rates and 
prevent losses is not unique to modern times.  
  
Development of a Security Information Management Model: It has been found 
that most police practitioners from law enforcement used the traditional problem 
oriented policing model to manage crime information in their environments. This 
involved scanning, analysis, response and assessment (SARA). The stages in the 
SARA model include the following: 
• scanning: identifying recurring problems and how the ensuing consequences 
affect community safety; 
• analysis: collecting and analysing relevant data on the problem, with the 
object of revealing ways to alter the causes of the problem; 
• response: seeking out responses that might have worked elsewhere, 
identifying a range of local options, and then selecting and implementing 
specific activities that will resolve the problem; 
• assessment: testing data collected before and after the response phase in 
order to determine whether the response reduced the problem and, if not, to 
identify new strategies that might work (Ratcliffe 2003: 74). 
 
An advancement to the traditional problem oriented policing model of crime 
information management is ‘Intelligence-led policing’ (also known as ‘intelligence-
driven policing’) model, which had its origins in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 
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1990s.The UK, National Intelligence Model (NIM) used four elements for its tactical 
tasking in the implementation of intelligence-led policing. These elements focus on: 
• targeting offenders (especially targeting of active criminals through overt and 
covert means) 
• management of crime and disorder hotspots; 
• investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents; and 
• application of preventative measures, including working with local 
partnerships to reduce crime and disorder. 
 
The production of intelligence in intelligence-led policing has different stages: this 
includes direction to collect intelligence, evaluation, collation, analysis, 
dissemination and feedback (NCIS, 2000: 14).  
 
Security Risk Management Cycle (SRMC) is commonly used by security service 
providers in Australia. This cycle begins with the security risk manager identifying the 
assets to be protected. The risks associated with the asset are prioritised. It is 
followed by the analysis of the effects of the risks according to probability, impact 
and frequency. This results in the identification of alternative actions to reduce the 
risks (Clark 2010: 260).  
 
During the period 1995-1997, the Programme Group: Security Management at the 
Technikon South Africa (TSA)8 developed a Security Risk Management Model 
(SRMM) for their National Diploma in Security Management and for the newly 
instituted (1999) BTech in Security Risk Management. This model is based on the 
following steps: 
• identification of the problem of security (crime risks); 
• studying the policy of the organisation and obtaining a mandate; 
• conducting an orientation exercise; 
• undertaking a risk analysis exercise; 
• conducting a security survey; 
                                                          
8 In January 2004 the TSA merged with the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the Programme 
Group became the Department of Security Risk Management which in January 2009 merged with 
Criminology to become The Department of Criminology & Security Science.  
246 
• doing a return on investment exercise to implement security risk control 
measures; and  
• submitting a crime risk management report to top management of the 
company for a decision on the implementation of security measures (Rogers, 
2008: 151-154). 
 
The SRMM was further adapted to the residential security environment with an 
additional step namely ‘maintenance and upgrade’ (Olckers, 2007: 103). Kole (2010: 
20) further adapted the SRMM with the addition of another step, namely ‘service 
level agreements’ which emanated from his masters research study on the 
protection of petrol stations.  
Security risks are identified using the SRMM if the need arises or if the financial 
situation warrants such an exercise (Kole, 2010:16). The SRMM is only implemented 
by security service providers on approval by management (Rogers, 2008: 151-154). 
At agency level crime information in the law enforcement sphere is collected, 
analysed and implemented in a logical and structured manner to produce different 
types of analysis products such as crime analysis, intelligence analysis, operations 
analysis and investigative analysis (Newburn et al., 2008: 204; Reuland, 1997: 7).  
 
The modern day crime information management strategy commonly used by law 
enforcement is the Compstat model which originated in New York City, USA during 
1994. It involves four principle stages, namely:  
• Collection of timely and accurate information, 
• Effective tactics, 
• Rapid deployment, 
• Relentless follow-up and assessment 
(Ratcliffe, 2003: 76). 
 
Presently, there is no Security Information Management Model (SIMM) for the 
security industry.  
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8.3.2   Findings related to the problem statement  
 
An issue of concern that needed to be addressed in this study was the collection, 
and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures in the security industry.  
 
The “status quo” of the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures was established. The nature and 
extent of problems experienced in the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures were identified. Solutions to 
to address the problems experienced in the collection and analysis of security 
information and the implementation of security risk control measures was 
determined. 
 
8.3.3  Findings related to the research questions 
 
The first question was to establish, the “status quo” of the collection and analysis of 
security information and the implementation of security risk control measures in 
practice. By means of this question, the researcher intended to establish the current 
situation of security information management in the security industry. 
 
The second question was to identify, the nature and extent of problems experienced 
in the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. By means of this question, the researcher intended to 
identify the nature and extent of the problems being experienced in the collection 
and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures by security officials. 
 
The third question was to determine solutions to address the problems experienced 
in the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. By means of this question, the researcher intended to 
find solutions to address the problems experienced in the collection and analysis of 
security information and the implementation of security risk control measures 
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The following findings are based on the responses received from the respondents in 
the semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews, and the self-administered 
questionnaire survey. The research findings were evaluated in relation to the 
research questions of this study. 
 
Research question 1: What is the “status quo” of the collection and analysis of 
security information and the implementation of security risk control measures in 
practice? 
 
Collection of security information: It was found that security information is 
collected whenever an incident takes place, for example an act of crime or a policy 
violation using specific personnel and electronic technology. The most common 
sources from which security information is collected include information from a 
victim/complainant and witnesses. Voluntary information is sometimes received from 
a third party on specific incidents, threats and vulnerabilities. Security information 
received by security officials is recorded in their pocket books and entered into a 
register (occurrence book) at the control room. It is also reported to the shift 
supervisor on duty.  
 
In some organisations/companies security information is not openly recorded in a 
register due to mistrust among security officials. Each security service provider 
applies his/her own method of protecting security information. Security service 
providers implement different ways to protect security information. Some government 
departments use the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) document for 
the classification and protection of security information. Sharing of security 
information is done on a need to know basis, because of business interests and fear 
for the leakage of information. Security information collected during workplace 
investigations is not stored in data base for future use. 
 
Analysis of security information: It was found that many security service providers 
use clerks and investigators as data capturers to carry out the basic analysis 
functions such as the capturing and verifying of data. The collected security 
information is considered by security managers and not analysed by qualified 
analysts. Security managers make a decision on security information which can be 
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used by SAPS and security officials for operational purposes. Some 
organisations/companies in South Africa use private security information 
management companies (SABRIC, PSI, CGRI) to analyse the incident information. 
In some instances the quality of the collected security information is also 
questionable. Sometimes a follow up is needed to collect missing information. This is 
not possible in the absence of a collection unit and an analysis capability. 
 
Many organisations/companies do not make use of computer technology, computer 
hardware and software for the purpose of analysis. The automated analysis function 
is only used by some of the big organisations/companies who have qualified analysts 
in their employ. Only in exceptional and sensational incidents will security 
information be out-sourced to qualified analysts for analysis reports. Many 
organisations/companies have found this to be more beneficial and cost effective 
than investing on an in-house analysis capability.  
 
Implementation of security risk control measures: It was found that in some 
organisations/companies the collected security information is handled by security 
management without the support of qualified analysts. The security information on 
incidents of crime is handed to SAPS, and the incident information on policy 
violations is given to security officials for internal investigation. Threat information 
which is seldom received is also given to the SAPS for investigation. Security 
management also provides actionable crime information products and tactical 
strategies to proactively address specific threats to security officials on static and 
mobile duty. Security information on vulnerabilities is addressed when a security risk 
assessment is conducted on the organisation/company being protected.  
 
The implementation of specific security risk control measures by security service 
providers are quantitatively driven in terms of cost. The qualitative designing of the 
security risk control measure to deter, detect, delay and respond to the intruder is not 
taken into consideration. If funding is not forthcoming from the organisation/company 
being protected, then the security information to enhance the the security measures 
is either shelved or a more cost-effective measure is implemented.  
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Security information management companies, who manage security information on 
incidents of crime for organisations/companies, generate actionable crime 
information products and tactical strategies for implementation by the respective 
organisations/companies being protected. Verbal and written communication 
methods are sometimes used to give feedback. Feedback is given as determined by 
individual end users of the security information.  
 
Research question 2: What is the nature and extent of problems experienced in the 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk 
control measures?  
 
Collection of security information: It was found that security officials collect 
security information without considering the strategic plan, operational security 
strategy, security plan or a collection plan of the organisation/company being 
protected. Personnel, budget and other resources are not specifically linked to the 
collection of security information. No specific effort is made to collect security 
information on specific matters within a specific context to address a specific threat.  
Security officials collect many different types of information with no goal or objectives 
in mind. They do not have a description of the security information they need to 
collect. The collected security information does not add value to the core business of 
the organisation/company because it is collected without any policy direction. This 
results in information overload. No communication between the client and the 
collector of the security information. Funding, human resources and technology is 
wasted on collecting security information which is not a need for the 
organisation/company.  
 
There is an absence of awareness on the importance of security information in 
reducing crime, increasing detection rates and preventing losses. Security officials, 
clients and the public are not made aware of their ethical obligations to report 
security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities to the 
organisation/company. Security desks and toll free numbers are not used for 
reporting security information. The mass media is also not used to encourage the 
public to provide security information on the organisation/company being protected. 
Security officers collect security information on threats and vulnerabilities when a 
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situation presents itself. Threats and vulnerabilities are not a priority for the collection 
of security information on a daily basis. Personnel do not have a responsibility in 
terms of a job description, service level agreement or a collection plan to collect 
security information relevant to specific threats.  
 
Very little use is made of sources, methods and techniques for collecting security 
information (e.g. mass media and undercover contracted operatives). External 
sources are also neglected. Fear of victimisation is seen as the biggest intimidating 
factor in the collection of security information. Personnel are reluctant to provide 
information due to intimidation and fear of being labelled as an ‘impimpi’ (derogatory 
Zulu term for informer or ‘sell-out’ from the pre-1994 era of political contestation in 
the townships). Security service providers do not use a standardised operational 
procedure for the protection of information. Security information received for analysis 
is sometimes not protected to prevent leakage of information. 
 
Security information is not always stored and maintained on a computer database. In 
many instances security information is manually recorded in registers. These 
registers are kept in the storage rooms. At smaller companies security information is 
not recorded but retained in the memory of investigators and security officers rather 
than data systems. Investigators possess a wealth of information. Computer access 
is not given to all security personnel to input security information personally collected 
by them.  
 
In some organisations/companies security officials working at lower levels are not 
trusted with information, neither are they tasked to collect security information for the 
purpose of investigations. There is mistrust between management and lower level 
security personnel. Management suspects that many of the lower level security 
officers work with criminal elements. There is a perception that they may sell the 
collected security information to criminal elements.  
 
Legal restrictions on the collection of intelligence are an impediment for private 
security service providers. They are unable to collect intelligence on threats and 
incidents of crime. Even if intelligence comes to their attention, they need to refer the 
intelligence to SAPS or to the National Intelligence Coordination Committee for 
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attention by legally mandated intelligence agencies. The collection of security 
information sometimes infringes on the rights of people. The handling of the 
collected security information is not standardised and streamlined which results in 
information overload. Security information is shared on a need to know basis. Not all 
information is made available to law enforcement; neither does law enforcement 
make information readily available to security service providers. 
 
In most instances, security officials have insufficient knowledge on the collection of 
security information. Many security officials do not have skills to identify security 
related information. Some of the security officials are unable to record information or 
statements as a result of poor communication and writing skills. Training is not given 
to security officials on the use of the different collection sources, methods and 
techniques. 
 
Analysis of security information: It was found that many organisations/companies 
do not have an analysis capability or qualified analysts in their employ; neither do 
they out-source the analysis function. Security information received by these 
organisations/companies is not evaluated/verified and interpreted. In many 
instances, no indexing, sorting and storage of collected security information takes 
place. Many security service providers do not have computer technology and specific 
computer software for analysis.  
 
Certain organisations/companies which have an analysis capability sometimes have 
problems with the integrity of their information. In many instances the information is 
insufficient, unreliable and inaccurate. The security information is not tested to 
determine if it meets the key information needs of the analyst. Analysts experience 
problems in obtaining missing information in the absence of a collection capacity. In 
most cases the analysis results are not directed at addressing specific threats or 
vulnerabilities. The threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and the incident 
pattern analysis of the organisation/company are not considered in the analysis 
process. In many instances actionable information products are often found not to be 
relevant, reliable or timely. Management sometimes undermines and generalises the 
analysis results before it is disseminated. No ongoing communication between 
analyst and user of analysis results. Dissemination of analysis results not being done 
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by analysts. Analysis results takes too long. In many instances the analysis results 
are not relevant to the security risk prevalent at the time. Management does not do 
much to manage data integrity and quality control of the analysis result before it is 
passed onto the end users for implementation. 
 
Implementation of security risk control measures: It was found that there is no 
policy framework for the implementation of security risk control measures. Security 
risk control measures take the form of prevention measures (more body and property 
searches during access control), disciplinary action and criminal prosecution. Very 
seldom do they take the form of physical protection systems, strategies and 
actionable crime information products. Security risk control measures are 
implemented without giving due consideration to the reduction of crime; increase in 
detection rates and the prevention of losses. The implementation of security risk 
control measures is not needs driven. Clients are unwilling to pay for additional 
resources to implement security risk control measures which is not needs driven.  
 
In many instances there is no communication between the analyst and the security 
official responsible for the implementation of the security risk control measures. The 
intended users are not always in a position to operationalise the security risk control 
measures, as the measures are sometimes outdated. If the services of a qualified 
analyst is used the results and recommendations are in some instances undermined 
and generalised by management, to down play the seriousness of the threat or 
vulnerability. Many of the personnel are inexperienced to implement security risk 
control measures. No training is provided for the implementation of security 
measures. In many instances the resources are insufficient to implement analysis 
results.  
 
Feedback is seldom given to management. Much the feedback is given informally to 
management on the progress of implementation. The implementation of the security 
measures is not monitored and evaluated by line management. There is no 
evaluation on the implementation of the security risk control measures.  
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Research question 3: Which solutions should be implemented to address the 
problems experienced in the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures?  
 
Collection of security information: Policies are needed to guide the collection of 
security information in the security industry. Management should provide the 
required human, physical and financial resources for the collection of security 
information. Collection of security information should be included in service level 
agreements and job descriptions. Security officials should be trained in the collection 
of security information. Communication skills of security personnel to be enhanced. 
Security personnel to be made aware of all technological advancement for the 
collection of security information. Computer technology and computer software 
programmes should be provided to personnel. Computer access should be given to 
all security personnel. The correct persons to be employed for the job. 
 
Personnel to be made aware of the importance of security information. They should 
be motivated to collect the required security information. Security information to be 
protected through classification. Information sources to be protected. Payment of 
incentives for information should be encouraged. Proper rewarding of informers is 
essential. All collected information should be placed on a database.Sharing of 
information to be encouraged. There should be a closer working relationship with the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) and National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). 
Improve networking with service providers. Accessibility to external databases to be 
negotiated. Security personnel should be trusted in the collection of security 
information. 
 
Analysis of security information: Qualified, experienced personnel to be used to 
do analysis. Management should not undermine analysis results. There should not 
be mistrust between management and lower level security personnel. Analysis 
results should not be generalised by management. Management should not interfere 
with the analysis function. Security information to be analysed in a structured way. 
Regular communication should take place between analyst and end user of the 
analysis result. The end user of the analysis result should be allowed to request 
additional analysis on the result. Data integrity of analysis results should not be 
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compromised. Establish a data analysis centre to monitor incidents. Dissemination 
should also take place formally by means of reports. 
 
Implementataion of security risk control measures: There should be a separate 
unit for the implementation of the security risk control measures. Security risk control 
measures should include strategies to mitigate risks. There is a need to have a 
structured way of implementing security risk control measures. Implementation of 
analysis results should be cost effective. Experienced security personnel should be 
used in the implementation of security risk control measures. Project management 
approach to be followed in the implementation of security risk control measures.  
 
8.3.4 Findings related to the research goal  
 
The research goal was based on the need to explore the management of security 
information in the security industry. 
 
The exploratory study of the management of security information in the security 
industry was successfully conducted in the Gauteng province of South Africa and 
Perth in Western Australia.  
 
8.3.5 Findings related to the research objectives 
 
The first objective was to establish the “status quo” of the collection and analysis of 
security information and the implementation of security risk control measures in 
practice. 
 
The second objective was to identify the nature and extent of problems experienced 
in the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. 
 
The third objective was to discover a new Security Information Management Model 
(SIMM). 
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Objective no. 1: It was found that the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures takes place without any 
strategic direction and infrastructure in place. No standardised framework is used to 
manage security information in the security industry. 
 
Objective no. 2: It was found that management does not provide an organisational 
security strategy, security plan or collection plans for the collection of security 
information. In most cases no analysis capability exists in organisations/companies. 
The implementation of security risk control measures is not designed to meet the 
strategic objectives of the organisation/company being protected. 
 
Objective no. 3: It was found that there was a need for a Security Information 
Management Model (SIMM) for the management of security information in the 
security industry. 
 
8.3.6  Findings related to the case study 
 
Collection of security information: It was found that the SAPS and the WAP have 
a formalised way of managing crime incident information and intelligence. They use 
collection units and investigators to collect information and intelligence. Collection 
plans are specifically structured for each project, so that only the required 
information and intelligence is collected. The information flows from the bottom 
upwards to the highest decision maker in the organisation. The crime incident 
information/intelligence is shared with interested networks such as private security 
companies, intelligence structures and other information networks. Only persons 
who have the level of security clearance have the authority to access the 
information. Private security service providers in Western Australia have individual 
ways of collecting security information on threats, vulnerabilities and incidents. 
Specific collection plans are developed for the collection of security information. The 
Western Australian government departments use the complaints management unit to 
collect information on incidents of policy violations.  
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Analysis of security information: It was found that in South Africa crime 
information management companies have a well-structured, regulated way to 
analyse crime incident information. The process is controlled by standing operating 
procedures which is agreed upon by the clients and the service provider. The 
analysis and recommendation of strategies to clients and stakeholders is 
coordinated, monitored and evaluated. Security information management companies 
in South Africa are private initiatives. They do not collect security information, but 
coordinate incident information received from their clients. They collate the crime 
incident information received from their clients, analyse the crime incident 
information. In Australia they do not make use of security information management 
companies to coordinate and analyse incident information. Private security service 
providers in Western Australia make use of a risk register to record all risks. The risk 
register informs on asset criticality against identified risks and provides a framework 
from which to allocate the needed physical security resources and funding. Qualified 
analysts are used to analyse intelligence in the WAP. 
 
All crime incident information/intelligence in the SAPS and WAP that enters the 
system is analysed by analysis units. The WAP sanitises the information and 
declassifies the level before information/intelligence is shared. Only the relevant 
portions of the information/intelligence are shared.In both SAPS and WAP decisions 
are made by management to operationally and strategically implement the 
information/intelligence. In addition to actionable crime information products, they 
also generate a Crime Threat Analysis (CTA) document with all the 
information/intelligence they receive. All threat information received by the police is 
also included in the CTA. 
  
Implementation of security risk control measures: It was found that the 
information management companies in South Africa provide actionable crime 
information products, threat assessment reports and tactical strategies aimed at 
mitigating serious crimes confronting their clients. The sharing of crime incident 
information by crime information management companies helps enrich the existing 
repository and avoids duplication of strategies to address the same problem. 
Networking assists in coming up with one formidable strategy for recommendation to 
the client and the police.  
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8.4  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY INDUSTRY 
 
After exploring the management of security information in the security industry in the 
Gauteng province of South Africa and Perth in Western Australia the following 
recommendations are proposed: 
 
A Security Information Management Model should be used as a tool to reduce crime, 
increase detection rates and prevent losses in organisations and companies. This is 
the first study into the management of security information in the security industry. 
The management of security information relates to security information pertaining to 
incidents, threats and vulnerabilities impacting on an organisation/company being 
protected. This research has opened a number of new avenues for the collection, 
and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control 
measures. Hence, a Security Information Management Model was developed. This 
model differs from the following models: 
• Intelligence Model, where a specific need for intelligence is identified for 
intelligence management. Mainly used by Intelligence agencies. 
• Security Risk Information Management Model, where risks are identified for 
risk assessment. Mainly used by Security companies. 
• Crime Information Management Model, where crime information is managed 
to identify crime trends and criminals. Mainly used by law enforcement. 
 
The stages of the Security Information Management Model should include the 
following: 
• timely collection of security information on incidents, threats and 
vulnerabilities; 
• rapid analysis of security information; and the 
• designing of strategies, actionable crime information products and physical 
protection systems to deter, detect, delay, and respond to an adversary. 
 
The organisation/company being protected should consider the role of security as 
important in protecting its assets and providing sustainability to its business 
activities. Security information should be seen as the life blood of any organisation. if 
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the circulation of this life blood is cut, the organisation/company will not be able to 
sustain itself. It is important that the board of directors include security threats as part 
of their strategic plan. The board of directors of the organisation/company should 
provide the organisational security strategy to address the identified threats. The 
organisational security strategy should indicate the prioritised threats, projected 
costs and time frames to address the specific threats. The Security Head should be 
a stakeholder on the board of directors, for the purpose of providing security advice 
and direction. The management of security information should be a permanent point 
on any board of director’s agenda.  
 
Security information should be managed by the Security Head in three phases 
namely; collection of security information; analysis of security information; and the 
implementation of security risk control measures. A Security Information 
Management Centre (SIMC) should be established to equally manage the three 
phases. The collection and the analysis of the security information should be 
handled by a Security Information Management Centre (SIMC) and referred to top 
management as an analysis report (result). The analysis report is handled by top 
management and referred to the operational manager or the human resources 
manager for the implementation of management’s decision. The operational 
manager will need to project manage the implementation of security risk control 
measures within the context of physical protection systems, strategies and 
actionable crime information products. The human resources manager will need to 
manage all workplace investigations. All feedback reports on the implementation of 
management’s decision should be managed by the SIMC.  
 
The Security Head responsible for all security related matters in the organisation 
should develop a security plan to address the security threats using the 
organisational security strategic objectives as a directive. The security plan which 
should consist of the threats affecting the organisation, information on vulnerabilities 
and incident related information relevant to the threat should be used to address the 
prioritised threats in terms of the allocated budget. In essence, the security plan will 
consist of a Threat Assessment document, A Vulnerability Assessment document 
and an Incident Pattern Analysis document. These assessment documents should 
be prepared by a qualified security analyst and used as part of the security plan. The 
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assessment documents should serve as tools to manage security risks, conduct 
performance management as well as impact studies on the physical protection 
systems. A target-centred approach should be followed to identify a shared target. 
 
A collection plan should be prepared to focus on the identified threat. The senior 
security officer should develop and manage this collection plan in accordance with 
project management principles. Collection capability should be intensified by making 
use of personnel from the organisation being protected, clients and security 
personnel. If feasible, organisations should consider establishing security information 
collection units. Responsibilities of security officials to collect security information 
pertaining to specific threats should be included in their contracts, job descriptions 
and service level agreements, whichever is applicable.  
 
An awareness ethos should be created, so that personnel, clients and stakeholders 
become involved in the collection of security information. Security awareness 
procedures to encourage voluntary collection of security information should be 
advertised in the organisation being protected. Motivational programs should be 
presented to personnel to intensify the collection of security information. Security 
personnel need to be skilled in the collection of security information. On the job 
training should be encouraged. The training curriculum should focus on the needs of 
the individual to perform the collection function. Psychologists should become 
involved in team building and life skills survival training, to address the fear and 
victimisation that might occur during the collection of security information. There 
should be policies in place for the protection of witnesses against victimisation, so 
that people are protected against intimidation by criminals. The Witness Protection 
Programme should include an anonymous call number. Management should provide 
sufficient human, technical and physical resources to collect security information.  
 
Policy and Standardised operating procedures similar to that used by SAPS, 
SABRIC, PSI and the CGRI should be designed for the collection of security 
information. The standard operating procedure should be inclusive of ethical 
standards to guide security personnel in the lawful collection of security information. 
In this way all personnel will be aware of the collection cycle and the process to be 
followed. Security information protection measures should be put in place as a 
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safeguard against leakage of information and to overcome mistrust. Once the 
collector feels trusted he should provide more information. This should enhance 
mutual relations. A cell phone system should be explored to enter all actionable 
information in SMS text and have it electronically relayed to the automated system in 
the control room, SAPS crime control room and to the response team. 
 
Workplace investigations should be made part of the private security provider’s 
infrastructure as it will help in the collection of security information. The focus should 
be on collecting information by making use of informers, surveillance and undercover 
operations. Information collected during workplace investigations will enlighten 
management on the extent of unlawful activities and misconduct in their 
organisation.  
 
A standardised framework should be used for the collection of security information. 
In this way all personnel will be aware of the collection process to be followed. 
 
The sharing of information should be encouraged by management. Sharing of 
information between management and grassroots personnel and with SAPS, NDPP 
and other security service providers with similar interests will go a long way in 
intensifying the collection of security information. External sources of information 
should be explored through networking and the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding to access each other’s databases. This will add value to the 
information on hand. Fusion Centres should be established by security service 
providers with similar interests so that joint sharing of information can take place. 
Security service providers should also participate in community policing structures 
and in the SAPS war room strategy established by SAPS provincial offices for the 
sharing of information. 
 
Every security service provider should create an analysis capability at their 
organisations/companies. The organisational security strategy, the security plan and 
the needs of the clients should be considered for the purpose of analysis. This is 
important to determine the projected costs allocated to address the specific threat 
confronting the organisation. This will help the analyst to prepare a recommendation 
based on the projected costs. Following this process will save the organisation 
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human resources, technical and physical resources and money. Qualified analysts 
should be employed to conduct security information analysis according to the 
organisational security strategy and the security plan of the organisation.  
 
The analyst should generate a threat assessment document, vulnerability 
assessment document and an incident pattern analysis document. All security 
information collected on a daily basis should be used to populate these documents. 
These documents should serve as live documents, which will continue to inform the 
designing and development of future collection plans. Security management should 
engage with analysts for the development of collection plans. The analysis of 
security information by qualified analysts will help in the identification of the correct 
vulnerability areas, so that the most appropriate operational responses may be 
provided to mitigate the risks. Personnel responsible for analysis should be given the 
necessary computer hardware and software resources to perform their tasks 
effectively. There should be adequate resources for the analysis of security 
information. There is a need for analytical computer software programmes to assist 
analysts to generate innovative strategies and actionable information products. The 
organisational security strategy should indicate the type of hardware and software 
requirements to perform specific types of analysis. 
 
Analysts should be given continuous training to keep them updated with 
technological advancements. Data analysis capability should be established by all 
security service providers. The analysis of security information function should be 
closely managed by line management. Management should enjoy a relationship of 
trust with their analysts. Qualified analysts with operational experience should be 
utilised to design actionable information products, strategies, and recommendations 
for the PPS in consultation with the end users. Management should not interfere with 
the analysis function. 
 
The reliability of the information source should be assessed on criteria such as the 
previous quality of information supplied by the source, the situation, the location and 
likely access of the source at the time the information was collected. All security 
information received should be reviewed by data capturers or information managers. 
They are to ensure that the information is reliable, accurate and timely. The collected 
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security information should be tested to determine if the collected information is 
sufficient for the analyst to conduct the relevant analysis.  
 
There should be a collection capacity to assist the analysts to obtain missing 
information or any other information need to enrich the information on hand. The 
completed document with all the relevant information should be sent to the analyst. 
Standard operating procedures should help in the data mining of all the collected 
security information. This should help in overcoming the problem of information 
overload and overburdening analysts from achieving the organisational security 
strategy. The focus should be on threat and vulnerability information, as proactive 
action will result in the prevention of incidents from taking place. Methods used for 
the classification of information should be improved by enforcing a code of ethics 
among personnel and introducing information protection standards to control access 
where necessary. A standardised framework should be used for the analysis of 
security information. In this way all personnel will be aware of the analysis cycle and 
the process to be followed. 
 
The analysis report should be sent to management to make a decision on the 
implementation of the recommended security risk control measures.Security risk 
control measures should be implemented according to the organisational security 
strategy and the security plan. In this way decisions will be made to give priority to 
specific threats that were not previously addressed or possibly not identified as such. 
Implementation of security risk control measures should be done in accordance with 
the allocated budget. Costs should not be an impediment to address the threat, 
Money spent on security risk control measures should be regarded as an investment 
and not a cost, because the purpose is to protect life and property, prevent losses 
and to finally ensure business continuity. The aim, therefore, should be to reduce the 
threat with the available budget and not shelve the application of security risk control 
measures. 
 
In making a decision on the implementation of specific security risk control measures 
management must consider the security strategy, the security threats and the 
strategic objectives as identified in the organisational security strategy. In many 
instances security service providers use the reduction of crime, increase in detection 
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rates and the prevention of losses as the strategic objectives to decide on the 
implementation of the most appropriate security risk control measures. Security risk 
control measures should be considered for implementation in conjunction with the 
organisational security strategy and the security plan. The security risk control 
measures should be directed at addressing specific threats, vulnerabilities and the 
re-currence of incidents according to the security plan. 
 
The strategic objectives of the organisational security strategy should direct the 
implementation of the security risk control measures. The design of the security risk 
control measures should be considered by management. The security risk control 
measures should be designed to address the strategic objectives. To design a 
specific security risk control measure, the security practitioner must take into 
consideration the organisation’s operations and conditions define the threat and 
identify the target. Security risk control measures need to be designed to deter, 
detect, delay and respond to intrusions. Organisations need to safeguard themselves 
against incorrect and illegally obtained information which may be detrimental to the 
implementation of security risk control measures. Security risk control measures 
relating to crime should be immediately operationalised by the security personnel 
with the assistance of the SAPS. The sharing of information on security risk control 
measures should take place at the Community Police Forums and at special 
meetings held with SAPS. This will benefit the broader South African community by 
creating a much safer and secure environment. The challenge is for security 
managers to stay current on innovative design strategies. This knowledge should be 
coupled with the latest information on issues of changes in cultural values, crime, 
technology, market conditions and political conditions.  
 
The approved implementation of security risk control measure should be 
disseminated in a formalised manner. It should preferably be a written 
communication. Experienced security personnel should be used for the 
implementation of security risk control measures. Project management approach to 
be used in the implementation of security risk control measures. Resources should 
be made available for the implementation of security risk control measures. The 
design of the security risk control measure should be quantitatively or qualitatively 
evaluated for deterrence of the adversary, detection of the adversary, delay of the 
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adversary and response by security personnel. Some situations may require 
immediate action and prompt intervention. Some are cyclical, managerial and are 
amenable to technical solutions and problem solving methods. Others are chronic, 
endemic difficulties that require the application of strategies over time, to change 
conditions and move an organisation ahead. There should be regular communication 
between the analyst and the end user. The end user should be allowed to request 
additional analysis of the security risk control measure. There should be a formalised 
manner in dealing with feedback from the end-user. It should preferably be a written 
communication. There should be continuous monitoring and evaluation of the 
implemented security risk control measure by line management. A standardised 
framework should be used for the implementation of security risk control measures. 
In this way all personnel will be aware of the implementation cycle and the process 
to be followed. 
 
Government departments, employing contract security companies, and those with in-
house security services should have the Security Head as part of top management. 
The Security Head should be there to give strategic direction and guidance on 
security threats affecting the organisation, organisational security strategy, strategic 
objectives and the security plan. Top management should make a commitment in 
terms of budget and resources to address the identified threats confronting the 
organisation. The procedures outlined above should be followed in the 
implementation of the Security Information Management Model. 
 
The security industry should consult with academic institutions responsible for 
providing academic qualifications in security management to offer a qualification in 
security information management, so that the qualification in security information 
management becomes compulsory for employment of security officials.  
 
The Security Information process outlined above should be used to address 
legislative gaps in the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act No. 56 of 2001 and 
other related legislative frameworks.  
 
 
 
266 
8.5   RECOMMENDED SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MODEL 
 
The grounded theory indicates that there is the need for security officials to use a 
Security Information Management Model (SIMM) to manage security information. 
This theory was verified by conducting a self-administered questionnaire survey with 
security officials from different sectors of the security industry in Gauteng. Based on 
the findings, the researcher has come to a conclusion that ‘security officials need a 
Security Information Management Model to manage security information in the 
security industry’. The researcher proposes a Security Information Management 
Model as indicated in Paragraph 7.3. This model may be used as a standardised 
framework to manage security information in the security industry. The advantages 
of the model include the following: 
• The model is based on a common body of knowledge for security information 
management specifically suited for the security industry. It includes in-house 
private security service providers, contracted security service providers and 
also those who provide a security service to government departments. This 
model introduces a new dimension to the security industry in the sphere of 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures.  
 
• In the collection phase the model introduces the security practitioner to 
Strategic Planning, organisational security strategy, a security plan and a 
collection plan. These plans if implemented accordingly will help manage 
security information effectively and efficiently within a specific budget. In the 
analysis phase it introduces the security practitioner to the organisational 
security strategy, security plan, qualified analysts capability, key information 
needs, tasking to collect missing information, evaluation and interpretation 
and analysis results. Documents relevant to the analysis phase are the Threat 
Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and the Incident Pattern Analysis. 
These are ‘real-time’ live documents which can be continuously used by all 
levels of the security industry. The implementation of the security risk control 
measures phase reflects on the strategic objectives, design and the 
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implementation of security risk control measures. All of these are new 
concepts.  
 
• This SIMM relates to the collection of security information on threats, incidents 
and vulnerabilities and it is not confined to the identification of crime risks. The 
analyst is responsible to conduct a threat analysis, vulnerability analysis and 
incident pattern analysis to prepare an assessment of threats, vulnerabilities 
and incidents. The analyst should provide the analysis results with 
recommendations to the top management of the organisation/company which 
is being protected, to address specific threats, vulnerabilities and prevalent 
incidents to reduce crime, increase detection rates and prevent losses. 
Management may decide on how best to use the analysis result to develop a 
strategy, actionable crime information product or enhance its physical 
protection systems to achieve its objectives.  
 
• The SIMM model may be applied using the security information management 
cycle. The cycle includes three important stages, namely; the timely collection 
of security information on incidents, threats and vulnerabilities; the rapid 
analysis of security information, and the designing of strategies, actionable 
crime information products and physical protection systems to deter, detect, 
delay, and respond to an adversary. 
 
• The model provides a broad standardised framework, which needs to be 
entrenched in a policy framework supported by standard operating 
procedures for implementation. 
 
• The Threat Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment and the Incident Pattern 
Analysis documents will be introduced to the security industry by this model. 
Threat assessments are used by the WAP and SAPS to provide operational 
and strategic direction in policing. For the sake of this model and to avoid 
confusion with law enforcement, my suggestion is, that the threat assessment 
document, hereinafter be referred to as the ‘Security Threat Assessment’. All 
three of these documents will help guide the Security Head of an 
organisation/company to strategically manage threats, vulnerabilities and 
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incidents. These documents will also assist the Security Head in preparing a 
projection of costs for a security budget. They may also serve as base 
documents to conduct performance assessments of personnel.  
 
• The model also ensures that all role-players are made aware of the 
importance of security information. It involves all employees, security officials 
and customers to become involved in the collection of security information. 
 
• The strategic objectives of this model are to reduce crime, increase detection 
rates and prevent losses. The model encourages the sharing of security 
information with all stakeholders and role-players.  
 
• Government sectors may implement this model to manage security 
information, within their environment. 
 
• This model will aid government in bringing about changes to the Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Act, No.56 of 2001, so that security information 
may be stored at a central database for use by all registered security service 
providers and law enforcement.  
 
• Academia will able to use the model to develop a learning programme in 
security information management, so that education, training and 
development may be provided to security officers in the security industry. This 
will help in equipping security officers in knowledge and skills with the object 
of professionalising the security industry. 
 
The proposed model, however, has the following limitations: 
• It may be used to enhance service delivery to clients with the necessary 
adaptations. 
 
• It cannot be used to replace the UNISA developed Security Risk Management 
Model (SRMM). According to Blyth and Kovacich, (2006:43-50), Security Risk 
Management is the process of assessing risk, taking steps to reduce risks to 
an acceptable level and maintaining that level of risk. The Security Risk 
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Management Model as discussed in Paragraph 1.2.6 is the one being applied 
by most security risk managers within Gauteng. In this SRMM security (crime) 
risks are identified by conducting a risk analysis and security survey. Security 
risk control measures are identified to counteract the identified risks. A return-
on-investment exercise is undertaken to ensure that the security control 
measures are cost effective. A report containing findings and 
recommendations is submitted to top management of the company for a 
decision on the implementation of security measures. On approval by 
management the security measures are implemented and then tested by 
means of a penetration exercise (Rogers, 2008: 151-154). 
 
• It is not an intelligence driven model. It may, however, be used for that 
purpose with the necessary adaptations. 
 
• See Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 for the schematic representation of the SIMM 
model. 
 
8.6  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study provides a new approach towards improving security information 
management in the security industry. The limitations discussed in the above 
paragraph uncover potential areas for future research. Another area that will benefit 
from further research will be the Fusion Centres and War Rooms presently being 
used by private security and law enforcement. Further research should also be 
considered on the information flow to develop a ‘Security Threat Assessment.’ 
Research should include such issues as the use of digital technology for security 
officials in order to allow them to more efficiently electronically collect security 
information and have it electronically routed to control centres and the SAPS. Owing 
to the dynamic nature of security information management, more advanced security 
information management models should be continuously investigated. This will 
contribute towards professionalising the discipline.  
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8.7  CONCLUSION 
 
The Security Industry needs to create the right environment for the collection and 
analysis of security information to flourish, so that, security information is valued and 
understood. Security managers must be ready to respond to the outcomes of 
analysis, by designing appropriate security risk control measures for 
implementataion. The standardised framework proposed by the researcher will help 
regulate the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
the security risk control measures. The proposed standardised framework ought to 
be reinforced with a policy framework and standardised operating procedures. 
Monitoring and evaluation should be used to measure the success of the application 
of the security risk control measures. The findings and recommendations took into 
consideration the responses of the participants and the literature study for the 
purpose of reliability and validity. The researcher experienced limitations with regard 
to literature, and the voluntary participation of security official working at lower levels 
in the security industry. This was overcome by using national and international 
literature pertaining to law enforcement information and intelligence. The lower level 
participation of security officials were encouraged by their senior managers to 
participate in the study. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE USED FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
COVER LETTER 
 
UNISA 
PO BOX 392 
PRETORIA 0003 
Dear Participant/Respondent 
PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH PROJECT: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW  
I am currently a student in the Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice at the University of 
South Africa (UNISA), busy with my studies for a DLITT et PHIL (doctorate) degree in Criminology (Security Risk 
Management). My research title is “AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION and ANALYSIS OF SECURITY INFORMATION 
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN GAUTENG, 
SOUTH AFRICA”.  
I will be conducting an interview with you on the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures. The interview should take about an hour. 
The purpose of this research is to: 
The purpose of this research is to: 
• Evaluate the “security service environment” with reference to the status quo and the nature and extent of problems being 
experienced in the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures. 
• Explore literature and other sources to discover new knowledge that can be used to improve the existing methods of 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures.;  
• Apply the collected knowledge by formulating and developing recommendations with specific reference to solutions which 
will enhance the performance of the security service providers (and their security personnel) in the collection and analysis 
of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures.  
You are kindly requested to please answer all the questions that follow, as honestly as possible. All the collected information 
will be collated and analysed in order to develop an accurate picture for this research project. If you have any queries please 
feel free to ask for an explanation. You are not required to provide your name or any other form of identification. All responses 
and information received will be treated as confidential and the respondent’s identity will remain anonymous (i.e. anonymity is 
guaranteed, your identity will NOT be divulged to anyone).If you need any further verification or clarity of any other information, 
you can contact my supervisor Prof. Anthony Minnaar (Tel: 012-429 2160; Cell: 083 8949485; email: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za). 
Thank you for your time and participation! 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER Tel: (012 429-2164 Cell no: 082 8174111 Email: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
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APPENDIX 1:  INTERVIEW GUIDE USED FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED 
INTERVIEWS 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL 
MEASURES IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN GAUTENG, SOUTH AFRICA  
SECTION A: Collection of Security Information 
1. Do you have a policy for the collection of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
2. Who are tasked to collect security information in your organisation/company?  
3. What steps are followed for the collection of security information in your 
 organisation/company? 
4. What sources are used for the collection of security information in your 
organization/company?  
5.  What collection method/s does your organisation/company use to collect 
security information?  
6.  What types of security information are commonly collected in your 
organisation/company? 
7.  What levels of classification are commonly used for the protection of security 
information in your organisation/company? 
8.  What are the advantages of collecting security information in your 
organisation/company? 
9.  What are the disadvantages of collecting security information in your 
organisation/company? 
10.  What problems are experienced in the collection of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
11.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the collection of 
security information in your organisation/company? 
 
SECTION B: Analysis of Security Information  
12.  Do you have a policy for the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
13.  How is security information analysed in your organisation/company? 
14.  What steps do you follow in the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company?  
15. Which analysis products are commonly used by your organisation/company? 
16.  What are the advantages of analysing security information in your 
organisation/company? 
17.  What are the disadvantages of analysing security information in your 
organisation/company? 
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18.  What problems are experienced in the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company?  
19.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the analysis of 
security information in your organisation/company? 
 
SECTION C: Implementation of security risk control measures  
20.  Do you have a policy for the implementation of security risk control measures in 
your organisation/company? 
21.  How is security risk control measures applied in your organization/company? 
22.  Who are the intended users of the security risk control measures in your 
organisation/company? 
23.  How are the recommendations for the implementation of security risk control 
measures disseminated in your organisation/company? 
24.  Do you get feedback on the implementation of security risk control measures in 
your organisation/company? 
25.  What are the advantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures for your organisation/company? 
26.  What are the disadvantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures for your organisation/company? 
27.  What problems are experienced in the implementation of security risk control 
measures in your organisation/company? 
28.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the implementation 
of security risk control measures in your organisation/company? 
 
SECTION D: General 
29. Is there any other matters on the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures you want to discuss? 
 
Thank you for answering my questions. 
 
Reference number of respondent......................................... Date............................ 
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APPENDIX 2:  CONSENT FORM USED TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS 
CONSENT FORM 
 
I, (Name of respondent. PLEASE print 
legibly) Hereby agree to freely and voluntarily participate in the following DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) studies research project: 
 
TITLE: “AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL 
MEASURES IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN GAUTENG, SOUTH AFRICA”. 
 
1. By participating in the interview YES NO 
 
2. By granting permission to be audio taped YES NO 
 
3. By agreeing that the information I provide may be YES NO used in the research 
report 
 
I, Doraval Govender hereby agree to treat all information received from the 
respondent in a confidential manner and to preserve his/her anonymity (i.e. identity 
will NOT be divulged). 
 
Signed at Date:  
      
 
Signature of respondent: 
 
 
Signature of researcher:  
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APPENDIX 3:  PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
AT SAPS 
 
SECURITY SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(incorporating Security Risk Management) 
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A.deV. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-429 2160  Cell: 0838949485 
Fax: (+27)(0)12-429 6609  Fax2email: 0865190625 
e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
 Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
18 February 2010 
Mr Johan Schnetler 
Head: Strategic Management (Research) 
South African Police Service  
PRETORIA  
0001 
 
Dear Mr Schnetler 
 
RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN SAPS FOR PHD 
STUDIES  
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER, is currently busy with research for a DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) (Department of 
Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law). His 
research title is: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND 
UTILISATION OF SECURITY RISK INFORMATION IN GAUTENG.  
 
As part of his research for his doctoral studies Mr Govender would like to 
undertake research on the SAPS’ Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) as a 
comparative case study for the best practices used in the collection, analysis and 
utilisation of security risk information by the CIAC. In support of the application, I 
attach a copy of the approved research proposal.  
 
Accordingly we hereby request permission and your written approval to conduct 
this case study.  
 
Thanking you 
Regards 
  (Prof) 
A. de V. Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Science 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
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APPENDIX 5:  INTERVIEW GUIDE USED FOR FOCUS GROUP 
INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
COVER LETTER 
UNISA 
PO BOX 392 
PRETORIA 0003 
Dear Participant/Respondent 
PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH PROJECT: FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS  
I am currently a student in the Department of Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice at the University of 
South Africa (UNISA), busy with my studies for a DLITT et PHIL (doctorate) degree in Criminology (Security Risk 
Management). My research title is “AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY 
IN GAUTENG, SOUTH AFRICA”.  
I will be conducting a focus group interview with you on the collection and analysis of security information and the 
implementation of security risk control measures. The focus group interview should take about an hour. 
The purpose of this research is to: 
• Evaluate the “security service environment” with reference to the status quo and the nature and extent of problems being 
experienced in the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures. 
• Explore literature and other sources to discover new knowledge that can be used to improve the existing methods of 
collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures.  
• Apply the collected knowledge by formulating and developing recommendations with specific reference to solutions which 
will enhance the performance of the security service providers (and their security personnel) in the collection and analysis 
of security information and the implementation of security risk control measures.  
You are kindly requested to participate in the group interview, as honestly as possible. All the collected information will be 
collated and analysed in order to develop an accurate picture for this research project. If you have any queries please feel free 
to ask for an explanation. You are not required to provide your name or any other form of identification. All responses and 
information received will be treated as confidential and the respondent’s identity will remain anonymous (i.e. anonymity is 
guaranteed, your identity will NOT be divulged to anyone).If you want to exit the group interview, you may do so at any time 
during the group discussion. If you need any further verification or clarity of any other information, you can contact my 
supervisor Prof. Anthony Minnaar (Tel: 012-429 2160; Cell: 083 8949485; email: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za). 
Thank you for your time and participation! 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER Tel: (012 429-2164  Cell no: 082 8174111 Email: govend1@unisa.ac.za 
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APPENDIX 5:  INTERVIEW GUIDE USED FOR FOCUS GROUP 
INTERVIEWS 
 
FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL 
MEASURES IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN GAUTENG, SOUTH AFRICA  
 
SECTION A: Collection of Security Information 
1. Do you have a policy for the collection of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
2. Who are tasked to collect security information in your organisation/company?  
3.  What steps are followed for the collection of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
4. What sources are used for the collection of security information in your 
organization/company?  
5.  What collection method/s does your organisation/company use to collect 
security information?  
6.  What types of security information are commonly collected in your 
organisation/company? 
7.  What levels of classification are commonly used for the protection of security 
information in your organisation/company? 
8.  What are the advantages of collecting security information in your 
organisation/company? 
9.  What are the disadvantages of collecting security information in your 
organisation/company? 
10.  What problems are experienced in the collection of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
11.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the collection of 
security information in your organisation/company? 
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SECTION B: Analysis of Security Information  
 
12.  Do you have a policy for the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company? 
13.  How is security information analysed in your organisation/company? 
14.  What steps do you follow in the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company?  
15.  Which analysis products are commonly used by your organisation/company? 
16.  What are the advantages of analysing security information in your 
organisation/company? 
17.  What are the disadvantages of analysing security information in your 
organisation/company? 
18.  What problems are experienced in the analysis of security information in your 
organisation/company?  
19.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the analysis of 
security information in your organisation/company? 
 
SECTION C: Implementation of of security risk control measures  
 
20.  Do you have a policy for the implementation of security risk control measures in 
your organisation/company? 
21.  How is security risk control measures implemented in your 
organization/company? 
22.  Who are the intended users of the security risk control measures in your 
organisation/company? 
23.  How are the recommendations for the implementation of security risk control 
measures disseminated in your organisation/company? 
24.  Do you get feedback on the implementation of security risk control measures in 
your organisation/company? 
25.  What are the advantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures for your organisation/company? 
26.  What are the disadvantages of the implementation of security risk control 
measures for your organisation/company? 
27.  What problems are experienced in the implementation of security risk control 
measures in your organisation/company? 
28.  What solutions do you suggest to overcome the problems in the implementation 
of security risk control measures in your organisation/company? 
 
SECTION D: General 
 
29.  Is there any other matters on the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures you want to discuss? 
 
Thank you for answering my questions. 
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APPENDIX 6:  PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
AT SABRIC  
 
 
SECURITY SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(incorporating Security Risk Management) 
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A.deV. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-429 2160  Cell: 0838949485 
Fax: (+27)(0)12-429 6609  Fax2email: 0865190625 
e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
 Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
18 February 2010 
Ms Kalyani Pillay 
CEO: SABRIC 
PO Box 3682 
Halfway House 1685 
GAUTENG, MIDRAND 
 
Dear Ms Pillay 
 
RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON SABRIC FOR 
PHD STUDIES 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER, is currently busy with research for a DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) (Department of 
Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law). His 
research title is: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND 
UTILISATION OF SECURITY RISK INFORMATION IN GAUTENG.  
 
As part of his research Mr Govender would like to undertake research on a case 
study on the best practices used in the collection, analysis and utilisation of 
security risk information by SABRIC. In support of the application, I attach a copy 
of the approved research proposal.  
 
Accordingly we hereby request permission and your written approval to conduct 
this case study.  
 
Thanking you 
Regards 
 
   (Prof) 
A. de V. Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Science 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
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APPENDIX 8:  PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
AT CGRI 
 
 
SECURITY SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(incorporating Security Risk Management) 
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A.deV. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-429 2160  Cell: 0838949485 
Fax: (+27)(0)12-429 6609  Fax2email: 0865190625 
e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
 Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
 27 May 2010 
Mr Michael Broughton 
Manager: Crime Prevention Programme 
Consumer Goods Council (CGCSA) 
PO Box 41417  
Craighall 2024 
 
CC: Mr James Oosthuizen 
Manager: Crime Prevention Strategies 
Consumer Goods Council (CGC) 
 
Dear Mr Broughton 
 
RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON CONSUMER 
GOODS COUNCIL of SOUTH AFRICA (CGCSA) FOR PHD STUDIES 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER, is currently busy with research for a DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) (Department of 
Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law). His 
research title is: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND 
UTILISATION OF SECURITY RISK INFORMATION IN GAUTENG.  
 
As part of his research Mr Govender would like to undertake research on a case 
study on the best practices used in the collection, analysis and utilisation of 
security risk information by the Consumer Goods Council (CGCSA). In support of 
the application, I attach a copy of the approved research proposal.   
 
Accordingly we hereby request permission and your written approval to conduct 
this case study research on the CGCSA.  
Thanking you 
Regards 
(Prof) 
A. de V. Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Science 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
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APPENDIX 10:  PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
AT PSI 
 
 
SECURITY SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(incorporating Security Risk Management) 
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A.deV. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-429 2160  Cell: 0838949485 
Fax: (+27)(0)12-429 6609  Fax2email: 0865190625 
e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
 Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
 
27 May 2010 
Mr M. Myburgh 
Manager: Security & Crime Prevention 
c/o South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) 
PO Box 783482  
Sandton 2146 
South Africa 
 
Dear Mr Myburgh 
 
RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (SAPIA) FOR PHD STUDIES 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER, is currently busy with research for a DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) (Department of 
Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law). His 
research title is: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND 
UTILISATION OF SECURITY RISK INFORMATION IN GAUTENG.  
 
As part of his research Mr Govender would like to undertake research on a case 
study on the best practices used in the collection, analysis and utilisation of 
security risk information by the South African Petroleum Industry Association 
(SAPIA). In support of the application, I attach a copy of the approved research 
proposal.  
 
Accordingly we hereby request permission and your written approval to conduct 
this case study research on SAPIA.  
 
Thanking you 
Regards 
  (Prof) 
A. de V. Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Science 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
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APPENDIX 12:  PERMISSION REQUEST LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
IN PERTH, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
 
SECURITY SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(incorporating Security Risk Management) 
DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY & SECURITY SCIENCE 
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLEGE OF LAW  
Prof. A.deV. Minnaar  
Tel: (+27) (0)12-429 2160  Cell: 0838949485 
Fax: (+27)(0)12-429 6609  Fax2email: 0865190625 
e-mail: aminnaar@unisa.ac.za 
Muckleneuk Campus 
Preller St 
 Muckleneuk Ridge, Pretoria 
PO Box 392 
UNISA 0003 
City of Tshwane 
Gauteng, South Africa 
 
21 January 2011 
Dr David Brooks 
School of Computing & Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup, Perth 
Western Australia 
 
Dear Dr Brooks 
 
RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH SUPPORT DURING MR D. GOVENDER’S 
RESEARCH TRIP TO ECU, 8-29 MAY 2011  
 
As discussed with you please see below the detailed information and formal request 
for assistance from you and ECU for Mr Govender’s Phd research studies. 
 
Mr DORAVAL GOVENDER, is currently busy with research for a DLitt et Phil 
(doctorate) registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA) (Department of 
Criminology & Security Science, School of Criminal Justice, College of Law). His 
research title is: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND 
UTILISATION OF SECURITY RISK INFORMATION IN GAUTENG.  
 
As part of his research Mr Govender would like to undertake research interviews, 
focusing on the best practices used in the collection, analysis and utilisation of 
security risk information by security practitioners in Western Australia. In 
addition, he would like your assistance in identifying suitable 
persons/practitioners and the setting up of such meetings during the period (8-29 
May 2011) he will be spending in Western Australia based at your Department. In 
support of this request, please find attached a copy of the approved research 
proposal.   
 
Thanking you 
Regards 
(Prof) 
A. de V. Minnaar 
Programme Head: Security Science 
Department of Criminology & Security Science 
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law 
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APPENDIX 14: SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN 
 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: SECURITY SERVICE PERSONNEL 
RESEARCH PROJECT: AN EVALUATION OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES IN THE 
SECURITY INDUSTRY, IN GAUTENG, SOUTH AFRICA  
Instructions: 
Please answer all the questions as honestly as possible. The information collected for this 
study will be collated and analysed in order to form an accurate picture of this research 
project on the collection and analysis of security information and the implementation of 
security risk control measures in Gauteng, South Africa. It will assist the researcher to make 
findings and propose recommendations to improve security information management in the 
security industry. You do not need to identify yourself and, similarly, the researcher will 
uphold anonymity in that there will be no possibility of any respondent being identified or 
linked in any way to the research findings in the final research report. Where required please 
indicate your answer with a cross (X) in the appropriate box or write a response in the space 
provided, using a black ballpoint pen. For the open-ended questions, please write your 
responses clearly and legibly in the space provided. If there is not sufficient space for your 
response please number a blank sheet of paper with the question number and continue 
writing your response on the extra piece of paper. 
 
SECTION A: (Demographic details)  
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
The following questions are for statistical purposes only. 
 
1. Gender:  
Male 1  
Female 2  
2. Age:  
16─20 years  1  
21─25 years 2  
26─30 years 3  
31─35 years 4  
36─40 years 5  
41─45 years 6  
46─50 years 7  
51 years and above 8  
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3. Race:  
Indian  1  
Asian (other than Indian) 2  
Black 3  
Coloured 4  
White 5  
 
4. Educational qualification: 
 
Standard 8/Grade 10 and below 1  
Standard 9/Grade 11  2  
Standard 10/Grade 12 3  
Certificate 4  
Diploma (1 year) 5  
Diploma (2 years)  6  
Diploma (3 years) 7  
Advanced diploma 8  
Degree 9  
Postgraduate degree 10  
 
SECTION B: (Security service details) 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
5. Security service working experience in the private security industry: 
 
1 year and below 1  
1─2 years 2  
2─3 years 3  
3─4 years 4  
4─5 years 5  
5─10 years 6  
10 years and above 7  
 
6. Security service position occupied at present: 
 
Security guard 1  
Patrol officer 2  
Investigator 3  
Security officer 4  
Administration official 5  
Trainer 6  
Supervisor 7  
Manager 8  
Other (Specify)   
 9  
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7. Security service work with which you are involved at present: 
Protecting or safeguarding a person or property 1  
Giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of a person or property, on any type of 
security service, or on the use of security equipment 
2  
Providing a reactive or responsive service in connection with the safeguarding of a 
person or property 
3  
Providing a service aimed at ensuring order and safety on the premises used for 
sporting, recreational, entertainment or similar purposes 
4  
Manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising monitoring devices contemplated in 
section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 
5  
Performing the functions of an investigator 6  
Providing security training or instruction to a security service provider 7  
Installing, servicing or repairing security equipment 8  
Monitoring signals of transmissions from electronic security equipment 9  
Performing the functions of a locksmith 10  
Making a person or the services of a person available, whether directly or indirectly, for 
the rendering of any security service 
11  
Managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of any security-related services  12  
Control room operator 13  
Other (Specify)   
 14  
 15  
 
 
8. Security service sector with which you are involved at present (mark one): 
City and metropolitan councils 1  
Transport services (rail, road, marine, aviation) 2  
Public services entities (Telkom, Eskom, post office, hospitals, other parastatals) 3  
Protection services (military, air force, intelligence services, correctional services, other 
government departments) 
4  
Financial and insurance institutions 5  
Industrial sector 6  
Mining sector 7  
Retail sectors (shops, casinos, shopping centres and hotels) 8  
Private security contract companies 9  
In-house security (university, complex, etc.) 10  
Other (Specify)   
 11  
 12  
 
 
9. Security service training which you have undergone: 
Patrol security officer (grade E) 1  
Access control officer (grade D) 2  
Asset and reaction officer (grade C) 3  
Security first-line supervision (grade B) 4  
Security supervisor (grade A) 5  
Risk management (risk analysis, security survey, risk assessment) 6  
Security threat assessment 7  
Firearm handling 8  
Emergency preparedness training 9  
Fire risk assessment training  10  
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Occupational health and safety training 11  
Specialised security training 12  
Specialised investigation training  13  
Collection of security risk information 14  
Analysis of security risk information  15  
Utilisation of security risk information 16  
Intelligence training 17  
Other (Specify)   
 18  
 19  
 20  
 
SECTION C: (Collection of security information) 
 
 
Mark with a cross (x) either the “Agree” or “Do not agree” block at each response option. 
 
 
 Agree  Do not agree 
10. “Security information” relates to information which may expose an 
individual/group or a stable, relatively predictable environment to the 
chance or probability of injury or loss.  
 
1 2 
11. “Collection (gathering)” is the act of gathering information that will 
be used to mitigate security risks. 
1 2 
12. “Overt means (open source techniques)” of collecting security 
information takes place inter alia through personal interaction with 
people (complainants, witnesses, victims, suspects, law 
enforcement personnel, clients and the general public), public 
agencies and institutions, mass media (internet, television, radio, 
literature, newspapers, academic public reports), public databases, 
maps, government public information, libraries, private companies, 
scenes of crimes/incidents.  
 
1 2 
13. “Covert means (closed source techniques)” of collecting security 
information takes place through agents, agent handlers, informants, 
surveillance officers, undercover operatives, monitoring and 
interception personnel, etc.  
 
1 2 
14. “Internal security information sources” include pocket book 
entries, occurrence book entries, statements, risk analysis reports, 
security survey reports, security risk solutions reports, security risk 
management reports, approved security measures reports, 
investigation reports, crime incident reports, loss reports, field 
interview report cards, suspicious activity reports, forensic reports, 
fingerprint reports, selected calls for service, arrest reports, traffic 
citations, admissions from arrestees, intelligence files, etc. 
 
1 2 
15. “External security information sources” include incident database 
reports under the control of other institutions and agencies, for 
example banks, government departments, private security providers, 
informers, the mass media, embassies, the public, community police 
forums, the e-natis database, cellphone providers, etc. 
 
1 2 
16. “Collection plan” is a formally defined approach, describing the 
information needed and the means of acquiring it. 
1 2 
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Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
17. How do you regard your knowledge about the collection of security information? 
 
Excellent 1  
Good 2  
Average 3  
Poor 4  
Very poor 5  
 
 
18.  Do you need permission from your supervisor/manager to collect security information on 
behalf of your organisation/company?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
19. Do you understand the steps to be followed when collecting security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
20. In the space provided, outline all the steps to be followed when collecting security 
information. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
 
21. Have you previously collected security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
22. Do you collect security information whenever a situation presents itself? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
23.  Have you previously collected security information by making use of a ‘collection plan’?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
24. If you answered “Yes” to question 23, what kind of collection plan did you use?  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
 
25.  Please indicate if you have previously received security information in any of the 
following situations?  
 
Voluntary information from a third party 1  
Information about a crime/incident from a victim/complainant 2  
Information while investigating a crime/incident 3  
Information while at a crime/incident scene from observers 4  
Information from informants 5  
Information through interaction with clients 6  
Information through interaction with personnel  7  
Information through interaction with the general public 8  
Information while investigating a suspicious activity report 9  
Forums (explosives, illegal mining forum, illegal special metals forum) 10  
Other (Specify)   
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 
 
26. Please indicate if you have previously used any of the following method/s to gather 
security information: 
 
Physical surveillance (observation, tailing, etc.) 1  
Electronic surveillance (cameras, biometrics, hi-tech, etc.) 2  
Research (external sources for example South African police, Home affairs, etc.)  3  
Internal audit (internal sources for example risk analysis, security survey, etc.)  4  
Forensics  5  
Undercover  6  
Interviews (briefing, debriefing, etc.) 7  
Interrogations 8  
Hacking into computer databases for information 9  
Other (Specify)   
 10  
 11  
 
 
27. In the past month, how many times did you personally collect security information? 
 
0 1  
1─5 times 2  
6─10 times 3  
11─20 times 4  
Over 20 times 5  
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28.  Please indicate the type of security information you personally collected during the past 
month:  
 
Crime threats 1  
Company policy breaches/violations, etc. 2  
Physical security breaches 3  
Electronic security breaches 4  
Other (Specify)   
 5  
 6  
 
29.  Please indicate the item that best describes how you handled the collected security 
information: 
 
Informed immediate manager/supervisor 1  
Informed the unit that handles all collected information  2  
Informed the analysis unit  3  
Informed the investigation unit  4  
Entered the information into an electronic database (computer) 5  
Recorded information in the control room OB  6  
Recorded information in personal pocket book  7  
Recorded information in an incident register 8  
Informed the supervisor on the duty parade  9  
Utilised information to perform task 10  
Forwarded the information to law enforcement 11  
Forwarded the information to human resource management for disciplinary 
investigations 
12  
Did nothing with the information 13  
Other (Specify)   
 14  
 
30.  Are there security measures in place in your organisation/company for the protection of 
information (data)? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
31.  If you answered “Yes” to question 30 please indicate which of the following information 
(data) protection measures are being used by your organisation/company: 
 
Information Protection Act 1  
Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) approved by Cabinet 2  
Organisation/company policy on the classification of information, for example 
confidential, secret, restricted  
3  
Access to the information database is not allowed to employees below management 4  
Access is allowed on a need-to-know basis 5  
Access to Information Act 6  
Security clearance to access classified information  7  
Other (Specify)   
 8  
 9  
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32. Does your organisation/company have the necessary resources to collect  
  security information?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
33.  Does your organisation/company store the collected security information in a database? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
34.  If you answered “Yes” to question 33, in which database is the collected security 
information stored? 
 
Electronic database (computer system) 1  
Manual database (handwritten in a register, document, etc.) 2  
Both electronically and manually 3  
 
 
35.  If the collected security information is stored in a database (computer or manual), who is 
responsible for entering the data onto the database?  
 
Self 1  
Data typist 2  
Data analyst 3  
Clerk 4  
Admin official 5  
Data administrator 6  
Investigating officer 7  
Supervisors 8  
Security managers 9  
 
 
36.  Please indicate what kind of database the person indicated above inputs the information 
into: 
 Computer Manual Combination of both 
Self 1  10  19  
Data typist 2  11  20  
Data analyst 3  12  21  
Clerk 4  13  22  
Admin official 5  14  23  
Data administrator 6  15  24  
Investigating officer 7  16  25  
Supervisors 8  17  26  
Security managers 9  18  27  
 
 
37.  Do you ever get feedback from your supervisor/manager on the security information 
collected by you?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
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38. If you answered “Yes” to question 37, how frequently do you receive such feedback? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
39. Have you previously experienced any problems in the collection of security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
40.  If you answered “Yes” to question 39, please indicate the nature and extent of the 
problems (shortcomings) experienced in the collection of security information. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
41.  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems (shortcomings) you encountered 
as indicated in question 40? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
42.  Do you think the collection of security information can be improved in your 
organisation/company?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
43.  What recommendations do you suggest for improving the collection of security 
information in your organisation/company? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
SECTION D: (Analysis of security information)  
 
 
Mark with a cross (x) either the “Agree” or “Do not agree” block at each response option. 
 
 
 Agree  Do not 
agree 
44. “Evaluation (verification) of security information” is the assessment of the 
reliability of the source and the quality of the information.  
1 2 
45. “Collation of the security information” is the sorting, indexing and storing of 
information into a format from which it can be retrieved and analysed.  
1 2 
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46. “Analysis of the security information” involves the careful examination of 
the information to discover its meaning and essential features. 
1 2 
47. “Operational analysis” provides day-to-day information to assist operational 
personnel in the identification of specific and immediate security risks. These 
include, but are not limited to, syndicate networks, individuals or groups 
involved in unlawful activities: methods used (modus operandi, or MO); 
specific details about the capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities and 
intentions of the likely perpetrators; and their sources of support and finance. 
1 2 
48. “Strategic analysis” is concerned with long-range problems and projections 
of long-term increases or decreases in security risks. It provides the 
organisation/company with an overview of criminal capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, trends and intentions.  
1 2 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
49. Have you previously evaluated (verified) security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
50. Have you previously collated security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
51. How do you regard your knowledge about the analysis of security information? 
 
Excellent 1  
Good 2  
Average 3  
Poor 4  
Very poor 5  
 
52. Do you know how to analyse security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
53. Have you previously analysed security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
54.  If you answered “Yes” to question 53, please indicate which of the following stages of the 
analysis process you have previously been involved with: 
 
Identifying assets (people, material, legalities) deserving of protection 1  
Identifying the security risks to the assets  2  
Estimating the probability that security risks will materialise 3  
Estimating the impact of security risks occurrences 4  
Estimating the frequency of event occurrences 5  
Assessment of the manageability of security risks 6  
Identification of countermeasures that will prevent or mitigate security risks 
occurrences 
7  
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55. Who in your organisation/company is tasked by the analysts to obtain additional 
information to enrich the collected information? 
 
Self 1  
Supervisors  2  
Security managers  3  
Risk managers  4  
Investigators 5  
Crime risk officers  6  
Collection unit 7  
Information/intelligence unit 8  
 
 
56. Have you previously experienced any problems in the analysis of security information? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
57.  If you answered “Yes” to question 56, please indicate the nature and extent of the 
problems (shortcomings) you encountered when analysing security information. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
58.  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems (shortcomings) you encountered 
as indicated in question 57? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
59. Do you think the analysis of security information can be improved in your 
organisation/company?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
60. What recommendations do you suggest for improving the analysis of security information? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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SECTION E: (Implementation of security risk control measures) 
 
 
Mark with a cross (x) either the “Agree” or “Do not agree” block at each response option. 
 
  
 Agree  Do not 
agree 
61. “Dissemination” is the release of the “results of the analysis” to the 
intended user under certain conditions and protocols, usually based on the 
security classification of the information and the security clearance of the 
user.  
1 2 
62. “Implementation” refers to the use of the “results of the analysis” to target 
a specific security risk with the object of reducing or eliminating it. 
1 2 
63. “Strategic application” refers to the strategic application of the results of 
the analysis in order to allow for the formulation of organisational policies 
and plans to mitigate security risks. 
1 2 
64. “Operational application” is aimed at directly meeting the 
organisation/company objectives and responsibilities, by focusing on 
security risks, individuals and modus operandi.  
1 2 
65. “Feedback” is defined as information resulting from the establishment of 
formal and informal communication processes implemented to determine 
the accuracy, reliability, validity, timeliness and overall usefulness of the 
results of the analysis. 
1 2 
66. “Evaluation” is the cooperative review of the security risk to determine if it 
has been reduced or eliminated. 
1 2 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
67. Indicate the “analysis result” provided to you:  
 
Profiles 1  
Security assessments  2  
Target analysis reports  3  
Statistical analysis reports 4  
Crime analysis reports 5  
Security risk mitigating strategies/products 6  
Security awareness products 7  
Alerts 8  
Other (Specify)   
 9  
 10  
   
 
68. Indicate in what manner (way) the “analysis result” was communicated to you: 
 
Briefings  1  
Meetings  2  
Handouts  3  
Reports 4  
Other (Specify)   
 5  
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69.  Have you previously encountered any problems in the communicating of the “ analysis 
result ” to you? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
70.  If you answered “Yes” to question 69, please indicate the nature and extent of the 
problems (shortcomings) experienced in the dissemination of the “analysis result” to you. 
  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
71.  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems (shortcomings) indicated in 
question 70? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
72.  Have you in the past provided feedback to the analysts on the implementation of the 
“analysis result” information provided (disseminated) to you? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
73.  If you answered “Yes” to question 72, please indicate the type of feedback you provided 
to the analysts. 
 
Formal (feedback forms, etc.) 1  
Informal (informal discussions) 2  
Both (formal and informal) 3  
Other (Specify   
 4  
 5  
 6  
 
 
74.  Have you previously experienced any problems (shortcomings) in the implementation of 
the “analysis result ” that was provided to you? 
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
75.  If you answered “Yes” to question 74, please indicate the nature and extent of the 
problems (shortcomings) experienced in the implementation of the “analysis result”. 
  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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76.  What solutions do you suggest for solving the problems (shortcomings) indicated in 
question 75? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate selected blank block with an “X”. 
 
 
 
77.  Do you think the implementation of security risk control measures can be improved in 
your organisation/company?  
 
Yes No 
1  2  
 
 
78.  What recommendations do you suggest for improving the implementation of security risk 
control measures in your organisation/company? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
SECTION F: (General) 
 
79.  Please indicate any other matters on the collection and analysis of security information 
and the implementation of security risk control measures you wish to discuss. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Thank you for answering my questions. 
 
Reference number of respondent......................................... Date............................ 
 
 
 
